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I. INTRODUCTION
In this survey, the Notre Dame Lawyer presents an analysis of selected legal
problems facing the banking industry today. Its purpose is twofold: to objec-
tively delineate the nature and extent of these problems, and to contribute in
some way to their solution.
II. CONFLICTS WrrIHIN THE FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM
A. Conflicts Between the Federal Regulatory Agencies - Comptroller of the
Currency v. Federal Reserve Board v. FDIC
1. Introduction
There can be little doubt that the strength of the nation's commercial bank-
ing system has a major effect on the progress of the country's economy. As a
[June 1967]
result, problems within that system can, and should, be a cause of concern to
all, and not merely to those involved in the banking business. It is for this rea-
son that the disputes that have arisen during the past few years between the
Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency have received a
great deal of publicity and attention, in some cases perhaps more than was
deserved. The development of these disputes, however, should not be surprising,
for it was an almost inevitable result of the very structure of the federal apparatus
for bank supervision. Under the present supervisory system, national banks are
subject primarily to the supervision of the Comptroller of the Currency as the
administrator of the National Bank Act." But, since all national banks are also
members of the Federal Reserve System, they are subject to a certain amount
of supervision by the Federal Reserve Board, the administrative body of the
Federal Reserve Act 2 This overlapping authority has frequently led to incon-
sistent regulatory policies, to such an extent that one prominent attorney regards
the resulting confusion in the banking system as having reached "an all-time
high."' This confusion has been assailed as a "bureaucratic mess,"" a "hodge-
podge,"' and the "tangled web of banking supervision."6  The disputes that
have given rise to these appellations are the subject of the first part of this sur-
vey. The origins of these controversies will be analyzed and determinations
made as to their present status. It is hoped that this will thereby pave the way
for their solutions.
2. Corporate Savings Deposits
According to the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System is authorized to define the terms "demand
deposits," "time deposits," and "savings deposits."7 Pursuant to this authority,
the Board has defined a savings deposit to include funds deposited to the credit
of a corporation operated primarily for religious, charitable, philanthropic, or
other similar purposes, but not those deposited to the credit of a corporation
operated for profit.8 A demand deposit has been defined to include every deposit
that is not a time or savings deposit.' The classification is of importance because
federal banking law forbids the payment of interest on demand deposits by any
bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System.' Member banks cannot,
then, pay interest on funds deposited by profit-making corporations, unless these
funds take the form of a "time deposit." And since time deposits are only avail-
1 Rev. Stat. §§ 5133-56 (1875) '(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
3 Hacldey, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. Rav. 565, 568 (1966).
4 Bank Regulation at a Crossroad, 123 FINANCIAL WORLD 14 (1965).
5 Hearings on thd Proposed'Federal Banking Commission and Federal Deposit and Sav-
ings Insurance Board Before the Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 174 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on Proposed Federal Banking Commission].
6 Moorhead, Federal Chartering Slowed by Bank Supervision Dispute, 199 THE Com-
MERcIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 2148, 2149 (1964).
7 80 Stat. 823, 12 U.S.C.A. § 461(a) (Supp. 1966).
8 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(e)(1)(i) (1963).
9 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(a) (1963). Time deposits are "time certificates of deposit" and
"time deposits, open account." 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(b) (1963).
10 Federal Reserve Act, 49 Stat. 714 (1935), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1964).
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able in very substantial denominations, only large corporations are able to get
a return on their idle funds from a member bank. This leads to the result that
member banks are unable to attract most corporate accounts, since they naturally
flow to those institutions that can accept corporate savings deposits, i.e., mutual
savings banks and savings and loan associations."
Primarily because of this discrimination between large and small corpora-
tions and between commercial banks and the other financial institutions, in
December 1963, the then Comptroller of the Currency, James J. Saxon, issued
an interpretation amending the Code of Federal Regulations. The interpreta-
tion declared that national banks can accept savings accounts from any class
of depositor, including profit-making corporations.' According to the Comp-
troller's rationale, the authority possessed by the Board under the Federal Reserve
Act to define time and savings deposits extends only to the terms of the deposit
contract. There is nothing contained in the act that "would preclude, or would
authorize a regulation which would preclude, the maintenance of such accounts
by any class of depositor."" Thus, a national bank can, subject to certain limita-
tions, "accept savings accounts without regard to whether the funds deposited
are to the credit of one or more individuals, or of a corporation, association, or
other organization, whether operated for profit or otherwise."' 4
The Board of Governors reacted quickly to the Comptroller's new interpre-
tation by issuing an interpretation of its own in which it reaffirmed its statutory
authority to define time and savings deposits. It went on to flatly state that
a deposit by a corporation operated for profit may not be classified by any
member bank, including a national bank, as a savings deposit. Unless such
a deposit comes within the definition of a "time deposit' it would consti-
tute a demand deposit under Part 217 and payment of interest on such
deposit by a national bank would violate the prohibition of the law against
payment of interest on demand deposits.' 5
To put force behind its interpretation, the Board further pointed out that failure
of a bank to comply with the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act could lead
to the imposition of severe penalties, since such failure constitutes grounds
for instituting legal proceedings to close the bank, and since any director who
participates in a violation of the act could be personally liable for any damages
sustained by the bank, its shareholders, or any other persons as a result of the
violation. 6
The Comptroller was not without comment on the Board's new interpre-
tation and soon thereafter wrote all national banks reaffirming his position
regarding the Board's authority to define the terms in question. He also asserted
that the Board has no authority to impose any penalty for failure to comply with
its unauthorized regulation; that the penalties of charter forfeiture and personal
liability of directors cannot be applied to the enforcement of the invalid regu-
11 Pending Problem: Savings Accounts for Businesses, Banking, April 1964, p. 122.
12 12 C.F.R. § 7.8 (Supp. 1966).
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 12 C.F.R. § 217.135(d) (Supp. 1966).
16 12 O.F.R. § 217.135(e) (Supp. 1966).
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lation; that these penalties can only be imposed as a result of a suit brought by
the Comptroller; and that, under these circumstances, he would have an affirma-
tive duty not to bring such a suit."' He also sent a letter to the Chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee stating that "national bank examination reports
will not take exception to, note, or criticize actions which are in accordance with
the Comptroller's interpretation of the national banking laws." 8
Valid arguments can certainly be made for both sides with regard to the
advisability of permitting commercial banks to accept corporate savings accounts.
In support of such permission, for example, it has been asserted that the accep-
tance of these accounts will enable member banks to compete more effectively
with other financial institutions; will enable small businesses to receive a return
on idle funds from commercial banks as well as from these other institutions;
will help to improve community relations with small businesses; and will cause
an inflow of deposits to these banks from new customers, which, despite a pos-
sible temporary decline in earnings due to the necessity of paying interest on
savings deposits, should prove to have a favorable effect on the banks. 9 On
the other hand, it can be argued that corporate savings accounts will tend to
increase operating costs, thereby causing a reduction in earnings (this reduction
in turn making it harder for the banks to raise additional capital), and that
the accounts will be more volatile than savings deposits held by individuals.
They will be more like demand deposits than true savings deposits. This in-
creased volatility will either require the bank to seek greater liquidity than would
be required in the case of customary savings deposits or may induce the bank
to permit riskier loans, thereby increasing its risk of loss.2"
This particular conflict surely does present serious problems for the bankers
involved, who must either forgo the profits to be derived from these accounts
or risk the penalties threatened by the Board, despite the Comptroller's assurances
that these penalties will not be imposed. It is not surprising to find that the fear
of sanctions has kept many bankers from accepting corporate savings accounts.2"
Though motivated by fear, these bankers would seem to be following the proper
course. In the light of the express statutory authority of the Board to define
time and savings deposits, it is difficult to see the justification for the Comptroller's
action in this area. His interpretation of the statute is without legal merit.
Though the policy arguments in favor of permitting member banks to accept
these deposits might very well outweigh the Board's arguments in opposition,
the fact nevertheless remains that, under the law, the decision as to the accepta-
bility of these deposits is the Board's, not the Comptroller's.'
3. Loans to Executive Officers
The Federal Reserve Act prohibits any executive officer of a member bank
17 Bratter, Index to Confusion, Banking, March 1964, p. 57.
18 Id. at 119.
19 Pending Problem: Savings Accounts for Businesses, Banking, April 1964, p. 122.
20 Ibid.
21 Note, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve Board, 65 CoLUm. L. REv. 660, 662, (1965).
22 The action of the Comptroller with regard to corporate savings accounts was also
contrary to the recommendations made by his Advisory Committee. See ADvIsORY COMMITTEE
ON BANKING, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE FUTURE 127 (1962).
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from becoming indebted to any member bank of which he is an executive officer.
However, with the prior approval of a majority of the entire board of directors,
a member bank may extend credit to an executive officer thereof in an amount
not to exceed $2,500." The same section of the act also authorizes the Board
of Governors to define the term "executive officer," to determine what shall be
deemed an indebtedness, and to prescribe any regulations necessary to effectuate
the provisions of the section. Pursuant to this authorization, the Board issued
its Regulation 0, in which it defined an executive officer as
every officer of a member bank who participates or has authority to par-
ticipate in the operating management of the bank or any branch thereof
otherwise than in the capacity of a director of the bank, regardless of
whether he has an official title or whether his title contains a designation
of assistant and regardless of whether he is serving without salary or other
compensation.
24
In December 1963, in response to a question from many national banks as to
whether title alone determines if an individual is an executive officer, Comp-
troller Saxon issued his interpretation of the meaning of the term. He felt that,
as contemplated by the Federal Reserve Act, an executive officer is any officer
of a bank who, "by virtue of his position, has both voice in the formulation of
the policy of the bank and responsibility for the implementation of such
policy."2 According to his definition, just as with the Board's, a person who
acts solely as a director would not be considered an executive officer. Also,
one whose sole responsibility is the administration of bank policy is eliminated
from that category.2" In short, the basic theory behind the Comptroller's inter-
pretation is that "it is the responsibility of and function performed by the indi-
vidual, and not his title, which determines whether he is an 'executive officer.' "27
His definition led the Comptroller to conclude that ordinarily the president,
principal vice-president, and cashier are executive officers, though officers with
other titles who perform the same functions ordinarily performed by these three
officers are also to be regarded as such.2" The Board, on the other hand,
assumed that the chairman of the board, the president, every vice president,
the cashier, secretary, treasurer and trust officer of a member bank are execu-
tive officers, unless it is provided by resolution of the board of directors or
the bank's by-laws that any such officer is not authorized to participate in
the operating management of the bank and he does not actually participate
therein.
2 9
The reasoning behind the Comptroller's interpretation was not compli-
cated. He recognized the fact that banks, unlike most other businesses, often
have a large number of employees who, for reasons such as additional prestige
in dealing with the public, are executives in name only. In his opinion, a defini-
23 53 Stat. 842 (1939), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 375a (1964).
24 12 C.F.R. § 215.1(b) (1963).
25 12 C.F.R. § 7.9 (Supp. 1966).
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 12 C.F.R. § 7.9(b) (Supp. 1966).
29 12 C.F.R. § 215.1(b) (1963).
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tion in any other terms than his own would deprive "many bank employees of
the opportunity of obtaining their home mortgage, automobile loan, and other
normal borrowing needs from the bank for which they work" and would deprive
"the bank of business from its employees who cannot influence their own loan
applications." 1 This last point lends what Mr. Saxon regarded as realism to
his approach, for he pointed out that the true purpose of the applicable Federal
Reserve Act provision is to prevent individuals from influencing their own loan
applications. If an officer cannot exert this influence, the Comptroller felt
that he should not be subject to the borrowing limitation.
It has been asserted, quite legitimately when the definitions are considered
together, that the Comptroller's standards for determining an executive officer
"do not appear to be substantially at variance with the standards set forth in
the regulations issued by the Federal Reserve System."33 Though this might
well be true, it seems equally valid to hold that the Comptroller, by the issuance
of his own definition, implied that the Board's definition is improper. His defini-
tion showed that he intended to construe the term "more liberally" with respect
to loans by national banks to their officers than it was construed by the Board
with respect to such loans by state member banks." Here again, though the
Comptroller's formulation might be the more desirable, it is the Board and not
the Comptroller that has been given the power to define this particular term.
The Comptroller seemed to recognize this sub silentio during the 1965 hearings
on the consolidation of bank supervisory functions when he failed-to answer the
.charge that his ruling was contrary to the statute giving the power of definition
to the Board.'3 Since'the statute does confer this power upon the Board, the
pronouncement of the Comptroller was in excess of his authority.
4. Capital Notes and Debentures
Various provisions of the federal banking laws impose restrictions on banks
in terms of a percentage of "capital stock" and "surplus." The National Bank
Act, for instance, limits the total obligations to a national bank of any person,
partnership, or corporation to ten percent of the unimpaired capital stock of
the bank and ten percent of its unimpaired surplus fund." The Federal Reserve
Act contains like restrictions for member banks with respect to various other
transactions." The problem currently facing the banking industry is to decide
what constitutes "capital" for the purpose of applying these different limitations.
The Office of the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board are in sharp dis-
agreement over the matter.
30 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Examining and Supervisory Functions Before the
Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking and
Currency and the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 398
(1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings on, Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions].
31 Ibid.
32 Id. at 398-99.
33 Id. at 399.
34 Hackley, supra note 3, at 617-18.
35 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 398-99.
36 44 Stat. 1229 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1964).
37 E.g., 48 Stat. 183 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964), as amended, 12
U.S.C.A. § 371c (Supp. 1966); 48 Stat. 184 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.G. § 371d (1964).
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Traditionally, only common and preferred stock were regarded as "capital
stock" for the purpose of these limitations."8 In recent years, however, many
banks have been selling to the public "capital notes" or "capital debentures,"
instruments which give their holder a creditor position rather than the "equity"
ownership afforded by capital stock. 9 This practice was given its initial impe-
tus in 1962, when Comptroller Saxon liberalized the views of the Comptroller's
Office with regard to this matter and announced that he would permit the sale
of these debentures.4" Such action was a radical break with the past, since the
issuance of these instruments had for years been regarded as an unsound form
of bank financing, primarily because of their association with the emergency
conditions of the 1930's." The immediate source of the present controversy
arose in 1963 when the Comptroller ruled on the question of whether or not
the proceeds of capital notes and debentures issued by national banks can be
included in the total of unimpaired capital funds for the purpose of computing
the loan limitation on these banks. His ruling held that
the proceeds of capital notes, capital debentures or other similar obligations
issued by a National Bank, provided that such debentures, notes or other
similar obligations are subordinate in right of payment to the prior pay-
ment in full of all deposit liabilities of the bank, may be included as part
of the aggregate amount of unimpaired capital stock and unimpaired
surplus funds for the purpose of the computation of the limit on loans to
individual borrowers contained in 12 U.S.C. 84.42
Since such subordinate notes and debentures have all the protective effect of
capital and surplus with respect to the bank depositors, and since the legislative
history of the lending restrictions indicates that the primary purpose of those
restrictions is the protection of depositors, Comptroller Saxon felt that capital
notes and debentures that stand in the same relationship to depositors as the
traditionally recognized forms of capital and surplus should be included in the
loan base.43
The Board of Governors took exception to the Comptroller's ruling and
shortly thereafter issued a ruling of its own. According to the Board, "capital"
excludes all debt instruments.4 4 As an evidence of debt, a note or debenture is
of a different quality than stock, which evidences a proprietary interest in the
assets of the bank.45 The Board also pointed out that the National Bank Act
expressly provides that "capital," when used in the laws relating to the capital
of national banks, is limited to "the amount of unimpaired common stock plus
38 Hackley, supra note 3, at 602.
39 Ibid.
40 Fenner, Bank Debenture Financing From All Points of View, 201 THE COMMERCIAL
AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 639 (1965). The Comptroller here acted in accordance with
the suggestion of his Advisory Committee. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKING, Op. Cit.
supra note 22, at 83.
41 Bank Capital Debenture Financing Highly Regarded, 200 THE COMMERCIAL AND
FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 1835 (1964).
42 12 C.F.R. § 7.7 (Supp. 1966).
43 Ibid.




the amount of preferred stock outstanding and unimpaired ... ."" Further,
at least once in the past when Congress wished to permit notes and debentures
to be considered capital, they deemed it advisable to specifically amend the
Federal Reserve Act."' The Board felt "these plain evidences of Congressional
intent compel the conclusion that, for purposes of statutory limitations and
requirements, 'capital' notes and debentures may not properly be regarded as
part of either 'capital' or 'capital stock.' "s
The Comptroller's original 1963 ruling did not involve a direct clash with
the Board since it only related to the amount a national bank could lend to a
single borrower, and the Board has no enforcement powers in this area. How-
ever, an expansion of his ruling later caused such a confrontation.4 9 Section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act" limits the amount any member bank may
lend to its affiliates, again in terms of a percentage of the bank's capital and
surplus. Though the Board's statement clearly held that capital notes and
debentures cannot be considered in determining the lending limits, the Comp-
troller subsequently extended his ruling to apply to loans made to affiliates of
national banks as well as to other classes of borrowers."'
During the 1965 hearings on the consolidation of bank supervisory func-
tions, it was asserted that the Comptroller's action with regard to these capital
notes and debentures is "not provided by law." 2 In light of the statutory defi-
nition cited above, it seems that this charge is valid. The fact is that the incon-
sistent positions of the two agencies cause confusion in the banking industry.
For this reason alone, if for no other, the conflict should be resolved. One pos-
sible solution could be a modification of a proposal by the American Bankers'
Association" whereby a statute would be passed clearly authorizing the Federal
Reserve Board to define, for all member banks, the meaning of "capital" for
the purpose of ascertaining their lending limits. 4
5. Undivided Profits as Capital
A problem related to the foregoing is the inclusion of undivided profits
46 48 Stat. 5 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 51c (1964).
47 12 C.F.R. § 208.108(c) (Supp. 1966).
48 Ibid.
49 Hackley, supra note 3, at 603.
50 48 Stat. 183 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 371c (Supp. 1966).
51 Hackley, supra note 3, at 603.
52 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 291.
53 Id. at 188.
54 There are both advantages and disadvantages associated with bank debenture financing
generally. Those in favor of such financing argue the relatively low cost of borrowed capital.
The interest payments on debentures are tax deductible, unlike dividend payments on common
or preferred stock. In addition to being low, the cost of borrowed capital is also fixed. Thus
any earnings in excess of the rate of interest paid by the bank will flow to stockholders, and
earnings on bank stock will thereby be improved.
Those opposed to the issuance of debentures argue that bank management will be under
pressure to earn more than the fixed rate on the debentures. The result will be deterioration
in the quality of bank credit as credit requirements on loans and quality requirements on
investment portfolios are lowered to obtain higher yields. Also, a sufficiently long period of
relatively low interest rates could reduce bank earnings below the level necessary to meet
the fixed costs of the borrowed capital and thereby make it harder for issuing banks to
redeem or refund the debentures. Mock, Banks Find New Ways To Raise Capital, Banking,
Nov. 1964, p. 60.
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within capital and unimpaired surplus. According to the Comptroller, undivided
profits constitute a capital account includable in the term "unimpaired surplus
fund" as that term is used in the statutory provision relating to the lending limits
of national banks5 as well as when used with respect to the other formulae
affecting national banks, such as that determining their borrowing limits.5"
"Unimpaired surplus fund" was held to include "all capital accounts (other
than capital stock), derived from either paid-in capital funds or retained earn-
ings, not subject to known charges, and which are considered interchangeable
by resolution of the bank's board of directors."5 Apparently, the Comptroller
felt that the category of undivided profits is "economically indistinguishable
from that of capital and surplus."5 The reasoning behind the ruling on un-
divided profits is similar to that which gave rise to the Comptroller's ruling
on capital notes and debentures; the former ruling, as the latter, conforms to
the purpose of the lending limitations, i.e., the protection of depositors. For
all accounts includable in "unimpaired surplus," including undivided profits,
stand in the same relative position to deposits as does the surplus account.5
The Federal Reserve Board, on the other hand, reached the opposite conclu-
sion that "undivided profits do not constitute 'capital,' 'capital stock,' or 'surplus'
for the purposes of provisions of the Federal Reserve Act .... . 6  Again the
Board pointed out that "capital," as defined in the National Bank Act, is limited
to common and preferred stock and further asserted that a bank's surplus fund
is more stable than its undivided profits account,"' a distinction that had been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court.62 Finally, the Board indicated
that the federal banking laws use the terms "undivided profits" and "surplus"
with different meanings, so that certain provisions would be meaningless or
their application impractical if undivided profits were regarded as part of a
bank's "surplus" or "surplus fund."6 The Board's position was rightly sup-
ported by the staff of the House Committee on Banking and Currency in 1965,4
since it is the more reasonable view and is supported by the greater weight of
authority.
6. Federal Funds Transactions
The fact that the federal banking statutes have created a number of limita-
tions on the lending and borrowing powers of both national and state member
banks necessitates an awareness of what is to be considered a loan or a borrow-
ing. At the present time, there exists a conflict between the Comptroller's Office
and the Federal Reserve Board on precisely this point. For the two agencies,
55 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS I 1100(c), in
3 CCH FED. BANKING L. REp. 1 59691 (1966).
56 Gerber, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 2 NATIONAL BANKING Rnv. 93
(1964).
57 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKs 1100(c), in
3 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 59691 (1966).
58 Note, supra note 21, at 665.
59 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 403.
60 12 C.F.R. § 208.111(f) (Supp. 1966).
61 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.111(b)-(c) (Supp. 1966).
62 See Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U.S. 204, 215 n. 5 (1925).
63 12 C.F.R. §§ 208.111(d)-(e) (Supp. 1966).
64 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 403-04.
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acting within their respective jurisdictions, disagree as to whether certain trans-
fers in bank reserves are loans." The problem arises because of a practice,
occurring more frequently in recent years, by which a member bank, temporarily
short of reserves or in need of loanable funds, "buys" reserves from another
member bank with excess reserves.66 This transaction ordinarily is in the form
of a transfer from the "se1ing" bank's account in the Federal Reserve Bank to
the "buying" bank's account for a specified fee and for a period of only one or
two days. At the end of this period, the "buyer" retransfers the reserves involved
from its account to that of the "seller.""7
Until 1963, the Comptroller's Office considered these transactions in reserves
to be loans on the part of the "selling" banks and borrowings by the "buying"
banks.08 In that year, Comptroller Saxon ruled that they constitute not-loans
but purchases and sales of reserve funds and consequently do not "create on the
part of the buyer an obligation subject to the lending limit or a borrowing
subject to 12 U.S.C. 82 . . . .," In defense of his ruling, the Comptroller
asserted that these transactions are really "trading in an established money
market" and are recognized by the banking industry as such; that they con-
stitute, in short, a "buying" of money for short-term use; and that his ruling is
"consistent with custom and practice within the banking industry." 70 As to
the charge that he was departing from the course of his predecessors, he argued
that imposing a restriction merely because it had been done in the past was not
a valid reason and that a "significant number" of state bank supervisors viewed
the transactions in the same way he did."-
The Federal Reserve Board has adopted the position that "for purposes
of provisions of law administered by the Board, a transaction in Federal funds
involves a loan on the part of the 'selling' bank and a borrowing on the part
of the 'purchasing' bank."72 What is "bought" is money itself, the "repayment
of which not earlier than the next day is the obligation assumed by the 'buyer.' ""
As described by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, these transactions, are
actually loans with a one-day maturity effected through a transfer of funds on
the books of Federal Reserve Banks. They do not increase or decrease total
member bank reserves, as could be the case if they were true sale transactions,
but merely redistribute them.7
As indicated, the classification of federal funds transactions is important
because of the various consequences involved. For example, if regarded as
loans and borrowings, they would be subject to the statutory limit on lending
and borrowing. Before Comptroller Saxon's ruling, then, a national bank could
65 Note, supra note 21, at 666.
66 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 599 (1966).
67 Ibid.
68 Bratter, Should a Federal Funds Transaction Be a "Loan" or a "Sale"?, Banking,
June 1966, p. 37.
69 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS 1 1130, in 3 CCH
FED. BANKING L. REP. I 59696 (1966).
70 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 382.
71 Ibid.
72 12 C.F.R. § 208.106(a) (Supp. 1966).
73 Bratter, Should a Federal Funds Transaction Be a "Loan" or a "Sale"?, Banking,
June 1966, p. 37.
74 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 383.
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not lend to another bank, in the form of federal funds, more than ten percent
of its capital and surplus. National banks were at that time also disadvantaged
in comparison to state member banks, which remain governed by state statutory
authority as to lending limitations.7 5 Though the Comptroller's ruling freed
national banks from most limitations, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act 6
still limits federal funds transactions between a member bank and its affiliates."
Support can be found for both positions with regard to these transactions.
Those in favor of the Comptroller's policy argue that they are specialized trans-
fers between member banks ordinarily within two business days and, as such,
do not involve the risks associated with longer loans. Furthermore, since the
Board is informed of each transaction, it can move swiftly to protect bank
stability should the transactions be used improperly."8 The American Bankers'
Association, on the other hand, supports the Board's view of these transactions
as loans subject to existing statutory limitations.79 The arguments in support
of the Comptroller's position outweigh those opposed to it. That the transfer
of these funds is generally only for one or two days, at a low fee, and for a limited
purpose, shows that, though possibly not a true "sale," such a transfer is "clearly
distinguishable" from an ordinary loan. It is an extremely secure transaction
with only a negligible effect on the banks involved and should be treated dif-
ferently from the usual loan."0 Once again a uniform view is desirable. The
divergence of opinion causes confusion and bad feeling between the agencies
and could give rise to inequitable competition between national and state mem-
ber banks."' One possible solution, which would at least result in uniformity,
would be to place in the Board of Governors exclusive jurisdiction to define,
with respect to all member banks, the nature of a transaction in federal funds&2
7. Underwriting Revenue Bonds
Possibly the most publicized of the current controversies between the two
agencies deals with the underwriting of revenue bonds. Under the terms of
the National Bank Act, a national bank is not permitted to underwrite any
issue of securities, with an exception that this restriction does not apply to "gen-
eral obligations of any State or of any political subdivision thereof. ... "" The
Federal Reserve Act subjects state member banks to the same limitations with
respect to underwriting as are applicable to national banks under the National
Bank Act. 4 Problems arise in attempting to determine what constitutes a gen-
75 Bratter, Should a Federal Funds Transaction Be a "Loan" or a "Sale"?, Banking,
June 1966, p. 38.
76 48 Stat. 183 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 371c (Supp. 1966).
77 Bratter, Should a Federal Funds Transaction Be a "Loan" or a "Sale"?, Banking,
June 1966, p. 38.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Note, Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve Board, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 660, 666 (1965).
81 Bratter, Should a Federal Funds Transaction Be a "Loan" or a "Sale"?, Banking,
June 1966, p. 38.
82 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 189.
83 48 Stat. 184 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24(7) (Supp. 1966).
84 48 Stat. 165 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1964).
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eral obligation for the purposes of these acts. Traditionally, it has been held
that general obligations are bonds backed by the full faith and credit of a
governmental body possessing general powers of taxation, including property
taxation, 5 while revenue bonds are obligations issued by a governmental entity
that are not supported by general powers of taxation 86 Such an interpretation
raised no problems until after World War II. Though revenue bond financing
was almost unknown at the time the prohibition against underwriting was
enacted, since the war, reliance by state and local governments on this method
of financing, as opposed to general obligations, has increased. This increase
eventually reached a level that enabled Comptroller Saxon to assert in 1965
that revenue bonds accounted for almost 40% of state and local government
financing; were "invaluable" in helping state and local governments meet finan-
cial needs, and were often the only practical way for an overtaxed community
to solve its problems on a financial basis that would be sound for both the com-
munity and the investor 8 7
Partly because of such changing circumstances, rulings began to come out
of the Office of the Comptroller that were inconsistent with past decisions. Thus,
national banks were permitted to underwrite certain State of Washington bonds
despite the fact that the state legislature had itself provided that they were not
to be regarded as general obligations but were to be paid from certain motor
vehicle excise taxes88 This was allowed chiefly on the grounds of a Washington
Supreme Court ruling that such bonds were issued upon the credit of the State
and constituted debts of the State 9 Despite the opposition of the Federal Re-
serve Board to the Comptroller's ruling regarding the Washington bonds,9 the
Comptroller soon afterwards went even further. Acting under the authority of
the National Bank Act,9 in September 1963, he approved the underwriting
of revenue bonds by issuing new investment securities regulations that redefine
a general obligation to include an obligation backed by the full faith and credit
of the obligor even though the obligor is a special authority without taxing power,
a definition which frees national banks from most of their underwriting restric-
tions.92 In effect, purely revenue bonds can now be equated with general obli-
gations and underwritten without regard to the statutory restrictions.
85 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 352.
86 52d ANN. IP. OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys. 238 (1966).
87 102 ANN. REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 246 (1964).
88 Gerber, Current Legal and Regulatory Developments, 2 NATIONAL BANKING REV. 425,
427 (1965).
89 Ibid. See State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384
P.2d 833 (1963).
90 12 C.F.R. § 208.105 (Supp. 1966). The Board, in addition to citing the Washington
statute declaring these bonds not to be general obligations, cited a prior holding of the
Comptroller's Office indicating that securities, to be eligible for underwriting, must be sup-
ported by the general taxing power and not merely payable out of a particular source. Ibid.
91 Saxon cited 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964) as authority for the new regulations. More Free-
dom in Underwriting Municipals?, Banking, Oct. 1963, p. 55.
92 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 352. These regulations
provide:
(d) The term "political subdivision of any State" includes a county, city, town
or other municipal corporation, a public authority, and generally any publicly owned
entity which is an instrumentality of the State or of a municipal corporation.
(e) The phrase "general obligation of any State or of any political subdivision
thereof" means an obligation supported by the full faith and credit of the obligor.
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The Board has refused to acquiesce in the Comptroller's expanded concept
of a general obligation and has affirmed the traditional definition as the con-
trolling limitation on state member banks." Thus, an obligation underwritten
by a state member bank must be supported either directly or indirectly by general
powers of taxation, including property taxation.94 A variety of arguments have
been put forth in support of the Board's position. Soon after the Comptroller's
new regulations were proposed in June 1963, the Board itself wrote the Comp-
troller that it felt the federal banking laws do not authorize him to expand or
contract the coverage of the underwriting powers conferred by the National
Bank Act. The Board argued that existing law empowered him only to define
"investment securities" and to prescribe "limitations and restrictions," but con-
ferred no regulatory authority as to underwriting securities. The Board bluntly
stated that the adoption of the regulations, "whether in the form of regulation
or interpretation, would amount to an unauthorized, attempt to change or to
nullify congressional policy expressed in existing law."9" Further arguments in
support of the Board's position are that the new regulations will create a conflict
of interest between traditional bank trust functions and their underwriting
functions, an evil against which the 1933 legislation ending securities under-
writing by commercial banks was directed, and could very well do harm to the
investment banking industry.96 The Governors' position found support with
the Investment Bankers' Association. The underwriting of revenue bonds has
also been criticized as imprudent, since many are not of bank investment quality
and underwriting them would tend to discredit the entire banking community.
Since this kind of underwriting is still speculative, it is argued it should be left
in the hands of investment bankers rather than commercial bankers.9"
The reasons behind the Comptroller's new definition are legion. Noting
the increasing reliance on revenue bonds in recent years, Mr. Saxon saw a duty
owed to the financially hard-pressed states and municipalities.9 " Believing that
there was a lack of money at competitive rates for revenue bonds,99 he argued
that ending restrictions on commercial banks with regard to revenue bond
financing would increase the competition in an area presently dominated by
investment banking institutions. This would lower the cost of the bonds for
the issuers.. and thereby be of benefit to the public. The Comptroller did not
feel that the entrance of commercial banks into this area would prove harmful
to investment banks.101 In answer to the charge that a certain risk is involved
It includes an obligation payable from a special fund when the full faith and credit
of a State or any political subdivision thereof is obligated for payments into the
fund of amounts which will be sufficient to provide for all required payments in
connection with the obligation. It implies an obligor possessing resources sufficient
to justify faith and credit. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.3(d)-(e) (Supp. 1966).
93 Hearings on Increased Flexibility for Financial Institutions Before the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hear-
ings on Increased Flexibility for Financial Institutions].
94 50 FED. RESERvE BULL. 564 (1964).
95 More Freedom in Underwriting of Municipals?, Banking, Oct. 1963, p. 55.
96 Id. at 126; Note, supra note 80, at 668.
97 ADvisoRy COMMITTEE ON BANKING, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE FUTURE 28-29 (1962).
98 Saxon Answers His Critics, Banking, June 1964, p. 132.
99 Hearings on Increased Flexibility for Financial Institutions 58.
100 Id. at 12.
101 Id. at 73.
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in underwriting revenue bonds, others pointed out that the fear expressed in
the debates on the 1933 amendments is no longer justified. The quality of
present-day revenue bonds is often very high, sometimes higher than the quality
of a municipality's general obligations, and it is argued that there are enough
high-quality revenue bonds to permit commercial banks to participate in their
underwriting." 2 Also, national banks would be squeezed out of more and more
financing of public improvements unless permitted to underwrite such obliga-
tions. As to the charge of a possible conflict of interest between the under-
writing function and the investment and trust functions of banks on the grounds
that banks underwriting securities would have an interest in selling them to
depositors and correspondents, which interest would impair the ability of these
banks to give disinterested advice, two points have been made. First, the in-
creased knowledge about the issuer and the market that an underwriting bank
would obtain would enhance its ability to give accurate investment advice.
Second, since the business of providing correspondent services is highly com-
petitive, the threat of losing correspondents and their deposits renders unrealistic
the fear that an underwriting bank would recommend inferior securities to a
customer merely because it had underwritten them.' Furthermore, the Comp-
troller's Regulation 9 expressly forbids the use of fiduciary funds to purchase
property or obligations from the bank,0 4 and this rule is strictly enforced irre-
spective of the intrinsic quality of the property or obligation involved.' Finally,
during the congressional hearings on consolidating the banking agencies, Comp-
troller Saxon asserted he could find no statute requiring a general obligation
to be issued only by a political unit with general powers of taxation that are
used to support the obligations. He argued that bonds adequately supported
by substantial resources of a political unit should be eligible for under-
writing.'
0 6
A settlement of this controversy is required in order to fulfill congressional
intent that federally supervised banks be subject to the same rules and to put
an end to the competitive disadvantage suffered by state member banks by
reason of their exclusion from the revenue bond market, which national banks
are permitted to take part in. The desire to improve the situation led the
Federal Reserve Board to assert that corrective legislation was imperative and
to recommend that Congress reaffirm existing law by adopting the Board's
definition of a general obligation.' Others suggested placing in the Comptroller's
102 ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE ON BANKING, op. cit. supra note 97, at 27.
103 102d ANN. REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 247 (1964).
104 12 C.F.R. § 9.12 (Supp. 1966).
105 102d ANN. REP. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY 247 (1964).
106 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 398.
107 52d ANN. REP. OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 238 (1966).
The Board defined general obligations as
only obligations that are supported by an unconditional promise to pay, directly
or indirectly, an aggregate amount which (together with any other funds available
for the purpose) will suffice to discharge, when due, all interest on and principal of
such obligations, which promise (1) is made by a governmental entity that possesses
general powers of taxation, including property taxation, and (2) pledges or other-
wise commits the full faith and credit of said promisor; said term does not
include obligations not so supported that are to be repaid only from specified sources
such as the income from designated facilities or the proceeds of designated taxes.
Hearings on Increased Flexibility for Financial Institutions 1018.
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Office exclusive jurisdiction over the determination of the types of bonds that
can be underwritten by national banks." 8 Such solutions as these, however,
may well have become unnecessary in the light of a decision recently handed
down by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." 9 The
case in question involved an action brought against Comptroller Saxon by a
group of investment bankers seeking an injunction to restrain him from author-
izing national banks to underwrite and deal in obligations of states and political
subdivisions where the obligations were not secured by the general power of
taxation. It therefore involved the precise question of whether the phrase
"general obligations of any State or any political subdivision thereof" is
limited to such obligations as are supported by the taxing power, or in-
cludes all obligations issued on the full faith and credit of a State or
political subdivision, even if they are not sustained by the taxing power. 10
Recognizing that Congress did not intend the "fortuitous differentiation" where-
by national banks are permitted to underwrite securities forbidden to state
member banks, i.e., those issued by an entity without general powers of taxation,
the court concluded that the origin of the Banking Act of 1933 conclusively
demonstrated Congress' unalterable intent to divorce commercial banks from
the business of underwriting and dealing in securities. Congress had not deviated
from that position since the passage of the act, allowing an exception only for
certain limited types of governmental securities. Since there was no discernible
basis for broadening that exception, which at the time of the passage of the
act referred to what the Board presently considers a general obligation, and
since the original objective of Congress should not be impaired except by later
legislation, the court adopted the construction of the term "general obligations"
which limited it to "those that are issued by a governmental entity endowed
with the general taxing powers, and that are based on the full faith and credit
of the issuing entity.""' The court thus approved the Federal Reserve Board's
position in this controversy. What effect this will have on the dispute remains
to be seen.
8. Purchase of Stock 6f Operations Subsidiaries
Operations subsidiaries are "organizations designed to serve, in effect, as
separately-incorporated departrnents of the bank, performing functions that the
bank is empowered to perform directly."" Their ownership has caused yet
another conflict between the Office of the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve
Board. According to section 24 of the National Bank Act, except as thereafter
provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing contained therein "shall author-
ize the purchase by the [national banking] association for its own account of
any shares of stock of any corporation.""'  Section 9 of the Federal Reserve
108 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 189.
109 Baker, Watts & CJo. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966).
110 Id. at 248.
111 Id. at 252.
112 52 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1151 (1966).
113 48 Stat. 184 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 24(7) (Supp. 1966).
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Act"4 applies this same prohibition to state member banks. Until fairly recently,
the view was generally accepted that banks were prohibited from purchasing
any corporate stock for their own account except where such purchase was
permitted expressly or by clear implication in federal law."'
The Federal Reserve Board has failed to make an exception to the preceding
rule with regard to operations subsidiaries and persists in strictly applying it.
When specifically faced with this question, the Board confirmed its prior posi-
tion that the so-called "stock-purchase prohibition" forbids a state member from
purchasing any shares of corporate stock except as specifically permitted by
federal law or as permitted by the concept of incidental powers necessary to
carry on the business of banking."6 Where Congress desired to permit stock
purchases, it made express provision, as in the case of purchasing the stock of
Federal Reserve Banks, bank premises subsidiaries, safe deposit companies, and
several others. In addition, the "incidental powers" of national banks have
been held to include the power to purchase corporate stock where that action
was a reasonable step in the collection of defaulted loans contracted in good
faith."' Beyond this, however, a bank's stock-purchase power is severely re-
stricted. For the Board felt, as have prior Comptrollers, that the stock-purchase
prohibition "was intended generally to prevent the purchase of the stock of
corporations, including those created to perform functions that could be per-
formed by the bank itself.""'  To support its position, the Board noted that the
"affiliate system," including a member bank's ownership of other corporations,
was such a major banking problem of the 1930's that one objective of the Bank-
ing Act of 1933 was to separate national and state member banks as far as
possible from affiliates of all kinds, a goal which the stock-purchase prohibition
helped to accomplish." 9 Furthermore, experience had shown the Board that
there is a "significantly greater" likelihood of unsound practices, violations of
law, and other developments contrary to the public interest where banks operate
through subsidiary corporations. These practices result from the inevitable tendency
of some banks to regard their subsidiaries as separate enterprises and to conduct
the operations of these subsidiaries in a manner unsuitable for part of a banking
enterprise, particularly by acting beyond the powers of the parent bank.' °
Thus, the Board felt it reasonable to infer that Congress, aware of the past abuses
of the affiliate system, thought the general welfare "would be benefited by limit-
ing the authority of member banks to conduct their operations through sep-
arately-incorporated organizations."''
Comptroller Saxon disagreed with the Board's reasoning as well as its
114 48 Stat. 165 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1964).
115 Hackley, supra note 66, at 608.
116 52 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1151 (1966). The question of what should be considered
among the "incidental powers necessary to carry on the business of banking" has been hotly
debated with regard to many of the disputes between these two agencies. For a comparison
of opposing views, see Bratter, Comptroller's Rulings Aid National Banks, Banking, July
1966, p. 48; 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 375-76; Huck,
What Is the Banking Business?, 21 Bus. LAw 537 (Jan. 1966).
117 52 FED. RE EPRvE BULL. 1151 (1966).
118 Ibid.





conclusion and adopted the position "that a national bank may directly or
indirectly own an affiliated corporation and may carry on by means of such
corporation any activity which the bank could legally carry on itself as an inci-
dent to the business of banking.""ua He found the authority for allowing national
banks to hold stock in these corporations in the provisions of the National Bank
Act that endow national banks with such incidental powers as are necessary
to carry on the business of banking."3 A national bank can, in short, purchase
the stock of a corporation engaged in a business in which the bank itself can
engage; this is such an incidental power. When faced with the stock-purchase
prohibition, the Comptroller concluded that it is not a prohibition at all and
that Congress could not have intended to generally circumscribe the authority
of national banks to acquire and hold stock in any and all corporate sub-
sidiaries." 4 He rejected what he termed the "jaundiced attitude" of those who
argued that the likelihood of unsound practice and violation of the law is greater
when banks operate through subsidiary corporations and felt it "antediluvian"
to contend that there is an inevitable tendency for banks to conduct the opera-
tions of their subsidiary corporations in a manner unsuited to the banking busi-
ness." '5 It was his opinion that care should be taken not to cripple national
banks or disrupt their activities by unreasonably strict statutory construction.
In his view, the powers of his office are adequate to insure compliance by sub-
sidiaries with restrictions applicable to them and their parent banks.
In support of the Comptroller, it may also be contended that
the purpose of the stock-purchase prohibition was simply to prohibit na-
tional banks from using their funds for "speculative" investments in cor-
porate stocks and that it was not meant to prohibit stock purchases as a
means of implementing the acknowledged powers of national banks, such
as the operation of a subsidiary corporation to carry on a business in which
a national bank may directly engage. The prohibition excepts not only
stock purchases as "hereinafter provided" by Section 5136 of the Revised
Statutes (i.e., stock of safe deposit companies) but purchases "otherwise
permitted by law," and this exception, it is argued, covers purchases that
are properly incident to the banking business as well as purchases of stock
expressly sanctioned by specific provisions of federal statutes.1
26
The desirability of his position can be seen in the additional options it would
provide for national banks in structuring their businesses. National banks could
use such subsidiaries as a means of controlling operation costs, improving effec-
tiveness of supervision, decentralizing management decisions, or separating cer-
tain operations of a bank from others.
It might also be argued, however, that
the fact that the stock-purchase prohibition in section 5136 excepts pur-
122 Bratter, Comptroller's Rulings Aid National Banks, Banking, July 1966, pp. 48-49.
123 31 Fed. Reg. 11460 (1966), amending 12 C.F.R. § 7 (1963).
124 For the Comptroller's interesting analysis of the stock-purchase prohibition, see id. at
11459.
125 Id. at 11460.
126 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. Rv. 565, 609 (1966).
127 31 Fed. Reg. 11460 (1966), amending 12 C.F.R. § 7 (1963).
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chases "hereinafter provided" indicates that it was not intended to exempt
stock purchases that might otherwise fall within the "incidental" powers
provision that appears earlier in that section. 2
Then, too, legal authorities have often stated that banks are organized to loan
money and not to make permanent investments, however advisable such invest-
ments appear to the directors. When placed together for comparison, though,
the view propounded by Comptroller Saxon in favor of stock purchase seems
to be the more valid of the two, both from the legal standpoint and on the
basis of policy considerations. The original purpose of the stock-purchase pro-
hibition seems to have been to protect against speculative investment, as opposed
to such investments as these. Also, it appears safe to regard the purchase of
stock of operations subsidiaries as a necessary incident to the business of banking.
9. Purchase of Domestic Bank Stock
The conflict between the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller over
the purchase of domestic bank stock is closely related to the one immediately
preceding and involves the same stock-purchase prohibition there held applicable
to both national and state member banks. Shortly after the enactment of the
prohibition in 1933, the Federal Reserve Board ruled that a state member
bank is not permitted to purchase the stock of another domestic bank. 29 Since
that time the Board has not changed its position. As recently as last year it
reaffirmed its original holding that such acquisitions, whether direct or indirect
(as where the stock was purchased by a wholly owned subsidiary of the member
bank), are not legally permissible. 3 It views the legislative history and judicial
interpretation of the prohibition as indicating a congressional intent to prohibit
both national and state member banks from acquiring for their own account
the stock of other banks, either directly or through intermediary corporations.
This prohibition applies to any voluntary acquisition of the stock of another
bank, whether the consideration be cash or shares in the acquiring bank. 1
The Board also feels that such acquisitions must be forbidden if observance of
the federal laws on branching is to be assured. Both the National Bank Act and
the Federal Reserve Act prohibit the establishment of branches except under
certain conditions. These conditions are designed to permit national banks to
operate additional offices only upon the prior approval of the Comptroller,
1 2
while state member banks must first obtain the approval of the Board of Gov-
ernors.1 33 The argument is that
when one bank owns all or a majority of the stock of another, the offices
and resources of the latter are a part of the banking organization owned
by, and subject to the control of, the parent bank, despite the existence
of separate corporate entities. Consequently, if such acquisition of stock were
permissible, member banks could conduct banking operations through
128 Hackley, supra note 126, at 610.
129 Id. at 612.
130 52 FED. RIsvav. BULL. 655 (1966).
131 Ibid.
132 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1964).
133 38 Stat. 259 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
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additional offices without obtaining supervisory approval, which would
undermine an important regulatory purpose of the Federal statutes relating
to multiple-office banking 
3 4
If one bank were allowed to acquire the stock of another, the former could easily
circumvent public policy and accomplish indirectly what could not be ac-
complished directly, i.e., ownership of banking offices in places where it was
forbidden for the parent to conduct banking operations. 35 For example, since
there is no statutory requirement for the Comptroller's approval of the purchase
by a national bank of the stock of another bank, it would theoretically be possible
for a national bank in one state to extend its operations to another
state by acquiring the stock of a bank in that state, despite the
Comptroller's disapproval of the acquisition. This would be contrary to the
traditional assumption that a bank can only have offices within its own state."
A bank could thus effectively engage in interstate branching contrary to law.
Despite these arguments, the Comptroller has ruled that
a national bank, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency,
may acquire and hold voting stock of another bank directly or through
an affiliate or subsidiary, in an amount constituting working control or more,
for the purpose of facilitating its banking operations.
37
This ruling is in part based on the belief that the idea of what is properly in-
cidental to banking has been expanded to such an extent that there is "sufficient
recognition" that the acquisition by a national bank of the stock of another
bank is within the corporate power of the acquiring bank. 3 Refusing to rely
on this foundation alone, the Comptroller also alleged statutory recognition of
the stock-purchase power. Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, a
bank holding company is defined to be any company that meets certain con-
ditions.'39 "Company" is then defined to include any corporation or association
other than a corporation of which the United States or any state owns a majority
of the shares and other than any partnership. 4 9 It therefore follows that a
bank falls within the definition of "company" and by necessary implication can
hold stock in another bank. Another section of the act provides that certain
provisions of the act do not apply to shares acquired by a bank that is a bank
holding company' 4 ' and thus also evidences the right of one bank to hold stock
in another. The legislative history and judicial interpretations of the stock-
purchase prohibition also influenced the Comptroller but led him to different
134 52 FED. RESERVE BULL. 655 (1966).
135 Ibid.
136 Hackley, supra note 126, at 614-15.
137 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS 7375, in 3
CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 59877 (1966). For an interesting view of what can happen
when a national bank tries to acquire such stock, see the discussion of Chase Manhattan's
attempt to acquire a majority of the stock of the Liberty National Bank and Trust Company
of Buffalo in Hackley, supra note 126, at 613-14.
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conclusions from those reached by the Federal Reserve Board. He felt they
showed the statutory provisions dealing with stock investments to
have no relevance to stock acquisitions that do not impair the bank de-
positor's position and are not for the purpose of investment in speculative,
nonbanking business. If the acquisition is effected through an exchange
of shares of stock, bank funds will not be expended and the depositor's
position is in no way impaired.
4
2
Finally, he did not believe it could be seriously contended that each banking
office of a subsidiary bank is a branch of the acquiring bank, thereby possibly
causing a violation of branch banking policy. To so hold could very well make
illegal all existing bank holding company organizations. If separate corporate
existence were to be disregarded in the one-bank acquisition transaction, it would
logically follow that it must be disregarded in the typical bank holding company
organization. This would lead to the illogical result that the banking offices of
each bank in a bank holding company organization would become branch
offices of the bank that dominated and controlled the organization and would,
therefore, be subject to the restrictions of the state branching laws. 4' The better
view, then, when one bank acquired a majority of the stock of another, was to
continue to regard each as a separate corporate entity.
10. Purchase of Foreign Bank Stock
Prior to July 1966, the Federal Reserve Act permitted national banks,
subject to the approval of the Federal Reserve Board,'44 to acquire indirectly
the stock of a foreign bank through subsidiary Edge Act or "agreement" corpo-
rations. 4 In June 1964, the Comptroller attempted to expand the powers of
national banks in this area by ruling that direct acquisition of the stock of a
foreign bank also involves a lawful exercise of the powers of a national bank.
While not objecting to the indirect acquisition of such stock, he felt that direct
acquisition is a "useful and practical" alternative to indirect acquisition and
would result in more effective supervision, regulation, and examination of national
banks involved in foreign banking and financing operations. 46 Thus, national
banks should be permitted to acquire and hold, directly as well as indirectly,
stock in foreign banks as a means of conducting overseas operations. Such a
142 Saxon, supra note 138, at 548.
143 Ibid.
144 39 Stat. 755 (1916), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 601 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 601 (Supp. 1966).
145 Edge Act Corporations, chartered by the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System under the authority of the Edge Act (Section 25a of the Federal
Reserve Act), may engage in foreign banking and other foreign operations, subject
to regulation by the Board. Their shares may be held by National Banks, so that
Edge Act Corporations serve as instruments through which such banks conduct
financial operations abroad. An Agreement Corporation is a State-chartered sub-
sidiary of a National Bank (or other bank) which has entered into an agreement with
the Board regarding the conduct of its operations. Edge Act and Agreement
Corporations perform similar functions and operate under the Federal Reserve's
Regulation K. ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON BANKING, op. cit. supra note 97, at 129-30.
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result had been suggested by the Comptroller's Advisory Committee some two
years previously. 4 '
Three weeks after the Comptroller's ruling, the Federal Reserve Board ex-
pressed its disagreement. While recognizing that a member bank is permitted
to acquire indirectly the stock of foreign banks through intermediate subsidiaries,
it declared that direct acquisition of such stock was not permissible under the
law as it then stood. The Board argued, as it had with respect to the other
conflicts regarding stock purchase, that
state member banks are made subject by section 9 of the Federal Reserve
Act (12 U.S.C. 335) to the same limitations and conditions with respect
to the purchasing and holding of stock as are applicable in the case of
national banks under section 5136 of the Revised Statutes (12 U.S.C. 24).
Under the last-mentioned section, a national bank is prohibited from pur-
chasing for its own account any shares of stock of any corporation except as
provided in that section or "otherwise permitted by law." There is no
provision in section 5136 or any other provision of law permitting the
purchase by national banks of stock of foreign banks?4a
In response to the Board's statement, the Comptroller issued a press release
indicating that his office was aware of the Board's attitude with regard to this
matter but found it without merit. He concluded he could "only assume that
the Board was motivated by the desire to bar this office from the proper and
essential exercise of its authority over the international operations of national
banks."
149
In issuing his ruling, the Comptroller once again relied on the National
Bank Act provision that endows national banks with such incidental powers
as are necessary to carry on the business of banking; he regarded the purchase
of a foreign bank's stock as such a power. 50 The stock-purchase prohibition,
he again asserted, does not preclude a bank from using corporate instrumentalities
in carrying on the business of banking; and the Federal Reserve Act provisions
providing for indirect investment in foreign banks are not to be regarded as
precluding all other participation in international financial operations. Finally,
he maintained that his finding that both direct and indirect stock holdings in
foreign banks are proper means of conducting the overseas banking operations
of national banks is an appropriate finding for his office to make. It is appropriate
because the Office of the Comptroller is charged by the national banking laws
with the execution of all federal laws relating to the organization, operation,
regulation, and supervision of national banks, including the execution of the
National Bank Act provision setting forth the corporate powers of national
banks.' 5 . It is therefore his responsibility to determine initially what financial
operations come within the business of banking."'52
147 ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON BANKING, Op. cit. supra note 97, at 133.
148 12 C.F.R. § 208.112 (Supp. 1966).
149 Bratter, Is Acquisition of Foreign Bank Stock Permissible?, Banking, Sept. 1964, p. 52.
150 Id. at 53.
151 Rev. Stat. § 5136 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), as amended, 12
U.S.C.A. § 24(7) (Supp. 1966).
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The Federal Reserve Board disagreed strongly with the Comptroller's in-
terpretation of his powers in this case, a disagreement that had substantial founda-
tion since the Federal Reserve Act gives the Board exclusive authority over
foreign and international operations of national banks.' The Comptroller's
position seemed to be another manifestation of his displeasure with a structure
that separates the supervision of foreign banking operations from his office,
especially since the clearly permissible indirect stock acquisitions were subject
to the Board's approval. Prior to July 1966, then, it might well have been argued
that the Comptroller was guilty of disregarding congressional intent to give the
Board supervisory jurisdiction over foreign banking operations. On July 1
of that year, however, Congress passed certain amendments to the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 that may well have solved this problem. One of these
amendments provides that a national banking association may apply to the
Federal Reserve Board for permission to exercise, upon conditions prescribed
by the Board, the power to acquire, directly or indirectly, stock in a bank
organized under the law of a foreign country.'54 Thus, subject to the Board's
conditions, national banks are now statutorily permitted to acquire directly
stock in foreign banks. It remains to be seen whether the Comptroller will
acquiesce in the delegation to the Board of the responsibility for establishing
the regulations for such acquisitions.
11. Bank Service Corporations
A bank service corporation is defined in the Bank Service Corporation
Act 5  as "a corporation organized to perform bank services for two or more
banks, each of which owns part of the capital stock of such corporation, and
at least one of which is subject to examination by a Federal supervisory
agency."' 55 According to the act, any two or more banks are permitted to
invest not more than ten percent of the paid-in and unimpaired capital and
unimpaired surplus of each of them in such a bank service corporation. 5 '
This act was passed to fulfill a need acknowledged by all three banking super-
visory agencies and clearly brought out at the hearings prior to its enactment.
There, Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board pointed out the great
amount of data processing which modem banking entails and the corresponding
need for efficiency possible only through automation. Because of the expense
of automation, however, it is only available to the larger banks or to those
banks having contracts with data-processing centers. Comptroller Saxon cited
the high cost of automated equipment as a reason why many smaller banks
desire to merge with larger ones. 7 In order to compete effectively with the
larger banks, it is necessary for the smaller ones to do away with their old
153 39 Stat. 755 (1916), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-04a (1964), as amended 12
U.S.C.A. § 601 (Supp. 1966); 41 Stat. 378 (1919), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-31 (1964).
154 80 Stat. 241, 12 U.S.C.A. § 601 (Supp. 1966).
154A 76 Stat. 1132 (1962), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1964).
155 76 Stat. 1132 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1861(c) (1964).
156 76 Stat. 1I32 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1964).
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techniques. This would be impossible in many cases without the availability of
the bank service corporation.
It was in light of these circumstances that the bill was enacted. The conflict
between the two agencies that has arisen over it is essentially one of policy, as
opposed to a conflict of jurisdiction, and centers around section 5(a). That
section provides:
No bank subject to examination by a Federal supervisory agency may
cause to be performed, by contract or otherwise, any bank services for
itself, whether on or off its premises, unless assurances satisfactory to the
agency prescribed in subsection (b) of this section are furnished to such
agency by both the bank and the party performing such services that the
performance thereof will be subject to regulation and examination by such
agency to the same extent as if such services were being performed by
the bank itself on its own premises.
1 8
These assurances, depending upon the type of bank involved, are to be given
to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Board of
Directors of the FDIC.
This assurances provision was strongly opposed by the Comptroller at the
hearings on the bill. It was his desire to have Congress deal with the problem
of automation in the simplest way possible and not with a series of burdensome
amendments. He felt that the proposed bill with the assurances provision carried
"excessive regulation not needed for the purpose sought to be accomplished here,
although that purpose we believe is desirable. . . . We do not believe that the
amount of regulation sought can reasonably be justified."'5 0 The Comptroller
believed that his office already had enough power to prevent any abuses arising
out of the bill, including the divulgence of confidential information, an abuse
feared by the FDIC because these service corporations would be handling the
data of several banks. He finally charged that the assurances provision would
give his office control over even nonbanking corporations, which would tend
to prevent corporations from making their services available to banks.60
The FDIC had originally provided the impetus for the assurances provision.
Arguing that the investments of banks would make up a large part of the capital
of service corporations and that these corporations would handle confidential
information of several banks, it felt that the supervisory agency should be in a
position of immediate control in the event of the violation of any regulations."
The Federal Reserve Board also favored enactment of the bill with the assurances
provision. The Board felt that the provision did nothing more than make certain
that there would be no "evasion of the necessary examination and supervisory
powers by the simple expedient of transferring or farming out those functions
to some other organization .... "62
158 76 Stat. 1133 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1865(a) (1964).
159 1962 Hearing on Miscellaneous Bank Bills 40.
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The substantial agreement between the Federal Reserve Board and the
FDIC was manifested after the passage of the bill, when they issued basically
the same regulations as to the form and time of submitting the assurances and
as to dispensing with the assurances in case of emergency. The Comptroller,
however, issued no formal regulations on'the subject. 6 ' At the present time,
he requires that
when a national bank invests in a bank service corporation, the bank must
obtain from said corporation a letter recognizing the right of the Comptroller
to examine and regulate its activities. . . .In the instance where a bank
contracts for the performance of such services, rather than invests in a
bank service corporation, the bank must obtain this letter from the supplier
of said service.'6
4
Though the difference in requirements is not of great import, it is another
instance of the inability of the Office of the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve
Board to achieve agreement.
12. Window Dressing
Under federal law, all federally supervised banks are required to make four
reports of condition annually upon dates selected by the Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or a majority there-
of." 5 In recent years, two of these reports have consistently been demanded as
of the last business days in June and December while the other two have been
demanded as of "surprise' dates. 66 That two of the "call" dates are, in effect,
predetermined has been asserted as the cause of "window dressing" in the bank
reports, i.e., the "use of temporary non-business-purpose transactions to enable
a bank to state a more favorable financial showing at a particular time than
would normally be the case."' 67 Such window dressing not only enables a bank
to display to the public a condition report presenting the bank more favorably
than its normal condition warrants, but also can be used to hide the indebtedness
of a bank. In an attempt to curtail the spreading practice of window dressing,
in 1962 Comptroller Saxon was able to obtain a "surprise' report as of
163 Hackley, supra note 126, at 624. For the Board's regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 219.1-.4
(Supp. 1966); for the FDIC's corresponding regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 334.1-.4 (Supp.
1966).
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all banks under its supervision for a report as of a prior date. Unless the bank can anticipate
the date of the call, the surprise call results in an accurate report of its normal condition.
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December 28 rather than as of December 31, the customary date. The results
showed clearly how extensive the practice had become. 6
Since 1962, the other federal agencies have successfully restrained the
Comptroller's subsequent efforts to increase the number of surprise calls, and
it is here that the basis of the conflict is found. The Comptroller regards the
call reports as valuable supervisory tools, which provide his office with informa-
tion necessary to assess the effect of regulatory policies on decisions of national
banks and are helpful in deciding new policies and proposing new legislation. 6
It is the Comptroller's opinion that "the legislative history of the call report laws
clearly indicates a design to employ these reports as a supervisory device and on
a surprise basis."' 70 This design is not being implemented because of the pre-
determination of the June and December reporting dates, a default from sound
supervision that has brought about and perpetuated the practice of window
dressing.
The Federal Reserve Board disagrees with the fundamental basis of the
Comptroller's thesis, for it minimizes the significance of call reports. At the
1963 congressional hearings on window dressing, Governor Robertson emphasized
that call reports originated at a time when the only depositors in commercial
banks were people of substance and when there was no deposit insurance. Most
bank customers at that time probably did read call reports to decide if a bank
was safe. Today, on the other hand, few people rely on the reports because
of the protection afforded by federal deposit insurance, and those who are
interested in the condition of a bank are generally not fooled by window dressing
but make allowances for it.'7' More importantly, however, the Board does not
regard the call report as a significant supervisory instrument (for this purpose
it looks to the bank examination report). Instead, it sees the condition report
as serving one important purpose, one that hardly existed at the turn of the
century. That purpose is to serve as the primary source of statistics for the bank-
ing industry. "In economic analysis and planning and particularly the formula-
tion of monetary policy, reliable bank statistics are a principal tool."' 7' For
this use, standardization of reporting dates is of great value. The Board argues
that, if the dates are varied, even its own statisticians could not accurately measure
movements in such basic items as deposits. Also, the accuracy of the actual
data reported would be better under fixed-date reporting than under surprise
calls. Since it is difficult for a bank to give an accurate condition report
retroactively, most banks make estimates, which result in a margin of error. With
fixed-date reporting, banks can arrange for accurate figures in advance."'
This need for precisely comparable information from year to year in order to
facilitate the formulation of monetary policy is held to outweigh any evils that
might be caused by window dressing. The Comptroller, however, asserts that
168 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 100th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY 14 (1963).
169 Hearing on "Window Dressing" in Bank Reports 21.
170 Bratter, Call Dates and "Window Dressing," Banking, Aug. 1963, p. 50.
171 Hearing on "Window Dressing" in Bank Reports 3-4.
172 Id. at 4.
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this need is not being met because of the impossibility of compensating for
window dressing brought about by predetermined call dates.
The Board's attitude should not be interpreted as condoning window
dressing. On the contrary, it agrees that the practice is undesirable and that
every reasonable effort should be made to do away with it. For
to the degree these efforts [at window dressing] succeed, they result in
deceiving the public. And, to the degree they are recognized and dis-
counted, they result in raising doubts as to the reliability of bank state-
ments and of bankers' statements.Y
It is also inequitable for one bank to publicize itself as larger than another when
it actually is not. However, the Comptroller's surprise-call panacea does not
appear to the Board to be the answer. For one thing, banks can publish addi-
tional condition reports whenever they desire. These highly publicized "dressed"
reports would be much more likely to come to the attention of the public than
the required call reports. The problem cannot be solved by governmental fiat
without an excessive degree of regulation and control. Instead, the Board would
rely on a program of "moral suasion" to curb the abuse, which would involve
an attempt by the various federal agencies to convince bankers that the practice
is "morally unworthy" and injurious to the public confidence."" If the various
agencies cooperated in requesting an end to window dressing, Governor Robert-
son feels that there would be an excellent chance of success. He indicates that
there has never been a time when the different agencies showed "determined
interest" in solving the same problem at the same time. If this were done, the
resulting moral suasion would solve the problem.' Cooperation is absolutely
necessary, though, since without it, one class of banks could obtain a competitive
advantage over the others; and once one bank began to window dress others
would follow suit.
It has been suggested, however, and probably correctly, that the problem
of window dressing is too great to be solved by moral suasion. Though the
banking industry regards the practice as undesirable, it is impractical to expect
bankers themselves to stamp it out. For almost inevitably some will continue to
dress their reports, and the competitive advantage accruing will induce others
174 Bratter, Call Dates and "Window Dressing," Banking, Aug. 1963, p. 50.
175 Hearing on "Window Dressing" in Bank Reports 7.
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to do likewise. Perhaps a better solution can be found in the suggestion of the
Comptroller's Advisory Committee. The Committee proposed that condition
reports be required only twice per year, as of the fixed dates of June 30 and
December 31, but that the reports be revised to require the publication of
average daily net deposits, loans, and investments for the preceding semiannual
period. 7 By this means, it is hoped to render the practice of calling on odd
dates unnecessary, since the efforts at window dressing would be ineffective due
to the use of figures.'
13. Unsubordinated Promissory Notes
The use of the short-term promissory note as a means of obtaining additional
funds for lending and other banking purposes was introduced by the First
National Bank of Boston in September 1964 and was soon adopted by several
other large banks."' This new method of financing banking operations was
supported by the Comptroller, who regarded the use of the instrument as within
the corporate powers of a national bank and as a method of giving national
banks "maximum access to one of the normal financing tools of the money
market." ' It was in 1963 that the present conflict in this area arose. In that
year, the Comptroller, recognizing that this type of note, unlike capital notes
and debentures, is not subordinated to the rights of depositors and other general
creditors, ruled that the amount that banks could borrow by means of such a
note is limited by the borrowing provisions of the National Bank Act.' These
provisions were to be an effective preventive against misuse of the new device.
But freedom from the artificial restraints of the reserve requirements and interest
rate ceilings of the Federal Reserve Board is vital to the effective use of the notes.
The Comptroller therefore concluded that
of 12 U.S.C. 461, 462, and 1813 relating to reserves, interest limitations,
of 12 U.S.C. 82, they cannot be considered deposits. Therefore, the ceiling
on the payment of interest contained in Regulation Q, and the requirement
for the maintenance of reserves contained in Regulation D, are inap-
plicable .... .12
Although the use of the new instrument met with a cool reaction in some
Federal Reserve circles, with Governor Robertson regarding this type of note
as a "gimmick" that should be treated like the deposit it was,' the Comptroller's
decision was accepted by the Board. It agreed that
since such notes constitute borrowings, they are not subject, under present
177 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKING, NATIONAL BANKS AND THE FUTURE 153 (1962).
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law and regulation, to the interest rate limitations or reserve requirements
prescribed for deposits by the Board.
* *'*Borrowings of this type would, of course, be . . . added to all
other borrowings in the application of statutory or other limitations on
the total amount of debt a bank may incur.8 4
Problems arose in 1965, when the Comptroller partially reversed his prior
position on the subject. He ruled that
such promissory notes, issued in the regular course of business to obtain
working funds for use in making loans and the performance of ordinary
banking functions, represent liabilities of the nature excepted from the
provisions of 12 U.S.C. Such notes may, therefore, be issued without regard
to the limitations on indebtedness contained in that section.8 5 (Emphasis
added.)
But,
notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation Q and D issued by the Federal
Reserve Board, it is the position of the Comptroller of the Currency that
the proceeds of such notes do not constitute deposits and that the provisions
of 12 U.S.C. 461, 462, and 1813 relating to reserves, interest limitations,
and deposit insurance are not applicable., (Emphasis added.)
Thus, though the Comptroller did not change his position that these notes do
not constitute deposits, he no longer regarded them as borrowings subject to
the statutory borrowing limitations. At the same time, it seems clear that these
notes do not fall within any of the expressly enumerated exceptions to the
indebtedness limitation' 7 The Comptroller's view that these notes are neither
deposits nor borrowings seems logically indefensible.
As already noted, Governor Roobertson regarded the promissory note as
a "gimmick." Others pointed out that the unsecured note served a purpose
identical to that of the certificate of deposit and appeared to be used to avoid
compliance with the reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings of deposits
while retaining the benefits afforded by them.' To some this seemed much like
the payment of interest on demand deposits (because of their short term and
the occasional agreements whereby creditors could get their money back before
maturity), which Congress had voted to abolish in 1933."9 Such attitudes led
to the idea that, if the volume of promissory notes increased substantially, the
Board might change its definition of deposits to include them, thereby rendering
applicable the reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings. Such an idea was
well founded, for in July 1966, under its authority to prevent evasions of section
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19 of the Federal Reserve Act,' the Board did take this action.19' Despite the
opposition of the Comptroller to this regulation, in light of the use of these notes
to evade regulations and the Board's authority to prevent such evasion, and in
the light of the weaknesses in the Comptroller's position, the Board can be judged
to have acted both wisely and properly.
14. Securities Disclosure Regulations
Although the majority of federal jurisdictional disputes we have seen deal
with variant interpretations of a bank's external powers, the internal corporate
structure also feels the effects of these conflicts. Disagreement regarding this area
followed the 1964 amendments 92 to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.'
The purpose of the amendments is to provide stockholders and prospective
stockholders of companies selling securities over the counter with information
about the companies.11 Companies having assets of at least 1 million dollars
and at least 500 stockholders are subject to the act.'95 According to an estimate
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, some 600 United States banks
representing 36% of all bank securities are brought under the act by the new
provisions.
9
The amendments require public disclosure of information concerning the
company's financial status, proxy solicitations, and insider trading. 97 The
amendments, however, contain a special provision regarding the regulation of bank
securities. The regulation of bank securities is taken out of the hands of the
SEC and instead is divided among the three federal bank supervisory agencies. 9
The law provides that these agencies may develop their own rules and regula-
tions for implementing the provisions of the act.' 99 The regulations adopted by
the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, pursuant
to the new law, are virtually identical. They both outline specific regulations
191 The Board ruled:
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the term "deposits" shall be deemed to include any promissory note, acknowledg-
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concerning the submission of financial statements and periodic reports. Rules
have also been adopted with respect to proxy solicitations and insider trading20
The Board and the FDIC appear to have made an effort to conform their
regulations to those applied by the Securities and Exchange Commission to non-
banking corporations °0
As might be expected, the regulations adopted by the Comptroller are
somewhat less stringent. They deal briefly with stockholders reports, proxy
solicitations, and ownership reports.0 2 They also require that registration state-
ments and offering circulars be filed with his office."0 ' This filing regulation is
the only one that is purported to be issued under the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1964.24
The lenient regulations of the Comptroller were attacked by the House
Committee on Banking and Currency as being "contrary to the intent of Con-
gress as expressed in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964" . . . .205 In
rebuttal, Mr. Saxon took the position that the act recognizes the need for
variance in security regulation when these regulations are to be applied to banks
rather than to other types of business. It seems to be the view of the Comptroller
that disclosure to investors may be of first importance where an ordinary corpo-
ration is involved, but in the case of a commercial bank the protection of in-
vestors is not as important as the protection of depositors. He also asserts
that the Comptroller has the power to act independently of the other regulatory
agencies in this area 2 08
Despite the validity of the Comptroller's opinion, it must be assumed that
a purpose of the act is to provide the investing public with an informational
common denominator from which they can make intelligent investment decisions.
To the extent that regulations of the Comptroller differ from those of the
Federal Reserve and FDIC, meaningful comparisons between the securities
of different banks are difficult if not impossible, and consequently the
purposes of the legislation have been defeated.
20 7
Investors are certainly not the only parties affected in this conflict. It can
be argued that the more strict regulations of the Federal Reserve Board and
FDIC give national banks another competitive advantage over state insured
banks and state member banks. The magnitude of the advantage is attested to
by the conversion of the largest state member bank in Missouri to a national
200 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 206.1-.7 (Supp. 1966) (regulations of the Federal Reserve Board);
12 C.F.R. §§ 335.1-.7 (Supp. 1966) (regulations of the FDIC).
201 There is one notable difference from the corresponding SEC rules in the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation F, however. The Board's regulation omits the SEC requirement
that proposals submitted by corporate stockholders be included by bank management in proxy
solicitations. See note, 41 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 451 (1966).
202 12 C.F.R. §§ 10.1-.4, 11.1-.6, 12.1-.12, 16.1-.11 (Supp. 1966), revised, 31 Fed.
Reg. 6949, 6950, 6952, 6955 (1966).
203 12 C.F.R. § 16.1-.11, revised, 31 Fed. Reg. 6955 (1966).
204 Ibid.
205 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 290.
206 Id. at 388.
207 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 626 (1966).
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charter, based in part on the bank's wishing to avoid the stringent disclosure
regulations contemplated by the Federal Reserve Board.2 8
All of the problems created by the new disclosure requirements cannot be
traced to the jurisdictional conflict. Of more practical concern to the banks
is the fact that the financial statements that they must submit under the various
regulations are quite different from those required for the call reports. "Thus
the banks are in a position of having to supply two materially different sets of
financial statements as of the same date to the same federal agency to become
a matter of public record." ' 9 This would appear to be an unnecessary burden
on the banks, which burden might be eliminated if the forms required by the
disclosure regulations and the call reports could follow the same format.2 1
15. Absorption of Exchange Charges
Generally, relations between the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation have been harmonious. They do, however, share
a disagreement, begun in 1934, that continues to trouble the banking industry.
This conflict concerns the absorption of exchange charges.
An exchange charge is a fee exacted by some banks for the payment of
checks drawn on them and presented through the mails. The payee bank is
charged by the drawee bank. This charge could be passed on to the payee;
but at this stage, a payee bank or its correspondent usually absorbs the charge.21
The payee is thus credited with a greater amount than was actually collected212
by his bank from the drawee bank.
It is the contention of the Federal Reserve Board that this absorption of
exchange charges is in fact an indirect payment of interest on the payee's de-
posi21 2 in violation of section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act, which forbids the
direct or indirect payment of interest on demand deposits. 1 4
Banks supervised by the FDIC are bound by a similar statutory prohibition
against the payment of interest on demand deposits.21 However, the FDIC has
taken the position that
the absorption of exchange charges by an insured nonmember bank in
connection with its routine collection for its depositors of checks drawn
208 American Banker, Nov. 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 4, at 2, col. 1. It should be noted, however,
that the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board did not become effective until Jan. 1, 1965,
and that before the regulations were adopted a flurry of excitement was caused when it was
rumored that the regulations of both the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC would include
the requirement of certified financial statements. 21 Bus. LAw. 427 (1965).
209 [Jan.-Sept. 1966] 2 N.Y. ADV. COMm. ON COMMERCIAL BANY SUPERVIsIoN RaP. 3 n.3.
210 Id. at 44.
211 Exchange charges are seldom absorbed by a bank for its individual customers, however.
In the typical case the charge is absorbed by a city correspondent bank for a country bank,
which maintains a compensating balance with the city correspondent. Hackley, Absorption
of Bank Exchange Charges as a Payment .of Interest, 40 VA. L. Rzv. 603, 613 (1944).
212 The old meaning of "exchange charge" was more literal. It referred to the actual
expense incurred by a bank in transferring funds or credit. The amount of the charge re-
flected the difference between the value of money in two different areas resulting from
fluctuations in the supply and demand for money in those areas. See SPAHR, THE CLEARING
AND COLLECTION 01 CHECKS 102 (1926).
213 29 FED. RESERVE BULL. 817 (1943).
214 48 Stat. 181 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1964).
215 64 Stat. 893 (1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (Supp. I, 1965), as amended,
12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(g) (Supp. 1966).
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on other banks cannot be considered a payment of interest, within the
terms of the interest regulation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, in the absence of facts or circumstances establishing that the practice
is resorted to as a device for the payment of interest.21 6
It is significant to note that both the FDIC and the Federal Reserve agree
as to the soundness of the usual judicial definition of interest, which is: "any
payment to or for the account of any depositor as compensation for the use of
funds constituting a deposit."21 It is only when the agencies must apply this
definition to the absorption of exchange charges that their views fail to coincide.
An attempt was made in 1943 to resolve the conflict when the Brown-
Maybank Bill.. was introduced into Congress. The bill amended the existing
legislation that governed the payment of interest by state member banks. It
provided that the existing law "shall not be deemed to prohibit the absorption
of exchange or collection charges by member banks.""1 9 The bill won the ap-
proval of the House in 1944,22 but it met defeat in the Senate.2 ' Since that
time Congress has repeatedly been requested to settle the dispute," but as yet
no congressional action has been taken. " Thus as the situation stands at present,
insured nonmember state banks may solicit deposits by agreeing to absorb ex-
change charges, while a state member bank may not.
B. Competitive Effects of the Conflicts Between the Federal Regulatory
Agencies -National Banks v. State Member Banks
As is manifest in the preceding discussion, these controversies among the
federal supervisory agencies and their series of conflicting rulings have not been
without effect upon the regulated banks. The federal laws were intended to be ap-
plied in an equal manner to all three classes of federally regulated banks: national,
state member, and nonmember insured state banks. However, the rulings that
the Comptroller has issued in order to regulate the operations of national banks
pursuant to this legislation have been based upon more liberal readings of the
controlling statutes than have been the rulings published by the Federal Reserve
Board and the FDIC, and applied to their member banks. Consequently, the
Comptroller's regulations have placed national banks in a more advantageous
position in their competition with state banks.
216 Hearings on H.R. 3956 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 78th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 117 (1944).
217 Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.2(a) (1963) (Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R. § 329.2(a)
(1963) (FDIC).
218 H.R. 3956, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
219 Ibid.
220 90 CONG. REc. 2170 (1944).
221 Id. at 2190.
222 SENATE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF
BANKING LAws 200 (Comm. Print 1956).
223 In 1965 the Federal Reserve Board made the following recommendations: That legisla-
tion be enacted that would "require all insured banks to pay at 'par' all checks drawn upon
them - that is, without deduction of an exchange charge." If such legislation is not enacted
then the Board recommended in the alternative that "provisions of the Federal Reserve Act
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act with respect to the payment of interest on deposits
by member and nonmember insured banks be amended to state expressly that absorption of
exchange charges by such banks constitutes a payment of interest for the purposes of such
provision." 52d ANN. REP. OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs. 240,
241 (1966).
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By allowing national banks to include capital notes, capital debentures,
and undivided profits in the computation of "capital and surplus" for the pur-
pose of computing loan restrictions and reserve requirements, while state banks
axe not permitted to do so, the Comptroller has conferred a definite benefit on
the national banks. Likewise, the classification of federal funds transactions
as neither loans nor borrowings permits national banks to circumvent restric-
tions on the lending and borrowing powers of banks that do apply to state banks
that are under the regulation of the Federal Reserve Board. The purchase of
the stock of subsidiary corporations will allow national banks to expand their
operations and to provide more flexibility in their organizational structure. The
power to acquire stocks of domestic banks with the Comptroller's approval
provides national banks with investment opportunities not available to state
banks that are under the Federal Reserve Board's control. In sum, national
banks now possess a definite edge in their competitive struggle with state banks
for the banking business in this country.
Not all of the disputes between the Comptroller, the Federal Reserve, and
the FDIC have significantly benefitted national banks in their contest with state
banks. Some of the disputes, as the controversies over "window-dressing," as-
surances from bank service corporations, purchases of stock of foreign banks,
and the definition of "executive officer," are rather inconsequential in their
effect upon the competitive balance between the national and state banking
systems. Other of the Comptroller's regulations that, if fully implemented, would
have added significantly to the national banks' edge over state banks have not
become generally operative. Underwriting revenue bonds, accepting corporate
savings deposits, and issuing unsubordinated promissory notes would have
afforded national banks even stronger weapons in their economic rivalry with
state banks; but, fortunately for state banking interests, such activities have been
stymied by the Federal Reserve Board.
Overall, the effectiveness of the Comptroller's policies has been seriously
hampered by the questionableness of his authority in many of these matters. The
major portion of the blame for the doubtful legality of his authorizations lies
in the confused jurisdictional boundaries existing among the three federal bank-
ing supervisory agencies. Because of the uncertain status of these rulings, many
national banks have been justifiably reluctant to implement them for fear of
violating conflicting regulations of the other agencies. Thus, the competitive
advantages that national banks now enjoy are not yet being exercised to their
fullest potentialities. Before this competitive inequality becomes even greater,
steps should be taken by Congress to ensure coordination between the federal
supervisory agencies and to provide for equal application of federal laws to all
federally regulated banks.
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III -CONFLICTS WITHIN THE DuAL BANKING SYSTEM
NATIONAL BANKS v. STATE BANKS
A. Comptroller of the Currency v. the Dual Banking System
1. Introduction
The application of more liberal interpretations of federal laws and regula-
tions to national banks, which has resulted in the above-mentioned conflicts
among the federal supervisory agencies,224 has benefited the national banks. In
addition, national banks have been aided in their competition with state banks
by rulings and directives from the Comptroller's Office that have resulted in
increased national banking powers. In areas of supervision clearly within the
scope of the Comptroller's authority over national banks, he has pursued a
policy that adopts the most expansive view of national banking powers permis-
sible under the federal statutes. He has achieved some degree of success in his
attempt to instill more flexibility and energy in the national banking system by
means of construing the statutory language in the manner most favorable to
the national banks, arguing strongly on the basis of alleged congressional intent,
and relying heavily upon the "implied powers" of national banks.
The goal of the Comptroller appears to be a reform of the entire banking
industry which he is attempting to implement through the leadership of the
national banking system. In his view, it is the obligation of the banking industry
to be responsive to the needs of the economy and to provide the full range of
banking facilities and services necessary for continued economic growth. Such
a view inevitably leads to conflicts with some of the established traditions in the
banking industry; but apparently, the Comptroller feels that this is a small price
that must be paid if he is to provide the banking industry with the resources
and responses necessary to meet the growing needs of the economy.
Undeterred by charges that he has exceeded his statutory authority, that
his orders permit national banks to violate statutory restrictions, and that his
actions have seriously threatened the continued existence of the dual banking
system, the Comptroller has single-handedly pressed his campaign to enlarge
the powers of national banks. The following are but a few of the many areas
in which the Comptroller has expanded the scope of permissible activities for
national banks.
2. Purchase of the Stock of Travel Agencies and Mortgage Service Corporations
In an attempt to provide greater organizational flexibility for national
banks, the Comptroller has promulgated a ruling that authorizes national banks
to purchase the stock of travel agencies and mortgage service corporations.2 "
224 See text accompanying footnotes 1-223.
225 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL 1OR NATIONAL BANKS ff 7476, in 3
CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 1 59878 (1966):
A national bank may engage in activities which are a part of the business of
banking or incidental thereto through a department of the bank or through a
subsidiary corporation, the controlling stock of which is owned by the bank. For
example, through a bank department or a subsidiary corporation, a national bank
may issue credit cards, service mortgages, lease' property, offer travel services, or
operate a credit bureau.
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This authorization has been challenged on the grounds not only that this power
is not granted by law, but that it is prohibited by the seventh paragraph of 12
U.S.C. § 24,' which severely restricts the purchase of corporate stock by a
national bank. The Comptroller's response was that
neither the provisions contained in that paragraph nor their purpose or
legislative history prohibits, or in any way limits, the judicially recognized
right of a national bank to exercise all such powers as are incidental to the
business of banking, including the power to carry on certain activities
which are a part of the business of banking through a subsidiary corpora-
tion.
2217
He argued that servicing mortgage loans has "long been recognized as an essen-
tial part of the business of banking"12 ' and that providing travel services is the
natural and necessary complement of long-standing banking services such
as the issuance of travelers' letters of credit and travelers' checks, the making
of loans to finance the costs of travel, the provision of custody accounts and
safe deposit facilities, and the entire range of bank credits employed in
international trade and investment.-
29
The Comptroller attempted to justify his position by claiming that these travel
and mortgage services are within the incidental powers of national banks. As
incidental powers they may be exercised either directly through a department
of the bank or "indirectly through a subsidiary corporation, the stock of which
is owned by the bank."" 0
In rebuttal, the House Banking Committee pointed to the often repeated
holding that the "measure of powers of national banks is the statutory grant
and powers not conferred by Congress are denied." '' The Comptroller's re-
liance on the "incidental powers" provision of section 24232 in order to justify
his authorization permitting national banks to purchase the stock of travel agencies
See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS 11 7379, in 3 COCH
FED. BANKING L. REP. 59880A (1966); COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR
NATIONAL BANKS 7475, in 3 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. % 59890 (1966).
226 REV. STAT. § 5136 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), as amended, 12
U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp. 1966):
Seventh. To exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers or
agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts,
bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and
selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and
by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this
chapter .... Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing
herein contained shall authorize the purchase by the association for its own account
of any shares of stock of any corporation.
227 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 388.
228 Ibid.
229 Id. at 389.
230 Id. at 390.
231 Ibid. See Yonkers v. Downey, 309 U.S. 590, 596 (1940); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 253 (1934); First Nat'l Bank v. Converse, 200 U.S. 425, 439
(1906); California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 366 (1897); Logan County Nat'l Bank
v. Townsend, 139 U.S. 67, 73 (1891); First Nat'l Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92
U.S. 122, 128 (1875).
232 REV. STAT. § 5136 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964), as amended, 12
U.S.C.A. § 24 (Supp. 1966).
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and mortgage service corporations ignored another provision in that same para-
graph. This provision states that "nothing contained herein shall authorize
the purchase of the association for its own account of any shares of any cor-
poration." '233 The stand taken by the Comptroller becomes even more untenable
when one considers that the power of national banks to purchase the stock of
a safe deposit business is the result of express statutory authorization.23 If this
power had already been within the incidental powers of the banking business,
then according to the Comptroller's reasoning, no such specific authorization
would have been necessary. Clearly, by making this specific exception to the
general rule prohibiting stock purchases by national banks, Congress has demon-
strated that it does not consider stock purchases to be among the incidental
powers of the banking industry. The major exception to this general prohibi-
tion on the purchase of corporate stock that has been recognized by the courts,
although not specially granted by statute, has been the ability of national banks
to invest temporarily in other corporations for the purpose of diminishing or
avoiding losses on outstanding loans to those corporations when such loss appears
imminent.
235
In relying on the "incidental powers" provision of section 24 to the exclu-
sion of the remaining provisions of that section, the Comptroller has violated a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that specifies that when general and
specific provisions are contained in the same statute, the specific provisions limit
the general ones. 3 The virtual absence of any judicial precedents supporting
the Comptroller's expansive interpretation of the "incidental powers" clause "r
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) strongly suggests that his viewpoint is fallacious.
Regardless of the rationality or economic desirability of the Comptroller's posi-
tion, it appears that his authorization of these corporate stock purchases is at
variance with the clear meaning of the controlling legislation.
3. Provision of Insurance Services
In another easing of restrictions by the Comptroller, national banks have
been given the authorization to act as insurance agents in communities of less
than 5,000 population, irrespective of the size of the community in which the
bank's home office is located;27 to act as agents in the sale of insurance incidental
233 Ibid.
234 Provided, That in carrying on the business commonly known as the safe-deposit
business the association shall not invest in the capital stock of a corporation or-
ganized under the law of any State to conduct a safe-deposit business in an amount
in excess of 15 per centum of the capital stock of the association actually paid in
and unimpaired and 15 per centum of its unimpaired surplus. Id.
235 First Nat'l Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875); Birdsell Mfg. v.
Anderson, 104 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1939) (recognizing the power to purchase and conduct
a business for the purpose of avoiding a loss); Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (1936),
rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937); Norton Grocery Co. v. People's Nat'l Bank,
151 Va. 195, 144 S.E. 501 (1928) (bank may pledge its credit to save an imminent loss
under a lawful contract); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. 'First-Second Nat'l Bank, 260 Pa.
223, 233, 103 AtI. 598, 600 (1918) (dictum).
236 CRAWFoRD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES, § 167 (1940); 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 4909-11 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
237 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, ff 7100, in 3 CCH
FED. BANKING L. REP. 59861 (1966).
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to bank transactions, without regard to the community population;"8 and to
underwrite credit life insurance policies." 9
The ruling that any office of a national bank may act as an agent for any
fire, life, or other insurance company if that office is located in a community
having a population of less than 5,000, even though the principal office of that
bank may be in a community with a population in excess of 5,000, has been
challenged on the ground that its statutory source, 12 U.S.C. § 92, had been
repealed in 1918. The Comptroller, while recognizing that "there is a disagree-
ment among lawyers as to the technical status of section 92 as having the force
of law," 240 argued that "the Comptroller's Office, along with the other banking
agencies and the banking industry generally, has always gone on the assumption
that the provisions contained in 12 U.S.C. 92 remain as part of the law."241
In this contention, the Comptroller is strongly supported by at least one writer
who says that: "In this respect, the Comptroller was clearly correct .... The
provisions in question were omitted from the United States Code in 1952 (not
in 1918) by a careless codifier simply because of an inadvertanfly misplaced
quotation mark ....
The ruling that national banks may participate in insurance arrangements
that are incidental to banking transactions was subjected to the same attack as
that made upon the rulings allowing national banks to purchase corporate stocks.
The Comptroller once again relied upon his expansive interpretation of the in-
cidental powers clause of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). "It is clear that the business
of banking is advanced by financial and related services, and powers necessary
to achieve and promote the fundamental purposes of banking must be regarded
as powers incidental to those expressly granted . . . . ,,' The most telling
criticism of this view was simply stated by the House Banking Committee:
What he overlooks is that the conduct of a national bank is a very
highly regulated business; and that by virtue of their subjection to so wide
a range of governmental supervision national banks are not at liberty to
deduce corporate authority with the same liberality as private commercial
entities.
244
The Comptroller was once again unable to cite any judicial interpretations in
support of his contentions, and his arguments based upon the concept of inci-
dental powers are less than persuasive. It would seem only reasonable that an
express congressional authorization would be required before national banks
would be justified in invading the field of insurance - a move that the Comptrol-
ler's regulation directly portends.
A stronger argument can be made in support of the Comptroller's ruling
238 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, 7110, in 3 CCH
FED. BANKING L. REP. 1 59862 (1966).
239 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, 1 7495, in 3 CCH
FED. BANKING L. REP. 1 58897 (1966).
240 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 391.
241 Ibid.
242 Hackley, supra note 207, at 778.




that permits a national bank to sell credit life insurance to a customer in order to
insure that the balance of the customer's loan held by that bank will be paid
in case of the customer's death. Such a debt cancellation policy seems to be a
justifiable means of self-protection for a national bank. The Comptroller
contended:
The debt cancellation ruling is not intended as a means of enabling
national banks to invade the field of life insurance. Rather, it is a recogni-
tion of a national bank's right to protect itself against anticipated losses
in connection with its lending activities, through the establishment and
maintenance of appropriate reserves.
245
Even critics of the Comptroller recognized the validity of this argument and
they merely suggested that it might be more convenient and expeditious to
purchase a group life insurance policy covering all borrowers.246
4. Leasing of Personal Property
In an unprecedented ruling the Comptroller authorized national banks to
become the owners and lessors of personal property purchased upon the specific
request of the customer and for his use.24 This ruling came as the result of a
study of current national bank lease financing practices. It was found that the
lessor's economic function was of little significance to the bank in determining
whether to proceed with the financing transaction.
In these transactions a bank lent money to a lessor solely upon the credit
of a lessee for the purchase of property specifically requested by the lessee
,4 for its immediate possession and use. The lessor acted solely as a holder
of title and as a nominal debtor.
248
In recognition of the obligation incumbent upon the banking industry to grow
and adapt to the changing needs of the economy, the Comptroller sought to
simplify and expedite lease financing by eliminating the unnecessary nominal
lessor, thus allowing national banks to directly lease tangible personalty. The
Comptroller based his case upon the proposition that "the economic development
of the United States had brought this form of lease financing into the business
of banking."2 49
However commendable one may deem the Comptroller's attempt to remove
the facade from current lease financing agreements, it has been asserted that
"the activity sanctioned by this Ruling would appear to be the least supportable
245 Id. at 393.
246 Id. at 394.
247 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, 3400, in 3 CCH
FED. BANxING L. REP. 59776 (1966):
A national bank may become the owner or lessor of personal property acquired
upon the specific request and for the use of a customer and may incur such addi-
tional obligations as may be incident to becoming an owner and lessor of such
property. Lease transactions do not result in obligations for the purpose of 12 U.S.C.
84. Since lease payments are in the nature of rent rather than interest, 12 U.S.C. 85
and 86 are not applicable.




of any that he has issued. ' 250 Nowhere is such a venture into mercantile activity
expressly granted by statute, nor can it be legitimately implied as incidental to
the business of banking.25 ' The effects of this ruling would not only bring national
banks into competition with existing businesses engaged in leasing, but would also
open the door to national bank participation in numerous other commercial
activities having little or no relation to the business of banking. "In short, all
limitations against embarking upon unrelated mercantile activities would fall with
the sanctioning of equipment leasing .... ""' The arguments offered by the
Comptroller in support of his ruling fail to establish proper authority for such
a radical departure from past practices. In view of the highly regulated nature
of national banking powers, it would seem hardly sufficient to permit this radical
extension of a national bank power to be effectuated by means of a mere ruling
by the Comptroller.
5. Stock Option Plan
The Comptroller has ruled that national banks may offer stock options to
their employees.25' The purpose of this ruling is to enable the banks to com-
petitively recruit and retain competent personnel. Adoption of this form of
incentive compensation was dictated by economic necessity, since other corpora-
tions have long employed such means of compensating their employees. The
House Banking Committee, finding the Comptroller's ruling unobjectionable,
stated:
Inasmuch as stock options relate to the internal management of national
banking corporations and represent a form of compensation calculated
to encourage the loyalty and to promote the initiative of employees, it
would seem that the comptroller's authorization thereof, subject to the
safeguard of stockholder approval stipulated in his regulations, probably
can be held as not contravening any express provision of law applicable to
such banks.
254
A further presumption of validity of allowing stock options can be found in the
holding that stockholders of a national bank have the incidental power to create
a pension fund for the officers and employees. 5 By analogy, this incidental
power can easily be seen to apply to the creation of stock option plans.
6. Real Estate Loans
The Comptroller has ruled that when a national bank relies primarily on
the general credit standing of the borrower in making a loan, the loan, though
250 Ibid.
251 By no accepted judicial interpretation of power allotted to national banks by 12
U.S.C. 24 can equipment leasing be viewed as an authorized activity of national
banks .... [N]o precedents have been recorded which would support a national
bank's venture into equipment leasing. 1-d. at 396.
252 Id. at 397.
253 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, 5015, in 3
CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 59813 (1966).
254 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 380-81.
255 Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1916).
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secured by real estate, is not a "real estate" loan256 and is not subject to the
restrictions contained in 12 U.S.C. § 371.57 This section states that
a loan secured by real estate within the meaning of this section shall be
in the form of an obligation or obligations secured by a mortgage, trust
deed, or other instrument upon real estate which shall constitute a first
lien ....
According to the Comptroller, "the quoted language is obviously regulatory,
not definitory." 58 The mere fact that a real estate security interest is taken in
a loan does not automatically make it a "real estate" loan.
Where a bank is primarily relying on [the] general credit standing of the
borrower, guarantees, or security other than real estate the loan does not
constitute a real estate loan within the meaning of 12 U.S.C. 371, although
as a matter of prudent banking practice it may also be secured by real
estate.
259
In making a personal loan that is entirely sound standing by itself, a bank may
nevertheless take a real estate security interest merely as additional protection
in the case of default. In the Comptroller's estimation, it would be patently
unjust to classify this type of personal loan as a "real estate" loan within the
meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 371. "Such a construction obviously defeated the
remedial purpose of the section which was to require maximum protection for
the bank.)
260
In another disputed ruling concerning real estate loans, the Comptroller
has said that real estate may be considered "improved" for loan purposes when
its value has been enhanced by substantial and permanent improvements on
other property in the immediate vicinity.26' This approach was attacked as being
violative of the literal meaning of improved real estate - "land which at the
given time is substantially enhanced in value by some probably durable struc-
tural improvement."262 The statute itself does not define "improved real estate,"
so its definition has always been the responsibility of the Comptroller's Office.
In formulating his latest definition, the Comptroller has given recognition to the
economic reality "that many changes may happen, both on and in the vicinity
of the real estate such as affords all the protection to the lender that is contem-
plated by the statutory requirement that the real estate be improved. 26 3
While these two rulings may depart from prior policies of the Comptroller's
Office, their underlying rationale suggests a purposeful effort on the part of the
256 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, 2000(b), in 3
CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 1 59741 (1966).
257 44 Stat. 1232 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 371 (Supp. I, 1965). This section authorizes national banks, with certain exceptions, to make
loans secured by first liens upon improved property and set limitations on the amount of
such loans.
258 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 399.
259 Id. at 399-400.
260 Id. at 400.
261 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANIcS, 2020(d), in
3 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 59742 (1966).
262 Feist v. Fifth Avenue Bank, 280 N.Y. 189, 192, 20 N.E.2d 388, 389 (1939).
263 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 401.
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Comptroller to update the regulations established by his office, thus harmonizing
his rulings with the economic facts of life.
7. Pledge of Bank Shares
The Comptroller has promulgated a regulation that would permit national
banks to require a borrower who holds shares of the bank to execute agreements
(1) not to pledge the shares other than to the lending bank; (2) to pledge the
shares to the bank at the bank's request when necessary to prevent loss; (3)
to leave such shares in the bank's custody.26" ' These requirements have been chal-
lenged as violating the prohibition that "no association shall make any loan
or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock .... "265 The
Comptroller attempted to defend his ruling by maintaining that "none of the
transactions described in that ruling constitute a pledge of bank stock as se-
curity."2 66 He pointed out that 12 U.S.C. § 83 allows national banks to accept
their own shares as security in order to prevent a loss on an existing loan, and
he insisted that each of the prescribed methods is merely a means of assuring
the availability of the stock as security if a loss should appear imminent. He
considered his regulations to be necessary if section 83 is to have any true pro-
tective value for national banks. 6r
The House Banking Committee claimed that such agreements are, in effect,
pledges of stock in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 83, since they impose severe re-
straints on the transferability of the stock. The Committee relied upon the
1904 case of Third Nat'l Bank v. Buffalo German Ins. Co.,26 a case involving re-
strictions similar to those advocated by the Comptroller except that they were in-
corporated in the bylaws and stock certificates of the bank. These restrictions
were held ultra vires. However, while asserting that these "liens" on the bank's
own stock are unlawful, the courts have admitted that, after such agreements
are executed and the stocks sold in accordance with the authorization, only the
government can complain of a violation of section 83; and the former stock-
holder cannot void the subsequent sale by the national bank.2 69
It appears that the House Banking Committee has the weight of judicial
precedent strongly in its favor. The regulation set out by the Comptroller seems
to be little more than a clever device to enable national banks to engage in an
activity that has been forbidden to them. Even though the Comptroller's position
can be defended by arguments stressing the borrower's freedom of contract, it
seems clear that fundamentally the regulation was designed merely to circumvent
the clear prohibitions on stock pledges contained in section 83.
8. Interest Rates on Loans
In the interest of securing competitive equality for national banks, the
264 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, 6030(b), in 3
CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 59836 (1966).
265 REV. STAT. § 5201 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 83 (1964).
266 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 408.
267 Ibid.
268 193 U.S. 581 (1904).
269 National Bank v. Stewart, 107 U.S. 676, 677-78 (1883); First Nat'l Bank v. Lanz,
202 Fed. 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1913).
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Comptroller has ruled that national banks may charge the maximum rate of
interest permitted by state law for any competing lending institution.2 0 This
includes institutions licensed under the state small loans acts, subject only to
those statutory limitations concerning the amount of the loan that may be made
at a given interest rate. The Comptroller insisted that it was the clear congres-
sional intent of 12 U.S.C. § 85271 to leave national banks free to compete with
state lending institutions. To hold that national banks must operate under more
restrictive conditions that their state-chartered competitors would put them at
a distinct disadvantage in the operations of the dual banking system.2 7 2 Without
his provision, the Comptroller feared that national banks would be vulnerable
to open discrimination at the hands of the state legislatures as to interest rates
chargeable on loans.
Critics of this regulation argued that, instead of establishing equality be-
tween national and: state banks, it has allowed -national banks to obtain a com-
petitive advantage over state banks. For example, under the small loans act of at
least one state,7 ' the legislature has specifically excluded commercial banks
from the act's coverage; but the Comptroller has said that such an exclusion
does not apply to national banks. 4 National banks may, therefore, charge the
270 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL BANKS, ff 7310, in 3
CCH FED. BANKING L. Rzp. 59872 (1966):
A national bank may charge interest at the maximum rate permitted by state
law to any competing state-chartered or licensed lending institution. If state law
permits a higher interest rate on a specified class of loans, a national bank making
such loans at such higher rate is subject only to the provisions of state law, relating
to such class of loans that are material to the determination of [or] permitted to be
charged by a state-licensed small loan company or morris plan bank, without being
so licensed.
A national bank located in a state the law of which denies the defense of usury
to a corporate borrower may charge a corporate borrower any rate of interest agreed
upon by such borrower.
271 Rnv. STAT. § 5179 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964):
Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made, or upon any notes, bills of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at
the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is
located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day
commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal reserve
district where the bank is located, whichever may be greater, and no more, except
that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organized
under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized
or existing in any such State under this chapter. When no rate is fixed by the laws
of the State, or Territory, or District, the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge
a rate not exceeding 7 per centum, or 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate
on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal reserve bank in the Federal
reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may be the greater, and such
interest may be taken in advance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or
other evidence of debt has to run.
272 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 404:
To contend now . . . that national banks are not free to compete with any com-
peting State lending institutions is to ignore this clear congressional intent and thus
to argue that national banks are required to operate and compete in a dual banking
system under conditions more restrictive and less favorable than those applicable
to State-chartered institutions. [Comptroller Saxon speaking.]
273 Tax. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 6165b, § 6(a)(11) (Supp. 1966).
274 Letter from James J. Saxon, United States Comptroller of the Currency, to Jack C.
Adams, Vice President of the Austin National Bank, Austin, Texas, Sept. 20, 1965. This
letter did not constitute a regulation; it was an interpretation of an existing ruling. See Note,
44 TzxAs L. Rav. 547 (1966).
In a recent letter to a Texas banker, the United States Comptroller of the
Currency stated that the attempt by the Texas Regulatory Loan Act (Small Loans
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higher interest rate on small loans as provided for in the act, while state banks
are not permitted to do so. The unfairness of this result clearly indicates how
the purpose of 12 U.S.C. § 85, which is to insure equality of treatment for
national banks in relation to state-chartered banking institutions, can be per-
verted to secure a competitive edge for national banks.
To further aggravate the problem, the interpretation advanced by the Comp-
troller is also broad enough to allow national banks to charge the higher credit
union rates on larger loans, since credit unions do loan money and, thus, argu-
ably are competing lending institutions.. 75 Such applications of the Comptroller's
ruling illustrate the unfair results that this policy would have for state banks,
which remain subject to all of the restrictive provisions in the state laws setting
the maximum rate of interest that may be charged. "These advantages will
place national banks in a favorable competitive position with respect to consumer
loans, thus enabling them to acquire more diverse loan portfolios than state banks,
and to achieve greater operational stability."2' 6
In this dispute the Comptroller is not without supporting authority. The
leading case that served as precedent for his ruling is Tiffany v. National Bank.2 7
The Missouri legislature had attempted to restrict national and state banks to
an interest rate of eight percent on loans while allowing individual lenders to
charge ten percent. The Supreme Court, however, held that national banks can
charge the highest rate of interest permitted by state law.
The only mode of guarding against such contingencies [state discrimination
against national banks] was that which, we think, Congress adopted. It
was to allow to National [banking] associations the rate allowed by the
State to natural persons generally, and a higher rate, if State banks of
issue were authorized to charge a higher rate.
2 7 8
The Court referred to the banks as "national favorites" and went on to explain
that, in light of their purpose, which was to provide a national currency, it could
not have been the intention of Congress "to expose them to the hazard of un-
friendly legislation by States, or to ruinous competition with State banks. ' 279
The support for the Comptroller's stand that was provided by this case
is seriously weakened by the clearly "dated" nature of the Court's views. The
Court in this 1873 case, indicated that it believed state banks were soon to be
extinct. "[M]uch has been done to insure their [referring to national banks]
taking the place of State banks. The latter have been substantially taxed out
of existence."2 ' Operating from such a premise, the Court's willingness to
Act) to prevent national banks from charging the interest rates allowable under
that act is ineffective. As a result, national banks can now charge interest in excess
of the state's general usury rate of ten percent on consumer loans under 1,500
dollars - a privilege previously allowed only to regulated small-loans institutions.
Because the act presently prohibits state banks from charging these higher interest
rates, the competitive balance that existed between state and national banks has been
upset. Ibid.
275 Note, 44 TnxAs L. Rxv. 547, 549 n.26 (1966).
276 Id. at 549.
277 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1874).




show favoritism toward national banks is more easily understood; but cor-
respondingly, the value of this case as authority for the Comptroller's ruling is
thereby diminished.
An objective evaluation of the above competing contentions leads to a
rejection of the proposition that national banks should be allowed to charge the
highest permissible rate of interest in the state. The purpose of section 85 was
to secure to national banks equal treatment with state banks; it was not designed
to place national banks in a position superior to their state counterparts. The
competition envisaged between the national and state banking systems was to
be in the areas of performance of services and operating efficiency - not in the
area of obtaining statutory advantages. It seems unduly beneficial to national
banks to allow them to charge an interest rate in excess of that which state banks
are permitted to exact for the same type of loan. Since the Comptroller's
regulation will lead to such an injustice, this policy of "reverse discrimination"
against state banks should be abandoned.
9. Branch Banking
In addition to the regulations and interpretations already noted, the
Comptroller has relaxed restrictions in many other areas under his supervision.
His liberality in granting new national bank charters,28' his substantial enlarge-
ment of trust powers of national banks," 2 and his highly controverted policy
in approving branches of national banls& are but a few of the most noteworthy
of the relaxed practices indulged in by the Comptroller.
In all of these actions the Comptroller has encountered general opposition
and criticism, but none nearly as strong as that which has arisen over his branch
banking policy. The Comptroller's authorization is contained in 12 U.S.C.
§ 36:
(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches:
(1) Within the limits of the city, town, or village in which said association
is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time expressly
authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at
any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such
establishment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by
the statute law of the State in question by language specifically granting
such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition,
and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the
State on State banks.
2 8 4
In granting approvals of branch applications under this section, the Comp-
troller has taken the position that restrictions in state laws other than as to per-
missible locations are not applicable to national banks. 5 In support of this
281 Hearings on Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
282 12 C.F.R. § 9.1-.19 (Supp. 1966).
283 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. Rv. 771, 773-76 (1966).
284 48 Stat. 189 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964).
285 E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); First Nat'l
Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
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view, it can be said that some of the more technical limitations in state branching
laws appear to be little more than veiled attempts to protect local monopolies
and to restrain effective competition. 8 6 However, the Comptroller's goal is much
larger than the mere elimination of local banking monopolies. "He is concerned
with the broad problem of growth in the national economy and, more particularly,
with insuring the existence of adequate banking facilities to promote, rather than
to retard, national growth." '28 7 Thus, his branching policy is designed to provide
banking facilities in areas of recent population growth and to stimulate com-
petition in the banking industry. Also, it has been asserted that bank expansion
through branching increases the mobility of capital and bank credit and stabilizes
the financial structure of banks.. 8
In a recent decision involving Utah's branch banking law, the United States
Supreme Court considered the arguments put forward by the Comptroller and
ruled against his position. In First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,2
the Court held that all the restrictions of state branch banking laws are applicable
to national banks.28 ° This ruling should serve to end much of the present con-
troversy over branching since it is a clear repudiation of the Comptroller's view.
It is the view of some that
restrictive state laws and the admeasuring of national bank power by these
laws have grown to the point where they may be said to impair the
efficiency of the federal government in promoting economic development.
On such grounds, Congress, exercising its valid, implied powers, would
be justified in granting national banks the ability to branch irrespective
or state laws.291
In sharp disagreement with this proposal, state banking interests contend
that the states are in a better position to determine the nature and extent of
local banking needs and this function should be left to their legislatures.292
In this policy dispute, it is the Comptroller's position that the "national" interest
286 See examples of these highly complicated branching restrictions in Note, 38 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 315, 320-23 (1963); Note, 71 YALE L.J. 502, 509-16 (1962).
287 Note, 16 STAN. L. Rlv. 983 (1964).
288 Even where new unit banks would fulfill the need, at least two economic factors
make expansion through branching the preferable alternative. Branch banking
increases the mobility of capital or credit, permitting a shifting of funds from branches
with excess deposits to branches where demand for additional credit exists and thus
promoting the optimum use of money. Secondly, stability of banking is increased
since banks having branches can achieve a greater diversification of loan risks.
Id. at 984.
289 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
290 The Comptroller argued that Utah's statute "expressly authorizes" state banks to
have branches in their home municipalities. He maintains that the restriction, in
the subsequent paragraph of the statute limiting branching solely to the taking
over of an existing bank, is not applicable to national banks....
The Comptroller also contends that the [National Bank] Act supersedes state
law only as to "whether" and "where" branches may be located and not the
"method" by which this is effected. We believe that where a State allows branching
only by taking over an existing bank, it expresses as much "whether" and "where"
a branch may be located as does a prohibition or a limitation to the home office
municipality. As to the restriction being a "method," we have concluded that since
it is part and parcel of Utah's policy, it was absorbed by the provisions of § 36
(c) (1) and (2), regardless of the tag placed upon it. Id. at 261-62.
291 Note, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 315, 325-26 (1963).
292 Hearings on Conflict of Federal and State Banking Laws Before the House Committee
on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963).
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in promoting economic growth outweigh "local concerns"; and, consequently,
the policies of national banks should be determined primarily upon the basis of
this overriding national interest.'" The solution to this controversy requires a
policy determination that only Congress has authority to make. Under existing
congressional enactments, the First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.
case clearly points out that state laws currently set the standards for branching
for both state and national banks.
10. Appraisal of These Rulings
It is very difficult to assess, with any degree of accuracy, the exact effect that
these liberal policies pursued by the Comptroller will have upon the competitive
balance between national and state banks. Any such appraisal is valid only in
general terms, because as one writer has stated, "[T]here are bewildering varia-
tions with respect to the powers and operations of state banks."" 4 Each of the
fifty states has its own banking law that varies in countless ways from the banking
laws of all other states. For the banks of any particular state, the competitive
effect of expanded national bank powers depends upon the relative strictness
of the limitations contained in the laws of that state. In some matters, as the
leasing of personal property and charging the highest permissible interest rates,
the Comptroller's policies have clearly tended to give the national banks a de-
cided advantage in comparison to state banks. Other rulings, however, such
as the allowance of stock option plans and the pledge of the bank's own stock
on loans, have been rather inconsequential to the dual banking equilibrium.
The policy of the Comptroller in liberally approving branches for national banks
in circumstances where state banks were not permitted to branch had placed
the national banks in a decidedly superior competitive position over state banks;
however, this policy has now been rejected by the Supreme Court 95
Although a precise evaluation of each ruling is virtu'ally impossible, it is
possible to appraise the cumulative effect of the Comptroller's overall policy
as it has been manifested through his lenient regulations. In pursuing his goal
of providing adequate bank capabilities in order to ensure continued economic
growth, the Comptroller has sought to expand the powers of national banks to
the outermost limits of their statutory grants. In doing so, an imbalance in favor
of national banks over state banks has definitely been established. (As indicated
above, in more than a few instances, it seems apparent that the Comptroller's
liberalizing authorizations have violated the controlling federal legislation.)
These more lenient regulations for the national banking system reflect the
general attitude of the Comptroller's Office, which seeks to instill within the
banking industry as a whole the flexibility needed to cope with new problems
and an openness to accept new solutions for old problems. Despite this initiative
from the national banking system, there is still a reluctance on the part of the
states to change their banking laws to permit state banks to engage in certain
activities that the Comptroller has authorized for national banks. These con-
293 Id. at 278-79.
294 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 580 (1966).
295 See note 290 supra.
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flicting attitudes toward "change" provide the real basis for the imbalance
presently existing in the dual banking system. It is the "open" attitude on the
part of the Comptroller, more than any of his specific rulings, that has placed
national banks in a competitive position superior to that of their slow-to-change
state counterparts.
The present disadvantageous position of state banks need not be permanent.
The organization of the dual banking system will tend to force remedial action
by the states. It is one of the assets of our dual banking system that banks
chartered under one system may switch their charter to the other system if the
restrictions under their original system become relatively more burdensome. If
one system begins losing banks to the other, this is a signal that the system must
take steps to eliminate the competitive disparities. In this manner, each system
acts as a check upon the other to ensure continual modernization of their re-
spective regulatory schemes. At the present time the signal has been given, for
the state banking system is losing banks to the national system.96 Thus, the state
banking system must either seek remedial congressional action that would compel
the Comptroller to conform his regulations to the strict letter of the existing
federal banking laws or seek to provide a liberalization of controlling restrictions
through modernization of the state banking laws. Failure to do so will lead
to a continued deterioration of the state banking system. The warning has been
given, the next step is up to the states.
B. Federal Law v. State Law
1. Introduction
It is a well-established principle that national banks are not subject to any
state law that would interfere with the purpose of their creation, impair their
efficiency as a federal agency, discriminate against national banks, or conflict
with the laws of the United States.29 This privilege flows from the status of
national banks as "instrumentalities" of the federal government. While un-
doubtedly valid at the time when the national banking system was established,
this privileged status is open to question today.
The national banks were created to promulgate a national currency and to
implement the government's fiscal policy 9 In pursuing these goals, the national
banks were validly operating as instrumentalities of the government. But over
296 From 1960 through 1965, 118 state banks switched to national charters, while only
40 national banks converted to state charters. Admittedly, the national system's net gain of
78 banks in this six-year period does not indicate a mass exodus from the state system, but
it does reflect a distinct trend that possesses serious implications for the state banking system.
Even more significant than the number of banks changing to national charters is the size of
these banks. The 118 newly converted national banks had assets totaling $16.5 billion, while
the 40 banks leaving the national system had assets valued at only $396 million. These figures
clearly indicate a disturbing movement of the largest state banks into the national system.
[Jan.-Sept. 1966] 2 N.Y. ADv. CoM. OF COMMERCIAL BANK SUPERVISION REP. 3 n.3.
297 First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923); Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161
U.S. 275 (1896); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
298 The National Bank Act's original title itself denotes this purpose: "The Act entitled
'An Act to provide a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to
provide for the circulation and redemption thereof,' approved June 3, 1864, shall be known
as 'The National Bank Act.'" 18 Stat. 123 (1874), 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1964).
[June 1967]
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the years, as the governmental functions of national banks have been gradually
diminished,2 these banks have expanded their operations to include the full
range of banking activities; and now their business is almost indistinguishable
from that of private banking institutions. While competing with state banks
in nearly all areas of the banking business and performing little more in the way
of governmental services than do the state-chartered banks that are members
of the Federal Reserve System, nonetheless, national banks enjoy immunity
from certain state laws and regulations that are binding upon state banks. Other
than their federally granted charters, it would appear that national banks can
claim little in the way of justification for their continuing classification as in-
strumentalities of the federal government.
2. State Taxation
One area in which national banks benefit from their status as instrumen-
talities of the federal government is that of state taxation. Although national
banks are not completely immune from paying state taxes, Congress has restricted
the methods by which they may be taxed."' 0
National banks are not merely private moneyed institutions but agencies
of the United States created under its laws to promote its fiscal policies;
and hence the banks, their property and their shares cannot be taxed
under state authority except as Congress consents and then only in con-
formity with the restrictions attached to its consent.80'
This doctrine originated in McCulloch v. Maryland;..2 and despite some con-
vincing criticism,"0 ' it is now too well settled, by virtue of judicial reiteration,
to be successfully overturned. 4
Nevertheless, it can be pointed out, without examining the desirability of
this doctrine, that the reason given in support of it is less than convincing. The
rationale has been concisely stated by Mr. Justice Marshall: "That the power
to tax involves the power to destroy... [can]not be denied.... If the states
may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the execution of its
powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. '305
Admittedly, action by a nation within the scope of its powers constitutes
299 The Federal Reserve Act took away from national banks the responsibility for managing
the monetary and fiscal policies of the government. 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
300 44 Stat. 223 (1926), 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964):
The legislature of each State may determine and direct, subject to the provisions
of this section, the manner and place of taxing all the shares of national banking
associations located within its limits. The several States may (1) tax said shares, or
(2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or
holder thereof, or (3) tax such associations on their net income, or (4) according
to or measured by their net income ....
301 First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347 (1926).
302 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
303 Schweppe, State Taxation of National Bank Stocks: Uncertainty of its Constitutional
Basis, 6 MINN. L. Rav. 219 (1922); Traynor, National Bank Taxation in California, 17
CALIF. L. Rnv. 83 (1929).
304 Note. 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 717, 719-20.
305 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431-32 (1819).
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governmental action, but this does not preclude the possibility that some of this
governmental action may also be business activity.
The fact that the nation may do only what it may do does not mean that
none of the things that it may do can be business activity. The fact that
the scope of national action is restricted by a written constitution in no
way prevents a ruling that when the United States elects "to support a
governmental activity through the conduct of a business comparable in
all essentials to those usually conducted by private owners," [Allen v. Regents
of the University System of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 451 (1938).] such busi-
ness is not thereby withdrawn from state taxation. Marshall's lumping of
of all national activity into the single category of "governmental" can be
rebuked somewhat after the fashion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's charac-
terization of his statement that the power to tax is the power to destroy.
It was a "flourish of rhetoric," a "seductive cliche," and, "a free use of
absolutes." [Graves 'v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 489 (1939)
(concurring opinion) .]306
In light of the predominately business nature of national banks today, there
seems to be even less of an argument for continuing their exemption from state
taxation. However, any hopes of overturning this exemption are premature,
for the privileged status of national banks is still too firmly established.
Since it appears unlikely that national banks will soon be made subject
to the general taxing powers of the states, it would be advisable for the states
to review their policies on taxing national banks and to revise the policies, if
necessary, in order to ensure that national banks will pay their just share of the
tax burden within each state. Great care must be taken, however, to coordinate
these taxing policies with the permissive federal legislation. Section 548 of Title
12 of the United States Code sets out the four alternative procedures by which
states may tax the national banks located within their boundaries: (1) a tax
on bank shares; (2) a tax on the income of bank shares; (3) a tax on the
bank's net income; (4) a tax according to or measured by the bank's net income.
As a further restriction on state taxing power over national banks, two other
limitations are imposed: (1) only one of these methods of taxation may be
employed at a given time; (2) the tax cannot discriminate against national
banks.307
This latter restriction, in conjunction with the former, has produced some
inequalities that have placed a greater tax burden on state banks. It appears
quite evident "that the various restrictions it [section 548] places on the permitted
methods of taxation are designed to prohibit only those systems of state taxation
which discriminate... against national banking associations or their shareholders
as a class." ' 8 In practice, however, the restrictions have led to a disadvantage
for state banks. "In most states, corporations are subject to one principal tax and
one or more of lesser fiscal importance."'0 0 Since national banks can be made
306 Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HALv. L. REv. 633,
651-52 (1945).
307 44 Stat. 223 (1926), 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1964).
308 Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 560, 567 (1940).




subject, at most, only to the principal tax and only at a rate not exceeding that
charged to other moneyed capital,"'0 the tax burden on state banks is necessarily
greater because of the secondary taxes.
Despite the availability of a tax on the net income of national banks, some
states have not adopted this more profitable method of taxation. In at least one
state, because of the existence at the local level of a bank share tax, the state was
prevented from imposing a tax on the income of national banks."' 1 In order for
a state to impose its principal corporate tax upon national banks it may be
necessary to repeal existing legislation that was enacted when a property tax
based on the value of the bank stock was the only permissible method open to
the states for taxing national banks. Then the state could adopt a tax provision
that conforms to either method (3) or (4) of section 548, permitting a tax on
the net income of national banks." This enactment would be a major step
towards equalizing the tax burden of national banks with that already imposed
upon state banks."'
It can be seen that the privileged status of national banks as instrumen-
talities of the federal government, despite congressional permission for four re-
stricted methods of state taxation, has generally resulted in a smaller tax burden
for national banks, affording them a competitive edge over state banks.
3. Venue Sanctuary of National Banks
-Section 94 of Title 12 of the United States Code reads:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter
may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held
within the district in which such association may be established, or in any
State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said
association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.314 (Emphasis
added.)
Courts have generally interpreted this venue provision of the National
Bank Act as requiring that suits against a national bank be brought in the county
or district in which that bank is "established." "This provision has been phrased
variously as the place of location, the principal place of business, the location
310 The term "moneyed capital" has been described as money employed in a business
whose object is to make profit by investing in securities by way of loan, discount, or otherwise,
which from time to time are reduced again to money and reinvested. See Mercantile Nat'l
Bank v. Shields, 59 Fed. 952 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1894).
311 Howell, supra note 309, at 280.
312 44 Stat. 223 (1926), 12 U.S.C. § 548(1)a-b (1964).
313 The suggested remedy for this situation is quite simple, even though its adoption
would most assuredly present political problems in some of the states. The first step
would be to repeal all supplementary state and local taxes on banks except property
taxes on real estate. Then an excise tax, measured by net income from all sources,
could be imposed on banks. This could be accomplished for national banks by
simply inserting a clause referring to method numbered (4) authorized by the Act
of March 25, 1926 amending section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States. A rate could then be determined which would absorb on the average ap-
proximately the same percentage of net income as do the combined state and local
taxes of the income of nonfinancial corporations. This rate could be included in the
statutes or computed annually .... Howell, supra note 90, at 281-82.
314 REv. STAT. § 5198 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1964).
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of the principal office, and the charter location."31 As these variations of "estab-
lished" indicate, the construction given to this statute has been a highly restricted
one that permits suit against a national bank only in that single county or district
where the bank has its main office. In the 1963 case of Mercantile Nat'l Bank
v. Langdeau,3 6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to this principle in
reaching the conclusion "that national banks may be sued only in those state
courts in the county where the banks are located." '
This view has been attacked convincingly on the ground that the history
and policy of the National Bank Act do not support this "venue sanctuary"
accorded national banks.3"8 Moreover, it has been argued that the harsh con-
sequences of this doctrine in denying litigants a forum or imposing unnecessary
inconvenience upon parties suing a national bank were certainly not contemplated
or intended by Congress when it enacted this provision. 9
In the early case of Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank v. Baack,"2' the position was
taken that a national bank was "located" or "established" at the place named
in its organization certificate and was subject to suit only in that location. At
the time of this decision, 1871, there was little, if any, branch banking by na-
tional banks and this interpretation worked to no one's disadvantage. Under
the unit-banking practices of the day, nearly all of the business transacted by
a bank took place in the locality where the office was located. With the advent
of branch banking in this century, however, national banks began to transact
business outside the county or district of their original charter. In effect, they
became "established" in locations other than their charter location. Courts,
however, did not accept such an interpretation. In the 1936 case of Leonardi v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 2' the principle was once again upheld that a national bank
was "established" only at the location designated in its charter; and therefore,
315 Scheflin & Dixon, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 GEo.
WASH. L. Rv. 765 (1966).
316 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
317 Id. at 561.
318 Scheflin & Dixon, supra note 315, at 765-74.
319 Mr. Justice Black, concurring in the remand of the case to the state court, but totally
disagreeing with the Court's interpretation of § 94 in Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson,
372 U.S. 591 (1963), argued:
Now, under this Court's holding, these people in Nebraska who allege that their
contracts were usurious under Nebraska law must, unless the bank be held to have
waived statutory venue, go all the way to Michigan to try to vindicate their rights
against the bank. This harsh result is held to be compelled by a provision of the
Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108, now codified in 12 U.S.C. § 94.
I do not know of a single Act Congress has passed in a century which clearly and
explicitly denies a person in one State the privilege of filing suit in his own State
against an out-of-state company where service can be obtained and where the suit
arises out of a transaction within the State. And I am not willing to find such a
congressional purpose in § 94. I realized that this Court did hold several weeks ago
in Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, that this statute requires a suit
in a state court against a national bank to be brought in the county where the bank is
located. Langdeau merely required that the plaintiff sue in one county of the State
rather than in another. Formal logic strictly applied might call for expansion of that
holding to cover the different factual situation here. But that would require a
plaintiff to go to another State hundreds of miles from home to bring suit for a
wrong done him in a transaction in his own State, a result which I cannot believe
Congress intended. Id. at 595.
320 16 Fed. Cas. 671 (No. 9052) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871).
321 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677 (1936).
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its venue was restricted to that site. The only generally accepted exception to
this rule has been in cases involving local actions. In Casey v. Adams,121 the
Supreme Court held that section 94 applied only to transitory actions. 23 Local
actions" involving national banks are subject to the ordinary rules of law af-
fecting local affairs.r
In the Langdeau case, it should be noted that there appears to be a certain
amount of reluctance on the part of the Court to wholeheartedly embrace the
traditional restrictive doctrine. After conceding that its ruling could be applied
so as to prevent a litigant from joining two national banks in the same action
in the state courts if they are located in different counties or in the federal courts
if they are located in different districts, the Court lamely pointed out that "aside
from not being presented by these cases, such a situation is a matter for Congress
to consider.""28 Apparently, the Court felt itself bound to follow the strong
weight of judicial precedent on the matter and then turn to Congress for any
relief from its harsh applications.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court in Langdeau could have remedied
the situation with the means already at its disposal. By expanding the definition
of "established" in section 94 to include all those locations within the state where
a national bank is transacting its general business, the Court still could have
reconciled its ruling with the language and purpose of section 94, while at the
same time enlarging the scope of that provision to meet the demands of a bank-
ing industry in which national banks engage in state-wide branching and thus
transact general business in more than one county or district.
In choosing to follow precedent in the face of radical changes in the or-
ganization of the banking industry, the Court appears to have closed its eyes
to the seemingly wider interpretation of "established" adopted by Congress.
By its adoption of branch banking legislation for national banks, Congress im-
plicitly recognized the fact that national banks may now be "established" in
more than one place for the purpose of carrying on their general business.
Although, as the court said in Leonardi, a reading of the branch banking
amendments and section 8 did not "require" a national bank to be "estab-
lished" in more than one place, the amendments, considered together with
the legislative history and changed factual basis, indicate strongly that, as
a national bank's general business could now be conducted in more than
322 102 U.S. 66 (1880).
323 The term [transitory action] is used in contradistinction to "local action," and is a
personal action, the cause of which might have arisen in one place or county as well
as in another; one that may be brought in any county; an action which seeks nothing
more than the recovery of money or personalty, whether it sounds in contract or in
tort, and which is generally founded on the violation of rights which, in contempla-
tion of law, have no locality. Chappell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 194 S.C. 124,
129, 9 S.E.2d 592, 593-94 (1940).
324 The distinction between local and transitory actions is as old as actions themselves,
and no one has ever supposed that laws which prescribed generally where one should
be sued, included such suits as were local in their character, either by statute or the
common law, unless it was expressly so declared. Local actions are in the nature of
suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the thing on which they are founded
is situated. Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 67-68 (1880).
325 Id. at 66. Accord, National Bank of Commerce v. State, 368 P.2d 997, 1000 (Okla.
1962).
326 Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 563 (1963).
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one location, Congress intended that a national bank could be "established"
in places other than its charter location.
27
Subsequent decisions have generally been content to repeat the traditional holding
of Leonardi without attempting to ascertain the validity of its rationale. 2 In
Langdeau, the Court did consider the issue more directly, but it did not venture
to lay down a definitive ruling on a national bank's "location" for venue purposes.
In a recent law review article, two writers have advanced the proposition
that
a national bank may be viewed as "located" or "established" for venue
purposes not only in the judicial district (state or federal) in which its
principal office or banking house is located, but also in other judicial dis-
tricts in which it maintains branches for conducting general business.3 29
Quite clearly, this view s° is more reasonable and more closely related to economic
reality than the narrow interpretation of "established" that the Supreme Court
chose to adhere to in Langdeau. At this time, however, the decision in Langdeau,
restricting suits against national banks to only the single county or district in
which the bank is located, represents the current state of the law.
4. Usury
Section 85 of Title 12 of the United States Code 31 authorizes a national
bank to charge interest on loans or discounts at a rate equal to the maximum
rate permitted by the laws of the state in which it is located.3 ' Section
86,"' however, sets out the only penalties which may be assessed against national
banks that contract or collect interest at a rate in excess of that permitted by law.
327 Scheflin & Dixon, supra note 315, at 770.
328 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 467 (1947); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lippert
Bros., 233 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D. Neb. 1964).
329 Scheflin & Dixon, supra note 315, at 771-72.
330 This view was followed in a recent New York Supreme Court case, Gregor J. Schaefer
Sons v. Watson, 49 Misc. 2d 265, 267 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd 26 App. Div. 2d 659,
272 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1966), where the court said:
Moreover, in the opinion of this Court the provisions of Title 12, § 94, United States
Code do not warrant an interpretation that a national bank having branch offices
in the different counties may be sued only in the county in which it has its main
office. Defendant bank maintains a number of offices in Suffolk County and conducts
general business at such offices. It is therefore located in Suffolk County. Id. 267
N.Y.S.2d at 252-53. In reversing this holding, however, the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court chose to follow the traditional interpretation of § 94.
331 REv. STAT. § 5179 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1964). For the relevant
text of this section, see note 271 supra.
332 For a table showing the maximum rates of interest in the 50 states, see 3 CCH FED.
BANKING L. REP. J 59005. While some states impose a maximum rate as low as 6%, other
states set no statutory maximum for interest rates.
333 REv. STAT. § 5198 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1964):
The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is
allowed by section 85 of this title, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a for-
feiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries
with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In the case the greater rate
of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal repre-
sentative, may recover back, in an action in the nature of an action of debt, twice
the amount of the interest thus paid from the association taking or receiving the
same: Provided, That such action is commenced within two years from the time
the usurious transaction occurred.
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It is clear under section 85 that it is federal law that has established the
interest rates that may be charged by each national bank, "although it is mea-
sured in each instance by the laws of the state in which it is engaged in busi-
ness." 3 4 Likewise, in determining whether the interest charged on a particular
loan is usurious, the court must decide the issue according to the laws of the
state in which the loan was made. 3 5
As already discussed, 3 6 the national banks have been authorized by the
Comptroller to charge the highest rate of interest that competing lending in-
stitutions in the state may exact. This ruling has permitted national banks to
charge the higher interest rates on small loans permitted under the various small
loans acts that have been enacted in most states.3 Thus, state banks have been
placed in a less favorable competitive position in those states that have attempted
to exclude all commercial banks from coverage of their small loans act.3 s Under
the guise of providing equal treatment for national banks, the Comptroller's
ruling has had the effect of securing an unwarranted advantage over state
banks in a very important segment of the banking business - consumer loans. 9
If such ruling becomes generally effective, the states will be faced with the
anomalous situation of being compelled to reform their banking laws to per-
mit state banks to charge the same interest rate as national banks or else
witness the continued switching of charters by state banks. 4
A provision in section 85 reads:
When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State, or Territory, or District,
the bank may take ... a rate not exceeding 7 per centum, or 1 per centum
in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect...
in the Federal reserve district where the bank is located, whichever may
be greater ....
In spite of this provision, the courts continue to treat national banks as
"national favorites"34 ' and strain to stretch the language of section 85 to permit
a reading that national banks may charge as much as a state bank where there
is no maximum rate for state banks set by law. For example, the court in Hiatt
v. San Francisco Natl Bank, 42 faced with a California law that did not set a
maximum rate for state banks, was guided by another provision in section 85:
"Any association may ... charge... interest at the rate allowed by the laws
of the State... where the bank is located .... "The court held that this wording
"should be construed as meaning that a national association located in a par-
ticular state may charge as much interest as may be legally charged by the state's
334 Morris, The Laws of Usury as Applied to National Banks, 81 BANKING LJ. 847,
851 (1964).
335 Schumacher v. Lawrence, 108 F.2d 576, 577 (6th Cir. 1940).
336 See text accompanying notes 270-80 supra.
337 Meth. A Contemporary Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44 A.B.A.J.
637, 639 (1958).
338 See text accompanying note 273 supra.
339 See text accompanying note 276 supra.
340 See note 296 supra.
341 Tiffany v. National Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1874).
342 361 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1966).
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banks under the state's existing laws." ' 3 Since no specific maximum rate was
set by statute, the court interpreted this as meaning, in effect, that California
had " 'fixed' the rates for state banks. . . as without limitation except such as
may be established by agreement between the banks of the... states and those
who borrow from them." '  By means of this reasoning, the national bank was
allowed to charge the agreed-upon rate of interest, although it exceeded the "7
per centum, or 1 per centum in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day com-
mercial paper." The court, in reaching its conclusion, said:
Considering the federal statute in its entirety, we clearly see a congressional
intent that the competitive opportunities of a national bank operating in
a certain state should not be impeded by congressional limitations on interest
charges which are more restrictive than state limitations imposed upon the
state's banks.
3 45
Although federal law adopts those state laws that establish the maximum
interest rates that may be charged, section 86 sets up its own exclusive penalties
for usurious practices by national banks.
A careful reading of Section 86 discloses that this section provides for two
situations: first, where the usurious interest has not been actually paid by
the borrower, but has been contracted for and is incorporated in the face
value of the evidence of the indebtedness; and secondly, where the usurious
interest has in fact been paid by the borrower.'S
4 6
In the first case, the penalty prescribed is a forfeiture of all the interest on the
obligation. When the second situation arises, that is, the usurious interest has
already been collected, the victim of the usury may recover back double the
amount of the usurious interest paid.347 It has been uniformly held that these
federal penalties preempt any state penalties when a national bank engages in
usurious practices. 4
In the states that impose more severe penalties for usury by state lending
institutions,34 9 this preemption by section 86 will favor national banks by allow-
ing them to escape with a lesser penalty than their state counterparts. A clear
example of this advantage is shown in Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank v. Con-
structors of Florida."' In that case, a national and a state-chartered bank par-
ticipated in a loan that was found to be usurious. Under Florida law,3 '- the
penalty prescribed for usury is a forfeiture of both principal and interest. The
343 Id. at 507.
344 Ibid. Accord, Daggs v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 177 U.S. 549, 555 (1900).
345 Hiatt v. San Francisco Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 504, 506-07 (9th Cir. 1966).
346 Morris, supra note 334, at 856.
347 Lake Benton First Nat'l Bank v. Watt, 184 U.S. 151 (1902); Louisville Trust Co. v.
Kentucky Nat'l Bank, 102 Fed. 442 (G.C.D. Ky. 1900); Hill v. National Bank, 15 Fed. 432
(C.C.D. Vt. 1883).
348 McCullom v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 245, 248 (1938); Evans v. National Bank,
251 U.S. 108, 109, 111 (1919); Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35
(1875); Panos v. Smith, 116 F.2d 445, 446 (6th Cir. 1940).
349 For a listing of the penalties applicable to violations of the usury laws of the 50 states,
see 3 CCH FED. BANKINO L. REP. 59005.
350 119 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 810 (1962).
351 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.07 (1966).
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court held that the entire amount of the interest due was properly forfeited as
to both parties, but that the portion of the principal due to the national bank
was not properly forfeited since federal law provides the exclusive penalty for
usurious practices by national banks, which, in this case, was the forfeiture of
only the interest."'2
While this disparity is not likely to cause any significant change in the overall
competitive positions of state and national banks, it does illustrate another in-
stance in which the banking laws of this country can tend to favor national banks.
5. Assessment of These Advantages
As has been shown in the areas of taxation, venue, and usury, national banks
possess some advantages over state banks. These benefits accrue to national
banks by reason of federal regulatory legislation. These inequalities, however,
are not of themselves fatal to the dual banking system. States could adjust their
regulatory legislation to place their state-chartered banks in as favorable a posi-
tion as that of national banks. However, few state legislatures have modernized
their banking regulations and consequently these national bank advantages re-
main.
When these advantages of national banks resulting from their more favor-
able statutory regulation are added to the other advantages that national banks
are enjoying due to the more lenient rulings of the Comptroller, it is quite
evident that the competitive balance in the dual banking system has swung
decidedly in favor of national banks. Although strict equality in the dual bank-
ing system may never be attainable, nor even necessarily desirable,"' significant
imbalance between its state and national components must be avoided if this
dual system is to remain viable. Further prolongation of this competitive in-
equality could continue to prove injurious to individual state banks and could
continue to cause the loss of state banks to the national system."5 4
As suggested before, 5 the states might be able to eliminate or mitigate the
inequalities resulting from the Comptroller's liberal regulations by making a
concerted effort to obtain congressional action that would set narrow limits on
the Comptroller's freedom of interpretation. However, this policy could not be
utilized successfully in the case of the statutory advantages that are enjoyed by
national banks. In this instance, where the federal laws themselves, not the rulings
of the Comptroller, give national banks a superior competitive position, it appears
that the states have little choice but to modernize their own banking laws so
that the powers of the state banks will once again compare favorably with those
of the national banks.
352 Coral Gables First Nat'l Bank v. Constructors of Florida, 119 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1960), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 810 (1962).
353 Note, 16 SAN. L. REV. 983 (1964).
One of the accepted principles of this [dual banking] system is the ability of banks
to convert from one system to the other as a restraint upon excessive regulation by
either the federal or state governments. If the goal of competitive equality among
banks were carried out to the extent that both national and state systems impose
identical restrictions upon their banks, the ability to convert would cease to be a
safeguard against overregulation. Id. at 991.
354 See note 296 supra.
355 See text following note 296 supra.
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IV. THE POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL POWER:
THE CONFLICTS ENGENDERED
A. Introduction
The problems spawned within the federal bank regulatory machinery have
been examined."' 6 Also examined have been the problems arising from the
banking industry's dual regulation by the federal and state governments.357
The competitive differences between state banks and national banks are in some
instances the result of differences between the laws governing national banks
and those governing state banks. To the extent that this is true, changes by
individual states in their banking laws will alleviate some of the competitive
advantages enjoyed by national banks. 58 National banks have certain built-in
advantages, however, that cannot be eradicated by the action of the states
(e.g., exemption from state taxation). In these areas, and in the areas where
the problem is conflict between the federal agencies themselves, a reform in the
structure of federal law is required.
An examination of recent changes and proposals for change on the federal
level reveals two movements designed to improve bank supervision and regulation.
One movement favors the expansion of federal power over banking. The other
represents an effort to change the structure of the federal regulatory power.
These two movements seem to be related in subtle ways; but before examining
this relationship, it may be helpful to examine each area separately.
B. Expansion Through Substantive Change
1. Early Proposals
"The regulation of banking may be more intensive than the regulation of
any other industry, and it is the oldest system of economic regulation."' 9 Early
in our nation's history the bank was seen as an effective instrument of federal
monetary authority, and regulation was directed primarily towards increasing
this effectiveness."' In the present century, federal power has been extended
to protect the bank depositor361 and the investor in bank securities."' Today
federal regulation and supervision of banking cover nearly every banking func-
tion and are the primary concern of three major governmental agencies. (See
table on facing page.) Despite this fact, there are many who feel that banking
356 See text accompanying notes 1-223 supra.
357 See text accompanying notes 224-355 supra.
358 One state's attempt at modernization of its banking laws can be seen in the Pennsylvania
Banking Code of 1965, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 101-2204 (Supp. 1966). For a discussion of
Missouri's proposed banking bill, see Leedy, The Proposed Banking Bill, 1967 J. o TUE
Mo. B. 52.
359 DAvs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 4.04 (1959).
360 A specie-paying bank, with an overwhelming capital and the whole aid of the
government deposits, presented the only resource to which the government could
resort, to restore that power over the currency of the country, which the framers
of the constitution evidently intended to give to congress alone. Osburn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 873 (1824) (dissenting opinion of
Johnson, J.). This view presages the later views of the Court concerning con-
gressional monetary functions.
361 48 Stat. 168 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1964), as amended, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-31 (Supp. 1966).
362 Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.).
[June 1967)
Distribution of Powers Aniong Supervisory Authoritiesf
EXERCISED WITH RESPECT TO-
State State
State Nonmember Nonmember
National Member Insured Noninsured
- Powers Concerning-
Issuance of charters
Mergers, with national banks
surviving
Mergers, with state banks
surviving
Assumption of liabilities of
noninsured bank
Acquisition of control of, by
bank holding company
Establishing branches
Relocation of bank or branch




Exercise of trust powers







Interest payments on time
deposits
Banks. Banks Banks Banks




















































































security loans FR FR FR FR
a Abbreviations used: "CC" for the Comptroller of the Currency; "FR"2 for the Board of
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is not as responsive to the public will as it should beas and that a real expansion
of federal power is called for. Such proposals are not new, however. As early
as 1933, it was urged that our dual banking regulation be abolished and that
we adopt unified banking control under federal supervision." 4 Modem proposals
for expansion of federal power have tended to be narrower in scope than those
proposed immediately following the depression. In 1963, a committee on finan-
cial institutions recommended to President Kennedy that all commercial banks
be subject to the same reserve requirements that now are applied only to members
of the Federal Reserve System." 5 A modification of the committee's proposal
was suggested in the 1965 Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. The board recommended
legislation that would authorize the Board to fix reserve requirements on
a graduated basis according to the amount of deposits and that would
make such requirements applicable to all insured banks. At the same time,
it is recommended that all banks subject to such requirements should be
afforded access to Federal Reserve discount facilities.366 (Emphasis added.)
In 1965 Senator Robertson of Virginia introduced a bill that would make non-
member insured state banks subject to many restrictions now imposed on member
banks only. These restrictions concern loans to affiliates, loans to executive of-
ficers, and the proper relation between bank directors and the management of
securities companies. 67
The latest example of congressional expansion of federal regulatory power
is the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 196666
2. The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966
Recent bank failures, which were the result of improper practices and
what has been described as the infiltration of financial institutions by "unscru-
pulous operators," ' 9 prompted the enactment of the Financial Institutions Super-
visory Act of 1966.'
Title II of the act deals with the regulation of commercial banks. The
principal provisions of this section provide for the issuing of temporary7 1 and
363 See Patman, The Federal Reserve System: A Brief for Legal Reform, 10 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 299 (1966).
364 19 FED. RESERVE BULL. 166 (1933).
365 1963 COMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REP. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 9.
366 52d ANN. REP. OF THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OFl THE FED. RESERVE Sys. 236 (1965).
367 See S. 2561, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); 111 CONG. REc. 23988 (daily ed. Sept.
23, 1965).
368 80 Stat. 1028 (1966) (Provisions relating to commercial banks are codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.A.). See Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insur-
ance Act of 1966 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong.: 2d
Sess. 134 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and
Insurance Act of 1966].
369 The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 23, 1966, p. 3, cols. 2-3.
370 80 Stat. 1028 (1966). (Provisions relating to commercial banks are codified in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.A.).
371 Temporary orders will be issued if insolvency is imminent, if there is a substantial dis-
sipation of assets, or any time the interests of depositors or savings account holders would be
put in jeopardy. 80 Stat. -, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(c) (1) (Supp. 1966). The temporary
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permanent cease and desist orderse72 by federal regulatory agencies whenever an
institution under their jurisdiction has violated a law, rule, regulation, or charter,
or any other written condition or agreement. The orders will also issue where
a bank has engaged in unsound or unsafe practices, or where the agency has
reasonable cause to believe that such a practice may be committed. The bill also
authorizes the removal of bank officers and directors. These removal orders
can be issued (1) where the directors or officers violate a regulation or a final
cease and desist order or engage in unsound banking practices, and (2) this
violation or practice has caused, or may cause, substantial financial loss to
depositors or holders of savings accounts, and (3) such violation involves personal
dishonesty.373 It should be noted that this removal power may operate against
a bank director or officer who causes financial loss to another insured "business
institution'; this is considered to be evidence of his "personal dishonesty and
unfitness to participate in the conduct of the affairs of such insured bank." 74
In addition, if a director or officer is indicted or charged with a felony involving
dishonesty or breach of trust, he may be suspended. If he is convicted, he may
be removed. 5 Court injunctions may be obtained to force obedience to any
cease and desist, suspension, or removal order. Title II divides the jurisdiction
with respect to the issuance of these orders between the three federal regulatory
agencies. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has the power to issue
orders to insured nonmember state banks. The Federal Reserve Board has the
power to issue orders with respect to state member banks. When the orders issue
to directors or officers of national banks (except for routine suspensions and
removals based on charges of dishonesty) they must be issued by the Federal
Reserve Board, with the proviso that in such cases the Comptroller is made
a member of the Board of Governors and is allowed to vote on the order."'
This special removal and suspension procedure, which limits the Comptroller's
power, reflects congressional reluctance to give the power to issue the orders
to only one man.
s77
At the time these measures were being discussed, it was felt by some state
banking groups that the act would give too much discretionary power to the
federal agency involved and would ignore the state supervisory power, thus
confusing further the "already confused supervisory picture."
3 7
As a compromise to state banking agencies, the act provides that the
appropriate state supervisory authority must be given notice of the federal
agency's intent to institute cease and desist, suspension, or removal proceedings
(other than ones based on felony charges or convictions). The state authority
is to be given an appropriate time to take its own corrective measures, and only
after the state agency has failed to act within the time specified may the federal
order can be stayed by the district court on application filed within 10 days. 80 Stat. -,
12 U.S.O.A. § 1818(c)(2) (Supp. 1966).
372 80 Stat. -, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(b) (Supp. 1966).
373 80 Stat. -, 12 U.S.O.A. § 1818(e)(1) (Supp. 1966).
374 80 Stat. -, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(3) (Supp. 1966).
375 80 Stat.-, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(g)(1) (Supp. 1966).
376 80 Stat. -, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(e)(7) (Supp. 1966).
377 112 CONG. Rc. 19221 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1966).
378 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966, at 131.
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agency begin proceedings. " To make the regulatory scheme more palatable,
the act provides that the maximum amount of deposit insurable shall be raised
from $10,000 to $15,000.380
The act represents a substantial increase in the federal banking agencies'
control over state chartered banks. Indeed, "the thrust of the bill is directed
at State-chartered institutions." 381
3. The Effects on the Dual Banking System
One of the dual banking system's most ardent defenders is the National
Association of Supervisors of State Banks (NASSB). It is their feeling that
federal regulation of state banking is only justified when it is exercised in "those
narrow instances where it is related to a legitimate aim of the Federal Govern-
ment."3 2 It is further contended by the association that duplication of state
supervisory functions is not a proper goal of the federal government unless "it
can be shown that the states do not adequately use the power they now possess. '"3
The state supervisors, however, do believe that their power is adequately used.
3 4
The arguments that favor a contraction of federal regulation are usually
based on the propositions that the dual banking system is of value to the banking
community and that too much federal power will stifle that system. The value
of the dual system is discussed by Mr. James F. Bell, General Counsel for the
NASSB:
Without such a two-way street, there would not be the competitive spirit
between the two segments which has resulted in a restraint on the part
of both segments in their regulatory activities, thereby resulting in less
Government regulation than is found in many foreign banking systems.
This same competitive spirit has also created the necessary interplay to
lead each segment to try to adopt the most effective and modem banking
regulation procedures found in the other.38 5
Although the dual banking system is too ingrained in our financial com-
munity to be easily abolished8 6 and may in fact be the impetus for continued
growth within the banking industry, it must be seriously doubted that a con-
traction of federal regulation would inure to the general benefit of the banking
industry and banking public. It seems obvious that
such a contraction would further accentuate competitive inequalities be-
tween the different classes of banks. For example, relinquishment of
379 80 Stat. , 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(m) (Supp. 1966).
380 80 Stat. -, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (Supp. 1966).
381 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966, at 132.
382 Hearings on the Proposed Federal Banking Commission and Federal Deposit and
Savings Insurance Board Before the Subcommittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 331 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission].
383 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966, at 131.
See also [Jan.-Sept. 1966] 2 N.Y. AnvisoRY CoMm. ON COMMERCIAL BANX SUPERVISION REP. 4.
384 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966, at 131.
385 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 331.
386 Note the compromise with state supervisors in the Financial Institutions Supervisory
Act of 1966, 80 Stat. - , 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(m) (Supp. 1966).
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federal regulation over branches and mergers of state member and non-
member insured banks could result in substantial disadvantages for state
banks in relation to national banks3ss
Even if a contraction of federal authority would prove beneficial, it is doubtful
that the states could handle the extra burden. Even the president of the Na-
tional Association of Supervisors of State Banks has admitted that less than
two-thirds of the existing state agencies could handle such responsibility."' 8
While some advocate the restriction of federal regulation, in practice, federal
power over banking is a growing power. The reason for this is demonstrated
by the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act: the protection of the depositor
and investor is the protection of the general public. Although a state-dominated
system of supervision may develop a competitive spirit among the regulatory
agencies, it does not guarantee the security of a nation's depositors. Though
some believe that even the federal agencies are not as responsive as they might
be to the public will,"s9 it seems that intelligent supervision at the national level
is wiser than allowing fifty states to set fifty different standards as to what is
sound banking practice.
C. Expansion Through Structural Change
1. Introduction
The present conflicts among the three federal banking agencies indicate
that a major problem facing federal regulatory power is the structure of the
regulatory system."' 0 The conflicts between the Comptroller and the Federal
Reserve Board have led to confusion within the banking industry and have
lowered the prestige and effectiveness of both federal agencies. Attempts at
separately resolving each conflict through specific remedial legislation have met
with failure,"9' as have attempts at coordination. 92' The only way in which such
differences may be finally resolved seems to lie in the consolidation of federal
bank regulatory authority in a single agency. If consolidation is the answer,
the obvious question is in which agency should the power be consolidated. Three
agencies or departments have been seriously considered: (1) the Federal Re-
serve Board; (2) the Treasury Department; (3) a new Federal Banking Com-
mission.
2. Consolidation in the Federal Reserve System
In 1919, six years after the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, Con-
387 Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 771, 795 (1966).
388 N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1964, p. 53, coIs. 6-7.
389 Patman, supra note 363.
390 See 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 168.
391 Two examples of such attempted legislation are: H.R. 3956, 78 Cong., 2d Sess. (1944),
which was intended to settle the dispute between the Federal Reserve and the FDIC regarding
the absorption of exchange charges (see text accompanying notes 212-23 supra); H.R. 5845,
88 Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), which was intended to resolve the dispute between the Comp-
troller and the Federal Reserve regarding investments in revenue bonds by commercial banks.
392 One such attempt at coordination can be found in the letters of Secretary of the
Treasury Dillon to the heads of the three federal banking agencies. 1965 Hearings on Con-
solidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 354.
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gress saw two bills introduced that would have eliminated the office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency and would have transferred his functions to the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System."'3 These bills were prompted by
the dissatisfaction of some members of Congress with the conduct of the Comp-
troller. 94 A similar bill was introduced in 1921 prompted by the fact that some
state banks had become members of the Federal Reserve System when the
Comptroller had allowed the state banks to obtain national charters after the
banks had previously been refused membership by the Federal Reserve."9 5
In 1949 a task force for the investigation of regulatory commissions, under
the Hoover commission, urged that all federal regulatory functions be con-
solidated in the Federal Reserve Board. The reasons given by the task force in
support of the plan were (1) that the Federal Reserve would be the organiza-
tion best able to regulate bank practices without adversely affecting the country's
monetary policies, since the Board already is the agency responsible for developing
and implementing these policies, and (2) that the System's regional banks con-
stituted a national framework for the delegation of supervisory authority."96
With the recent interest in consolidation, the Federal Reserve has again
come under consideration. Former Federal Reserve Board Governor Abbott L.
Mills suggested in 1963 that if Congress decided to consolidate the supervisory
power, the agency that could most appropriately handle the resulting power
would be the Federal Reserve. In a statement before the Subcommittee on
Bank Supervision and Insurance, Governor Mills explained: "Whe Federal
Reserve System suggests itself as the one most appropriate, in that its responsi-
bilities in the field of monetary and credit policy already demand a close rela-
tionship with its Nation's commercial banks."3 '
Those who oppose consolidation in the Federal Reserve argue that the
burden of supervisory authority would interfere with the Board's monetary
functions. In the opinion of Governor J. L. Robertson of the Board:
The Federal Reserve could function as a central bank at least equally
well, in my judgment, better, if it were to devote its full time to the formula-
tion and execution of monetary policy and were not engaged in bank
supervision at all.3 8
Former Comptroller Saxon echoed this view when he advocated one central
banking agency - "not the Federal Reserve Board" - to exercise "all non-
monetary Federal authority over all State-chartered banks."39
As has been seen, this argument is turned around by those who favor
consolidation in the Federal Reserve Board. They argue that the supervisory
authority, rather than burdening the monetary controls, actually makes the con-
393 See S. 1370, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); S. 5537, H.R. 15983, 65th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1919).
394 See 57 CoNG. REc. 3451-54 (1919). Compare the complaints of congressmen against
the Comptroller in 1919 with those levied against Mr. Saxon in 1965. 1965 Hearings on Con-
solidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 289.
395 H.R. 4906, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
396 REP. OF TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 116-17 (1949).
397 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 184.
398 Id. at 180.
399 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Federal Bank Supervisory Functions 241.
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trols more usable in the sense that the makers of monetary policy have close con-
tact with the practical world of commercial banking via the supervisory func-
tions. 0 The President of the American Bankers Association, Mr. William F.
Kelly, suggested the position of his organization on the subject of consolidation:
Without attempts to judge this complex issue, we would at least
raise the question as to whether sufficient consideration has been given
the fact that supervision exercised by the Federal Reserve banks gives
the System direct and intimate contact with the commercial banking
system and thereby keeps open important avenues of communication not
otherwise available. Monetary policy decisions are of such far-reaching
importance to the economy that it is essential that their purposes and
consequences be thoroughly understood by the commercial banks.4"'
Another reason for favoring consolidation in the Federal Reserve Board
is that, because its monetary and supervisory controls are exercised over both
national and, state banks, it is least likely to favor one class of bank over another.
The Board has been accused of another bias, however, which if true would
seem to reflect on its supervisory capabilities, at least from the public's stand-
point. Chairman Wright Patman of the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee has accused the Board of being the autocratic tool of the banking com-
munity and "well beyond the reach of the people and their elected Repre-
sentatives." ' 2 If the general public has a major stake in proper bank super-
vision at the federal level, as it seems they have, then the supervisory agency
should in some sense be responsive to Congress. Board Chairman Martin has
argued that a certain degree of isolation is needed to protect the Federal Re-
serve System from political control,"' but he maintains that the board is basically
a public agency. He has defined it as "independent within the government,
not independent of the government .... 404
Mr. Patman's view of the nature of the Federal Reserve Board is not
shared by everyone, however, as testified to by the support from outside the
banking community for coordination within the Board." 5
3. Consolidation in the Treasury Department
In 1965, Mr. Patman introduced his own bill that would consolidate
federal regulatory and supervisory authority in the Treasury Department.0 8
This approach is consistent with his belief that the Federal Reserve, as an in-
dependent agency, is the tool of the banking community and unresponsive to
the public will. 4 7 By consolidating these powers in the Treasury Department,
regulation would be taken out of the hands of agencies dominated by bankers
400 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 187.
401 Id. at 270.
402 Patman, supra note 363, at 314.
403 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 1, at 536-37, 693 (1964).
404 Newsweek, Feb. 20, 1967, p. 77, cols. 1-2.
405 In 1963, the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce recommended that
the Federal Reserve Board be given the authority to charter and regulate national banks.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4. 1963, p. 48, cols. 6-7.
406 H.R. 6885, 89th Cong., ist Sess. (1965).
407 Patman, supra note 363, at 314.
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and would be concentrated in the chief financial officer of the Government,
who is under the direct control of the President. The proposal would also elimi-
nate the need for any new federal agency. The office of Comptroller of the
Currency would be abolished by the Patman Bill. The Comptroller's present
functions, as well as the functions of the FDIC, would be transferred to the
Secretary of the Treasury. The FDIC would still exist, but only as a sub-
division of the Treasury Department, since the Secretary would absorb the
functions of the FDIC's Board of Directors. All the supervisory functions of
the Federal Reserve Board would also be given to the Secretary, leaving the
Board with its monetary functions only. The Secretary of the Treasury would
be able to distribute the regulatory power in any manner throughout the agencies
and officers of the Department. "
The bill would certainly end the destructive fragmentation of federal author-
ity, and for this reason it received some support from those who viewed any
consolidation arrangement as an improvement over the present situation.40
The Patman bill met with strong opposition, however, from many quarters.
The American Bankers Association condemned it as contrary to "the basic
rationale of a dual banking system."410 The bill was also opposed by the Chair-
man of the FDIC41 and the Comptroller of the Currency.-
The Patman bill would centralize regulatory authority in one individual,
which would enable more decisive action without the cumbersome delibera-
tions of a body like the Federal Reserve Board. However, it would seem that
the deliberations of a board or commission would develop sounder policies
and make wiser decisions than would an individual administrator. "The wisdom
of this principle has been recognized by Congress again and again, in the estab-
lishment of the independent regulatory agencies that characterize 20th-century
government."4 '
4. Consolidation in a Federal Banking Commission
Perhaps the perfect compromise between the two proposals already dis-
cussed would be the creation of a new federal supervisory agency as proposed
by a Federal Reserve Board Governor, J. L. Robertson. The new agency would
not be burdened with monetary decisions, which was the major criticism of
consolidation in the Federal Reserve; and it would be an independent agency
free from executive domination and one man control, which were "defects" in
the Patman bill.
Governor Robertson recommends that all bank examination and super-
visory functions be vested in a new Federal Banking Commission composed of
five members. The Office of the Comptroller and the FDIC would be abolished;
and the Federal Reserve would be stripped of its supervisory authority, remaining
408 See 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Federal Bank Supervisory Functions 69.
409 Governor Robertson of the Federal Reserve Board offered some support for the Patman
bill, although he preferred the idea of a new Federal Banking Commission. 1965 Hearings
on Consolidation of Federal Bank Supervisory Functions 87.
410 Id. at 182.
411 Id. at 210-15.
412 Id. at 235-36.
413 Id. at 85.
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an instrument for the formation of monetary policy only. The commission
would have two separate departments. One department, under a Director of
Bank Examinations, would examine national banks and have authority to ex-
amine state member and nonmember insured banks as well. The other depart-
ment would handle the deposit insurance functions of the FDIC and would
be under the supervision of a Director of Insurance.414
In 1963 Congressman Multer introduced a bill415 that was based on Gov-
lernor Robertson's proposals. The same arguments used against the Patmani
proposal were levied against the proposed commission. Bankers themselves were
in the forefront of the opposition. They claimed that the new commission would
violate the "plan" of Congress to keep the control of banking decentralized.
Speaking for the American Bankers Association, the' President, Mr. Archie
K. Davis, argued that "Congress recognized that the advantages of dual super-
vision would be lost if all Federal supervision were lodged in one place." '416
It seems obvious that the duplication of functions and the present triple
standard in federal bank regulation are undesirable and may well have put
our banking system in a dangerous position. Yet whenever the obvious answer
of consolidation is urged, the bankers themselves rise to defend the present con-
fusion. But does consolidation really mean the expansion of federal power?
Is there any connection between direct expansion in federal power such as the
Financial Institutions Supervisory Act and the weakness in the tripartite enforce-
ment structure?
D. The Race of Laxity
On May 8, 1963, Governor Robertson spoke before the House Subcom-
mittee on Bank Supervision and Insurance in support of his new Federal Bank-
ing Commission. He felt a major benefit of his proposal was that it
would do away with a dangerous tendency toward a "race of laxity" in
bank supervision that will lead, at an accelerating rate, to deterioration
of the standards of sound banking which it is a function of bank supervision
to maintain.417 (Emphasis added.)
This race of laxity results from the attempts of each agency to eliminate
the competitive disadvantages of the banks under its supervision. Those who
benefit from this laxity 6ppose consolidation, fearing that it would result in an
expansion of regulation. Logically, however, consolidation of federal power
does not have to mean expansion of federal power. The General Counsel for
the'Federal Reserve Board, Mr. Howard H. Hackley, believes that consolida-
tion proposals
would not in any respect change the substantive requirements of federal
law; they would change only the structure of federal bank supervision.
They would not extend to state banks any provision of federal law not
414 See id. at 81-110; 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 174-81.
415 H.R. 5874, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
416 1965 Hearings on Consolidation 'of Bank Supervisory Functions 183.
417 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 177.
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now applicable to such banks. The fear that the mere establishment of
a single agency would lead to encroachment on the powers of the states





Although the fear that consolidation means an expansion of power might not
have any logical foundation, it may have a practical one. Although state banking
agencies oppose any increase in substantive federal power 19 (e.g., the Financial
Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966), they oppose with equal vigor any plan
that would permit enforcement of the present law to the limits of the statutory
language." ° Given the present situation, each agency is reluctant to fully utilize
its supervisory power where this would result in competitive disadvantages for
the banks under its regulation. If all power to regulate were in one agency, that
agency could fully enforce its supervisory controls, because it would have no
fear that such enforcement would cripple one class of federally supervised banks
to the advantage of another class.
Power over banking, then, can be visualized as substantive power - the
letter of the law - and effective power - the way that law is interpreted and
the extent to which it is enforced. Consolidation may very well expand the
effective power of the federal government over banking, and this seems to be
at the root of the banking community's reluctance to consolidate. However, it
seems that, as a reaction to the laxity in the enforcement of the present supervisory
power, some legislative steps will be taken. If bankers generally are not willing
to support a reorganization of federal power in such a way as to permit stricter
enforcement of existing federal law, Congress may enact stiffer supervisory mea-
sures in an effort to expand substantive federal power. Consolidation would
seem to be the more preferable solution. As Governor Robertson has stated:
It would end much friction and conflict among banks and bank supervisors.
It would eliminate wasteful duplication and overlapping among agencies.
It would abolish the present triple standard and enable the banking in-
dustry to operate under a single, consistent set of rules, as far as federal
supervision is concerned. It would do away with a dangerous tendency
toward a "race of laxity" in bank supervision that will lead, at an ac-
celerating rate, to deterioration of the standards of sound banking which
it is the function of bank supervision to maintain.421
V. FEDERAL REGULATION OF ANTICoMPETrrIVE BANKING PRACTICES
- CONFLICTING POLICIES
A. Introduction
The eighty-ninth Congress will be remembered by those in the banking
profession for two noteworthy acts of legislation: the 1966 amendments to both
the Bank Merger Act of 196062 and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.23
Both acts represent attempts to resolve problems left unresolved, and to some
418 Hackley, supra note 387, at 817.
419 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Supervisory and Insurance Act of 1966, at 131.
420 1965 Hearings on Consolidation of Bank Supervisory Functions 120.
421 1963 Hearings on Federal Banking Commission 177.
422 74 Stat. 129 (1960).
423 70 Stat. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1841-49 (Supp. 1966).
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extent actually initiated, by previous congressional legislation in this area. The
problem to be discussed is caused by a basic lack of consensus as to what is the
genus "banking" as an economic activity. This in turn causes a lack of con-
sensus regarding the type and extent of regulation to which banking should be
subject. At one pole, with former Senator Robertson as spokesman, are those
who believe that the banking industry should not be subject to sections 1" or
2" of the Sherman Act or section 742 of the Clayton Act because, through com-
prehensive regulation by the three federal banking agencies and the fifty state
banking agencies,427 the banking industry has taken on the nature of a public
utility - it has become a unique economic pursuit.42 The reason for banking's
uniqueness, it is claimed, lies in its importance to our economy. It is the very
basis of our economy because it creates the resources and provides the means
by which most commerce within the country is transacted." 9 Because of this
important function of the banking industry, it differs from industries traditionally
subject to the philosophy of "success to the efficient, failure to the inefficient"4 '
and, therefore, subject to the antitrust laws. Such a philosophy in the field of
banking would produce far-reaching effects detrimental to the public interest.43'
Because the freewheeling competition of unregulated industry does not exist in the
highly regulated banking industry, it is argued that the antitrust laws, created
as the guardians of economic opportunity within unregulated industry, should
not apply to the banking industry. 3 '
At the other pole stand the proponents of strict application of antitrust law
424 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
425 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
426 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
427 According to the Director of the Department of Banking and Economic Research in
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, this regulation should be a factor in deter-
mining the applicability of the antitrust laws to the banking industry.
Public policy with respect to banking may clearly be distinguished from that applied
to the unregulated industries, and the distinctions are relevant to the proper applica-
bility of antitrust concepts to the banking industry. Entry into banking is restricted,
bank expansion is controlled, and the competition of banks for the "raw materials"
of their operations, the services which they offer, and the prices which they charge
for those services, are in greater or less degree publicly regulated or supervised. These
basic decisions, which are left largely to private entrepreneurs in the unregulated
industries, represent the critically essential means through which the competitive
forces are expressed. There is no more fundamental sense in which an industry
could be said to be unique with respect to the applicability of the competitive con-
cepts embodied in our antitrust laws. Abramson, The Philadelphia National Bank
Case: A Reply, in STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING STRUCTURE
39 (The Administrator of National Banks ed. 1966).
428 Hearings on S. 1698 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S.
1698]; Robertson, Bank Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, Banking, May 1965, p. 36.
429 See A Statement of Policy, in *(The Administrator of National Banks ed.), op. cit. supra
note 427, at 401, 402.
430 See Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 589, 592 (1949).
431 Berle, supra note 430, at 592; Harfield, Legal Restraints on Expanding Banking Facili-
ties, Competition and the Public Interest, 14 Bus. LAW. 1016, 1021 (1959).
432 KRONSTEIN, MILLER & DOMMER, MAJOR AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS 295 (1965).
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency believes that "competitive forces are pur-
posefully restricted in order to safeguard the viability of the banking system, and an effort to
apply conventional antitrust principles in these circumstances is almost certain to conflict with
bank regulatory objectives." A Statement of Policy, in (The Administrator of National Banks
ed.), op. cit. supra note 427, at 401, 408.
One commentator believes that much of the supervision and regulation over banking
today has as its purpose the actual elimination of competition-the antithesis of the anti-
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to the banking industry. This faction also bases its reasoning on the importance
of banking in our economy, but fails to be swayed by the arguments of unique-
ness and comprehensive regulation. The reason for their viewpoint was clearly
stated by former Attorney General Katzenbach:
The proper discharge of banking functions is indispensable to a healthy
national economy. Access to credit on competitive terms is critical to the
survival and growth of commercial and industrial enterprises. Unduly
high banking charges, or abnormal disparity between the rates at which
large and small borrowers can obtain funds will inhibit industrial growth
and prevent the emerging of innovating competitors. Undue concentra-
tion in banking can lead to inflated charges and discriminatory rates.
It may fairly be said that, because of the central role of banks in relation
to other businesses, the traditional antitrust goal of prevention of undue
concentration is as important in banking as in any other field.
I say this in full recognition of the fact that banks are, to some extent,
formally regulated. Extensive governmental supervision of banking exists
primarily to prevent financially unsound practices. This regulation, how-
ever, is far less comprehensive than the regulation of public utilities, for
example, which warrants displacement of the antitrust laws. . . . In the
absence of such comprehensive regulation, the protection of the antitrust
laws . . .in banking must be retained.
4 s
Those who would apply antitrust law to banking attempt to distinguish the
industry from public utilities by arguing that the essential characteristic of a
public utility - "the presence of some feature which makes competition clearly
impossible or at least extremely wasteful"' 4 - is not present. Thus, they con-
clude, banking may be unique, but no more so than all other industries,
inter se.43' This attitude reached its ascendancy in United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank,4 6 where the Supreme Court applied the strict standard of section 7
trust laws. As examples he cites requirements for specified reserves, limitations on interest
rates, and control over the cost and availability of bank credit. Seely, Banks and Antitrust,
21 Bus. LAW. 917 (1966).
A historical basis for antitrust exemption also exists. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), held, inter alia, that Congress had the power to regulate banking.
This power was founded upon the necessary and proper clause, id. at 421-24, rather than the
commerce clause, which is the basis for federal jurisdiction under the antitrust laws. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Reinforcement for this position came
in Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73 (1850), where the Court determined that use
of money in buying and selling bills of exchange does not constitute engaging in commerce,
but merely "supplying an instrument of commerce." Id. at 81. This line of reasoning, however,
was severely shaken in United States v. South-Easter Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944),
wherein the Court determined that writing a contract of insurance, previously considered non-
commercial, is engaging in "commerce." See Berle, supra note 430, at 590. The question is
moot today in the light of Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953) and United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F.
Supp. 348 (1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where federal antitrust law was held ap-
plicable to commercial banking as "commerce." Even after these decisions, however, Congress
continues to deal with banking as a specialized field. Examples of this special treatment are
cited in Legislation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 200, 201-04 (1966).
433 Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 170-71 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings on S. 16981.
434 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 1048.
435 Id. at 966.
436 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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of the Clayton Act4 3 7 to a proposed bank merger without considering applicable
statutory mitigating factors promulgated specifically for the banking industry.
The failure'to sufficiently define the nature of banking for purposes of
effective regulation is shown by attempts to pacify, to some extent, both extremes
by calling banking a "quasi-public utility" 38 and suggesting that it be regulated
in the same manner as "quasi-utilities and monopolies." '439 Further attempts to
satisfy both factions through compromise legislation have resulted in vague stan-
dards which only worsen the problem,44 since these standards must be jointly
interpreted and enforced by the very factions holding the opposing views. Thus,
there is a lack of "consensus as to direction," '441 even though all the regulatory
laws have the same objective of promoting safe, efficient banking service.442
The result of this chaos has been a failure to resolve the real problem: the
"demonstrable public need, and perhaps . . . demand, for increased banking
capacity and increased accessibility of banking services." 4 ' Despite past failures,
Congress has again attempted to satisfy this basic public need through the process
of redefinition and reclassification manifested by the amendments to the Bank
Merger and Bank Holding Company Acts. The probable success or failure
of this effort will be explored in the following sections.
B. Bank Mergers
444
Although it has been generally accepted for almost 150 years that banking
is vested with a public interest due to its close relationship with the country's
fiscal policies,4 15 federal regulation of concentration within the industry has been
by and large "incomplete and confusing."4 ' The need for supervision over na-
tional bank mergers was recommended as early as 1913, 41 but federal regulation
in this area was almost nonexistent until recent years.
1. Supervision of Bank Mergers Prior to 1960
The futility of attempting to apply the original Clayton Act44 to bank
437 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock oi other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
438 105 CONG. REo. 7692 (1959) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
439 102 CoNG. REo. 14347 (1956) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
440 "[MIuch of the trouble in applying the antitrust laws and related legislation generates
from the failure of legislators to meet the issues squarely by clear statements of purpose and
by laws clearly drawn to meet the issues." Carter, Commercial Banking and the Antitrust Laws,
11 ANTITRUST BULL. 141, 189 (1966).
441 Harfield, supra note 431, at 1016; Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L.
REv. 771, 789 (1966).
442 KIONSTEIN, MILLER & DOmMER, op. cit. supra note 432, at 294.
443 Harfield, supra note 431, at 1025.
444 For the sake of brevity, the term "merger" will be used hereinafter to include not only
technical mergers, but also consolidations and transactions where one institution acquires the
assets of another and assumes its liabilities.
445 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See discussion in note
432 supra.
446 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
447 Klebaner, Federal Control of Commercial Bank Mergers, 37 IND. L.J. 289 (1962).
448 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
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mergers stemmed from the fact that mergers were not accomplished by acquiring
the "stock or share capital" of another bank, but by the acquisition of its assets,
a procedure not regulated by the Act.4 9 A second reason for believing that the
Clayton Act could not reach bank mergers was that banking was not considered
"commerce," thereby constitutionally exempting it from the Act's purview.
The same constitutional exemption also protected bank mergers from the reach
of the Sherman Act. 5 A final reason for assuming that the Clayton Act would
have no effect upon bank mergers was that, while section 11 vests exclusive
enforcement authority in the "Federal Reserve Board where applicable to
banks,"45' the Board appeared to be "uninterested in utilizing this authority."4"2
Attempts to control bank mergers by means other than the antitrust laws
proved equally as futile. The National Bank Consolidation Act of 1918"'8
requires prior approval by the Comptroller of the Currency before a consolidation
can be effected between two or more national banks or between a state and
national bank under the charter of the national bank, or before effectuation
of a merger of a state bank into a national bank. Section 18(c) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act4 4 required prior approval by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation before, inter alia, an insured bank could merge with a
noninsured bank. It further required that no two or more banks could merge
if their aggregate capital stock would decrease because of the merger, without
prior written consent of the proper supervisory agency. That agency would be
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; depending upon whether the resulting bank was,
respectively, a national or district bank,"' a state member bank, or a non-
member insured state bank. In neither the National Bank Consolidation Act nor
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, however, did Congress provide the federal
banking agencies with any standards to be applied in judging the proposed
merger's effect upon banking concentration. Consequently, this factor was not
one of their considerations.
or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation . . . where
the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition . . . or to
restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
of any line of commerce.
449 Although part of the merger transaction will involve acquisition and cancellation of
the acquired bank's stock, and subsequent reissuing of the acquiring bank's stock to the equity
holders of the acquired bank, this procedure was considered an integral part of the merger
transaction, and not an acquisition of "stock or share capital" subject to the Clayton Act.
Accord, Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
450 Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal .
Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor ....
451 64 Stat. 1126 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
452 Comment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 764, 766 (1966).
453 73 Stat. 460 (1959), 12 U.S.C. §§ 215-215b (1964).
454 Ch. 967, § 18(c), 64 Stat. 892 (1950).




As a result of this almost unlimited freedom, between 1940 and 1950,
774 banks disappeared through absorption, consolidation, or merger."" This
concentration was largely responsible for the fact that by 1951 "1'2 per cent
of the banks had over 54 per cent of the total assets of all American banks...
[and] the hundred largest banks controlled 48 per cent of the deposits of all
commercial banks .... "",' The widespread use of the merger device has been
attributed to: (1) a desire to avoid the limitation on the lending power of a
national bank, restricting the amount of unsecured loans outstanding to ten
percent of its capital stock and surplus;45 (2) the lower operating costs and
higher profits that accompany growth in size;459 (3) the lack of sufficient depth
in management within the smaller banks;4. (4) meeting the expanding credit
needs of an expanding industrial economy;4 ' (5) meeting the competition of
other financial institutions;," (6) providing for "diversification in deposits,
investments and services."'"
Concentration by merger and consolidation between 1940 and 1950 was
not limited to the banking industry. In 1950 Congress was shocked to learn that
as early as 1946 "one-tenth of one percent of the total number of all American
corporations . . . owned 49 percent of the assets of all American corporations
...... This concentration was attributed in part to a loophole in section 7
of the Clayton Act, which, as originally enacted,8 ' covered stock acquisitions
but not asset acquisitions. To close this loophole, Congress in 1950 enacted the
Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7. The pertinent part of the amend-
ment states, "[N]o corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corpo-
ration"4 6 where the effect of the acquisition may substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. The Senate Report stated that the purpose of
the amendment was
to prevent corporations from acquiring another corporation by means of
the acquisition of its assets, where under the present law it is prohibited
from acquiring the stock of said corporation. Since the acquisition of stock
is significant chiefly because it is likely to result in control of the under-
456 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959).
457 Klebaner, supra note 447, at 288.
458 41 Stat. 296 (1919), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1964), as amended 12 U.S.C.A. § 84
(Supp. 1966).
459 KRONSTEIN, MILLER & DOMMER, Op. cit. supra note 432, at 299; A Statement of
Policy, in (The Administrator of National Banks ed.), op. cit. supra note 427, at 401, 406;
Saxon, Bank Expansion and Economic Growth: A New Perspective, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 597,
603 (1963).
460 Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 59-60.
461 Gruis, Antitrust Laws and Their Application to Banking, 24 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
89 (1955).
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.; A Statement of Policy, in (The Administrator of National Banks ed.), op. cit.
supra note 427, at 401, 406.
464 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4293, 4295.
465 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731. For the text of this act, see note 448
supra.
466 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).




lying assets, failure to prohibit direct purchase of the same assets ha been
inconsistent and paradoxical as to the over-all effect of existing law. 67
As noted, before 1950 commercial banks desiring to merge had three lines
of defense against attack under the antitrust laws: (1) the Clayton Act did
not cover asset acquisitions; (2) banking was not "commerce"; (3) sole authority
to enforce the Clayton Act against banks rested with the less than militant
Federal Reserve Board. The Celler-Kefauver Amendment, however, marked
the beginning of the end for banking's antitrust immunity. Though it proscribes
anticompetitive asset acquisitions only where the acquiring corporation is subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission - which banks are not -
it nonetheless demonstrated to the banking industry that merger by means of
asset acquisition is not inherently sacrosanct. The second defense, that banking
is not "commerce" and thereby not subject to the antitrust laws, was destroyed
in 1953 by Transamerica v. Board of Governors,"" when the Third Circuit ap-
plied the Clayton Act to a bank holding company. By the late 1950s, therefore,
the basis for believing bank mergers to be outside the purview of the antitrust
laws was considerably narrowed. The lines of defense had narrowed to two:
(1) the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 of the Clayton Act did not
cover banks; (2) the Federal Reserve Board still retained exclusive authority to
apply the Clayton Act against banks.
Though the defenses were diminishing, the merger trend continued. Be-
tween 1950 and 1958, 1,258 commercial banks disappeared as a result of
absorption, consolidation, or merger. "9 In 1955, "the largest single merger in
American banking history," resulting in the Chase Manhattan Bank, was effected
without the need for federal approval."' So ineffective was federal legislation
controlling bank mergers, that between 1955 and 1960 federal approval was
not required for mergers involving over 10 billion dollars of resources.7 " Some
Senators believed that even in the limited situations where approval by one of
the federal banking agencies was required before the merger could be effected, 72
the record of agency disapprovals was disappointingly low.47" Discontent with
the situation grew 4 to the extent that by the end of the decade Congress was
determined to enact legislation that would effectively avert the trend toward
banking monopoly.
2. The Bank Merger Act of 1960
The Bank Merger Act of 1960""5 was born of controversy.47 The Depart-
468 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
469 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959).
470 Klebaner, supra note 447, at 298.
471 H.R. REp. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
472 See text accompanying notes 453-55 supra.
473 Klebaner, supra note 447, at 300.
474 See 102 CONG. REC. 14346 (1956) (remarks of Senator Fulbright); Id. at 14347
(remarks of Senator Stennis); Id. at 14350 (remarks of Senator Lehman); Id. at 14353
(remarks of Senator O'Mahoney); 103 CONG. REc. 6150 (1957) (remarks of Representative
Celler).
475 74 Stat. 129 (1960).
476 Wemple & Cutler, The Federal Bank Merger Law and the Antitrust Laws, 16 Bus.
LAw. 994, 995 (1961).
477 S. REP. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
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ment of Justice had recommended legislation that would apply section 7 of the
Clayton Act to bank mergers;4 7 the federal banking agencies, however, de-
sired that they be vested with the power to review proposed mergers on the
basis of anticompetitive and monopolistic factors." 8 Neither faction was com-
pletely successful, for the Bank Merger Act of 1960 was a compromise that
attempted to combine the expertise of the banking agencies7 " with the antitrust
experience of the Department of Justice."" The act, in an effort "to provide
for control of all mergers481 by asset acquisition by banks under the jurisdiction
of the Federal banking agencies,"4 ' prohibited mergers where the resulting bank
was a national or district bank, a itate member bank of the Federal Reserve System,
or an insured nonmember bank, unless prior approval was obtained, respectively,
from the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. The granting or denial .of approval by these
agencies was to be based upon "uniform and clear standards . .. . There
were two classes of standards: the banking factors and the competitive factor.
The banking factors were
the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved, the
adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general
character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community
to be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with
the purposes of this Act.
484
These six banking factors were taken from section 6 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.4"5 The Senate report noted that "these are the usual banking
factors which these three regulatory agencies are accustbmed to review and con-
sider."4  Though these factors might have been familiar, the fact that the
familiarity was obtained through their use as criteria in approving federal
deposit insurance applications - something quite unlike bank mergers - was
not mentioned in the legislative history. The act also directed the agencies to
take into account the competitive factor, i.e., "the effect of the transaction on
competition (including any tendency toward monopoly)."" The agency with
jurisdiction over a particular merger was to request reports on the competitive
factor from the other.two banking agencies and the Attorney General in order
to insure uniformity and to
avoid a situation where one Federal agency is "tough" about mergers and
another one is "easy," where there might be an inducement to arrange
478 Ibid.
479 H.R. RzP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1960).
480 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1959).
481 The Act's coverage extended to all banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation which included 95% of all banks in the United States, holding 97% of the
country's total banking assets. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960).
482 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
483 Ibid.
484 74 Stat. 129 (1960).
485 64 Stat. 876 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1964).
486 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1959).
487 74 Stat. 129 (1960).
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mergers so as to result in the kind of bank where approval could be
easily obtained.
4 88
It is clear, however, that these reports were to be purely advisory. They in no
way bound the responsible agency or affected its exclusive jurisdiction.8 9 In
rendering its decision, the agency was to consider all seven factors together,
without giving controlling weight to any of them,49 and was not to approve
the merger unless it found it to be in the public interest. The "public intcrest"
was interpreted to mean merely a finding, after all seven factors had been
equally weighed, of some positive benefit to be derived from the merger. 9'
The agency's decision was to be a "balanced judgment." '492
The Senate report noted that the banking factors were essential, but that
they alone would not suffice, since they gave insufficient weight to the merger's
effect upon competition. " 3 On the other hand, the rule of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, including the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, was regarded as too
strict to be applied to bank mergers, since by its terms, absolute weight is
given to the merger's effect upon competition;494 no other factors can be con-
sidered regardless of their beneficial effect. Use of the Clayton Act standard in
the Bank Merger Act was also deemed undesirable due to a fear that the
legislative history of the Bank Merger Act, combined with subsequent judicial
decisions that would interpret the Clayton Act standard as applied under the
Bank Merger Act, could weaken section 7 of the Clayton Act to the extent that
it would lose its effectiveness when used to attack mergers in unregulated indus-
tries where strict application is desired. 95 Although the House Committee was
convinced of the basic soundness of the Senate's approach,499 the committee
reported:
We are concerned ...with some indications that under the Senate bill
a merger could be approved even though it "unduly" lessened competition.
While this result presumably was not intended, .... doubts on this score
should obviously be removed. We are convinced, also, that approval of
a merger should depend on a positive showing of some benefit to be derived
from it .... We . . .reject the philosophy that doubts are to be resolved
in favor of bank mergers ..... .[and] feel [that] the burden should be on
the proponents of a merger to show that it is in the public interest, if it
is to be approved.
497
In neither conmittee report, however, was there any question that a merger
488 H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1959). The Senate report also em-
phasized this fact. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1959).
489 H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1960); S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 24 (1959).
490 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 22 (1959).
491 H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1960); see Senate Hearings on S.
1698, at 302.
492 S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959).
493 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
495 Id. at 20-21.
496 H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1960).
497 Id. at 10-11.
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could be found to be in the public interest though it did in fact lessen com-
petition.
498
Other provisions of the Bank Merger Act required the federal banking
agencies to apprise Congress annually of the pertinent facts of each merger
approved during the previous year499 and required publication of notice of pro-
posed mergers, except in certain emergency situations, in order to allow in-
terested citizens to express their views.
If any one purpose can be gleaned from the legislative history of the Bank
Merger Act of 1960, it is the congressional intent to achieve control over bank
mergers - indeed to make them more difficult5"' - through the implementation
of uniform standards, including a consideration of the proposed merger's effect
upon competition.'0 1 Effectuation of this purpose, however, depended upon a
good faith effort on the part of the federal banking agencies to heed the intent
of Congress.0" Whether the agencies made this effort is questionable. Between
May 1960 and December 1963, the agencies approved over 95 per cent of the
merger applications, although 70 per cent of them had been criticized by the
Department of Justice as violating the Bank Merger Act's competitive factor? °
Although these statistics have been interpreted by some as evidence of agency
disregard for congressional intent, others have noted that the advisory reports
on the competitive factor should not be judged as an opinion on the desirability
of the merger as a whole, since they fail to take into account the six banking
factors.5 ' The fact remains, however, that the act proved ineffective in achieving
its goal of making bank mergers more difficult. 5 This ineffectiveness might well
be traced back to Congress itself; for uniform ' regulation is quite difficult to
achieve where three agencies, each subject to different laws, attempt to apply
"standards" that "are commonly passive legal and descriptive considerations or
at most conditioning factors which would influence the decision only in-
directly."
'
The continued trend toward banking concentration led the Department
498 Id. at 10; S. Rp. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1959).
499 This report was to include the names and resources of the banks involved, the reasons
why the agency approved the merger, and a summary of the Attorney General's report in each
case where one had been submitted.
500 Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 182.
501 S. Rnp. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
502 Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 298.
503 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 3. The Federal Reserve Board approved 117 applica-
tions and denied 15; the Comptroller of the Currency approved 329 and denied 11; and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation approved 127 and denied 2. Senate Hearings on S.
1698, at 16.
504 A Statement of Policy, in STUDIES IN BANKING COMPETITION AND THE BANKING
STRUCTURE 401, 409 (The Administrator of National Banks ed. 1966).
If the merger involves two competing banks, and their competition is more
than insignificant, the Ejustice] Department typically looks no further .... But the
antitrust inquiry of the agencies is more penetrating. Going beyond the question
of what quantum of competition will be lost as a result of the merger, they focus
on the vigor of remaining competition- the variety of alternative sources for bank
services and credit- in an effort to forecast the effect of the transaction in the
market as a whole. Waxberg & Robinson, Chaos in Federal Regulation of Bank
Mergers: A Need for Legislative Revision, 82 BANKING LJ. 377, 381 (1965).
(Footnotes omitted.)
505 Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 182.
506 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 1051.
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of Justice to urge again"' that section 7 of the Clayton Act should be extended
to bank mergers accomplished by asset acquisition. As a means of testing its
proposition, the Department of Justice chose to attack the approved but uncon-
summated merger of Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Corn Ex-
change Bank.
Before its contention could be successfully maintained, however, there had
to be an initial determination as to whether the Bank Merger Act had superseded
the Clayton Act's applicability to bank mergers. The Supreme Court, in United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,5"' ruled that the Clayton Act had not been
superseded and allowed the action to proceed solely under section 7. In doing
so it stated that
the legislative history of the [Bank Merger] Act seems clearly to refute
any suggestion that applicability of the antitrust laws was to be affected.
Both the House and Senate Committee Reports stated that the Act would
not affect in any way the applicability of the antitrust laws to bank
acquisitions....
It should be unnecessary to add that in holding as we do that the
Bank Merger Act of 1960 does not preclude application of § 7 of the
Clayton Act to bank mergers, we deprive the latter statute of none of its
intended force. Congress plainly did not intend the 1960 Act to extinguish
other sources of federal restraint of bank acquisitions having anticompetitive
effects.
509
This initial obstacle having been overcome, the Court, in a decision that rocked
both Congress and the banking industry, accepted the position of the Department
of Justice and thus extended the scope of section 7 to bank mergers accomplished
by asset acquisition. In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned that the Celler-
Kefauver Amendment gave the Clayton Act
a reach which would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations,
from pure stock acquisitions to pure asset acquisitions, within the scope
of § 7. Thus, the stock-acquisition and assets-acquisition provisions, read
together, reach mergers, which fit neither category perfectly but lie some-
where between the two ends of the spectrum. . . . So construed, the
specific exemption for acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC's
jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7 only assets acquisitions by
such corporations when not accomplished by merger.510
507 See text accompanying note 477 supra.
508 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
509 Id. at 352, 354.
510 Id. at 342. The Court based this statement on the following reasoning:
Appellant [the Government] argues vigorously that a merger is crucially different
from a pure assets acquisition . . . . [In its brief, the Government stated that "a
merger necessarily involves the complete disappearance of one of the merging cor-
porations. A sale of assets, on the other hand, may involve no more than a sub-
stitution of cash for some part of the selling company's properties, with no change
in corporate structure and no change in stockholder interests." Id. at 336 n.13.]
[Aippellees argue with equal vigor that it is crucially different from a pure stock
acquisition. [In their brief, the banks stated that "a merger such as appellees'
may be effected upon the affirmative vote of the holders of only two-thirds of the
outstanding stock of each bank ... but if PNB were acquiring all of the Girard stock
each Girard shareholder could decide for himself whether to transfer his shares. A
merger requires public notice whereas stock can be acquired privately. A share-
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Justice Harlan, dissenting, believed that the majority opinion left the Bank
Merger Act "almost completely nullified."511 To look only to the Clayton Act
with its single standard - the merger's effect upon competition - was to ignore
recent congressional intent, as evidenced by the Bank Merger Act of 1960, that
other factors be considered. Not only did the majority fail to consider the six
banking factors, but they reversed the roles of the Attorney General and the
banking agencies. Now the agencies would retain only an "initial veto";5
"for if the agency's decision is not satisfactory, a § 7 suit may be commenced
immediately." ' One year later, in United States v. First Nat'l Bank, & Trust
Co.,..4 the Lexington case, the Court finished what it had begun in Philadelphia.
It held section 1 of the Sherman Act applicable to a bank consolidation and
thereby effectively construed the Bank Merger Act of 1960 out of existence.51
The open conflict between the federal bank regulatory agencies and the
Attorney General that culminated in the judicial legislation of the Supreme
Court, left banks in a "never-never land" of merger confusion.b"' Not only was
holder dissenting from a merger has the right to receive the appraised value of
his shares .. .whereas no shareholder has a comparable right in an acquisition of
stock. Furthermore the corporate existence of a merged company is terminated by
a merger, but remains unaffected by an acquisition of stock." Id. at 337 n.14.]
Both positions, we think, have merit; a merger fits neither category neatly. Since
the literal terms of § 7 thus do not dispose of our question, we must determine
whether a congressional design to embrace bank mergers is revealed in the history of
the statute. The question appears to be one of first impression; we have been directed
to no previous case in which a merger or consolidation was challenged under § 7
of the Clayton Act, as amended, where the acquiring corporation was not subject
to the FTC's jurisdiction.
When it was first enacted in 1914, § 7 referred only to corporate acquisitions
of stock and share capital; it was silent as to assets acquisitions and as to mergers
and consolidations. . . . It is true that the omission may not have been an over-
sight. Congress' principal concern was with the activities of holding companies,
and specifically with the practice whereby corporations secretly acquired control
of their competitors by purchasing the stock of those companies. Although assets
acquisitions and mergers were known forms of corporate amalgamations at the
time, their no less dangerously anticompetitive effects may not have been fully
apparent to the Congress. Still, the statutory language, read in the light of the
overriding congressional purpose to control corporate concentrations tending to
monopoly, lent itself to a construction whereby § 7 would have reached at least
mergers and consolidations ...
But the courts found mergers to be beyond the reach of § 7, even when the
merger technique had supplanted stock acquisitions as the prevalent mode of cor-
porate amalgamation. . . .As a result, § 7 become largely a dead letter ...
It was against this background that Congress in 1950 amended § 7 to include
an assets-acquisition provision. . . . The legislative history is silent on the specific
questions why the amendment made no explicit reference to mergers, why assets
acquisitions by corporations not subject to FTC jurisdiction were not included,
and what these omissions signify. Nevertheless, the basic congressional design
clearly emerges and from that design the answers to these questions may be inferred.
Congress primarily sought to bring mergers within § 7 and thereby close what it
regarded as a loophole in the section. But, in addition, it sought to reach trans-
actions such as that involved in Columbia Steel, which was a simple purchase of
assets and not a merger. Id. at 336-42. (Footnotes omitted.)
511 Id. at 384 *(dissenting opinion).
512 Id. at 385 (dissenting opinion).
513 Id. at 384-85 (dissenting opinion).
514 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
515 Seely, Banks and Antitrust, 21 Bus. LAW. 917, 923 (1966). In United States v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the third case to be
decided under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, the district court found the merger of two
New York banks to violate both § 7 of the Clayton Act and § I of the Sherman Act. In
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there a doctrinal clash on the question of what constitutes the anticompetitive
effects of a merger, but Congress had condoned this conflict by prescribing that
the banking agencies assess the merger under the liberal standards of the Bank
Merger Act, while at the same time allowing the Department of Justice to make
its assessment under strict antitrust standards.
3. The Bank Merger Act of 1966
a. Introduction
'In an attempt to remove the uncertainty and confusion surrounding bank
mergers, Congress amended the Bank Merger Act in February 1966. The
amended act... has two basic purposes. As a "specific repeal of two Supreme
Court decisions," ' its primary purpose, according to Representative Ashley, is
"to assure that the courts will never again dismiss as irrelevant the question of
the need of a community for the services which a proposed merger may pro-
vide." 519 The act also attempts to effect a workable compromise in bank merger
regulation between the banking agencies and the Department of Justice.
520
Certain provisions of the original Bank Merger Act have been retained.
Prior written approval of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is required
before an insured bank may merge with a noninsured bank or institution. Before
insured banks may merge, prior written approval is required from the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation, depending upon whether the resulting bank is, respectively,
a national or district bank, a state member bank, or a nonmember insured bank.
The responsible agency is required to publish notice of the proposed merger and
deciding the case the court was of the opinion that the Bank Merger Act was "impotent."
Id. at 880.
The Court's decisions in Philadelphia and Lexington were both surprising and frustrating
to Government officials. The Chief of Staff of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency stated that
every responsible official of the Government, from 1950 to 1960, who took a
position on the subject, took the position that . . . section 7 of the Clayton Act
would not apply to bank mergers. This applies to Congressman Celler and Senator
Kefauver, the authors of the Celler-Kefauver amendment of 1950, and to every
other Senator and Representative who spoke on the subject, and to every repre-
sentative of the Department of Justice, as well as representatives of the Federal
Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission, and other agencies. No statements to
the effect that section 7 of the Clayton Act would or should apply to the Bank
Merger Act have been found up to the filing of the complaint in the Philadelphia
case .... Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 329.
516 Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 97.
517 80 Stat. 7, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828c (Supp. 1966).
.518 112 CONG. REc. 2538 '(daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966) (the Philadelphia and Lexington de-
cisions).
519 112 CONG. REc. 2339 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966). Senator Robertson stated:
It is not often that Congress finds it necessary and desirable to reverse a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court. It is necessary and desirable in this instance because
the consequences of the Court's erroneous opinions and decisions are so serious and
because the error is so clear. The legislative history of this specific repeal of two
Supreme Court decisions and one district court decision, and the clearer and more
specific standards set forth in this bill should convince the courts that the Congress
does not intend that mergers in the banking field should be measured solely by the
antitrust considerations which are applied in other industries.
112 CONG. REC. 2538 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
520 112 CONG. REc. 2338-39, 2344 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
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to request reports on the competitive factor from the other two agencies and the
Attorney General, unless immediate approval of the merger is necessary to pre-
vent the probable failure of one of the banks. Finally, as in the original act,
the agencies are required to annually inform Congress of the mergers that they
have approved during the previous year.
b. The New Provisions
(1) Past Mergers
By section 2(a) of the 1966 amendment, all bank mergers that were con-
summated prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia521 are made
exempt from antitrust prosecution except under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
This was done in an effort to
lift a cloud of uncertainty from consummated mergers; to redress alleged
inequitable application of the antitrust laws to mergers consummated at
a time when the state of the law may have been uncertain; and to avoid
the difficulties of unscrambling a merged bank.5
22
Though over 2,000 bank mergers were permanently protected by this provi-
sion,52' Attorney General Katzenbach believed it unnecessary, since "past mergers
against which no action was taken will remain undisturbed."524 He viewed this
provision as a mere "private bill"5 25 for the relief of a small number of politically
powerful banks, whose recent mergers were either subject to pending antitrust
litigation or had been ruled illegal subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in
Philadelphia.5 26 His view of this provision as a private bill seems to be sound.
The banks seeking inclusion of this exemption in the act argued that demerger
and divestiture of assets would be unconscionable. However, they seem to have
planned this defense far in advance. These same banks brought the possibility
of ultimate divestiture upon themselves when, with knowledge that divestiture
would be decreed if the Government's cases against their mergers were successful,
they nonetheless either accelerated the merger in order to effect it before a pre-
liminary injunction could be granted or argued against granting the preliminary
injunction after suit was brought. In either case, if the injunction had been
obtained, a subsequent divestiture would have been unnecessary."'
(2) Future Mergers-The New Standards
In the 1966 amendment the antitrust aspect of bank mergers is stated
more definitively and receives more emphasis than in previous legislation.
521 The decision was rendered on June 17, 1963.
522 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 172.
523 112 CONG. REc. 2538 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
524 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 173.
525 Id. at 170.
526 Id. at 174.
527 Id. at 173; H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1966).
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(a) The Monopoly Standard
Paragraph 5 (A) of the Bank Merger Act of 1966 prohibits the responsible
agency from approving
any proposed merger transaction which would result in a monopoly, or
which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to
monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part
of the United States ....
This standard, clearly the same as that embodied in section 2 of the Sherman
Act, was present in the 1960 act only by implication. Its emphasis is clear. A
bank merger that would violate section 2 of the Sherman Act may not be ap-
proved under any circumstances.
(b) The Competitive Standard
Paragraph 5(B) is the focal point of the 1966 amendment. It prohibits
the responsible banking agency from approving
any .. .proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of the
country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade,
unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction
are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to
be served.
This paragraph "intentionally" '52 8 embodies the antitrust language found in
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, in order to em-
phasize the fact that all the principles established through these acts' long his-
tories "are carried forward unchanged by this... legislation." '529 According to
the established principles of antitrust law, the competitive aspects of a merger
are measured by its effects upon a "relevant market." This relevant market, in
turn, is composed of a product market-a "line of commerce"-and a geo-
graphic market-an area where both competitors operate so as to afford the
public alternatives in their choice of goods or services."'
(i) The Product Market
A product market, or line of commerce, can be defined as specific goods or
services that differ from other goods or services to such an extent
that the consumer or user will believe the other goods or services to
be "distinctly inferior substitutes."5'' The less inclusive the line of com-
merce is found to be, the greater will be the potential monopoly power,
528 112 CONG. REc. 2334 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
529 Id. at 2344.
530 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
531 Herman, The Philadelphia Bank Merger Decision and its Critics, in (The Administrator
of National Banks ed.), op. cit. supra note 504, at 43, 44.
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should the suppliers of the line of commerce merge or consolidate.532 In Phila-
delphia, the district court held commercial banking to be the relevant line of
commerce."' Its finding was later accepted by the Supreme Court." 4 This
determination is significant because in assessing the competitive effect of the bank
merger the Court discounted the relevancy of any competition that might have
existed between the banks and other financial institutions. The Court justified
its finding on three grounds: (1) some commercial bank services, such as the
checking account, are so unique that they face no effective nonbank competition;
(2) loan services are effectively insulated from nonbank competition since poten-
tial competitors must borrow much of their capital from commercial banks, and
consequently must charge higher rates than are charged by the banks from which
they borrow; (3) although certain bank services freely compete with those offered
by other financial institutions, users of these services have a preference for dealing
with banks.
5 35
Whether the 1966 amendment will effect a change in judicial determinations
of the relevant line of comnierce in future bank merger litigation is unclear. In
its determination that commercial banking was the product market in Philadel-
phia, the Court was guided by the language of the Clayton Act that expressly
mentions "line of commerce." In paragraph 5(B), however, this phrase is
absent. Senator Robertson believed that the phrase was bmitted as an indication
that the competitive effect of commercial bank mergers should no longer be
assessed solely in the light of competition between banks, but that the competition
of other financial institutions should also be considered."3 ' The benefit
of Senator Robertson's interpretation is questionable. If services rendered
by other financial institutions were to be considered in determining the 'competi-
tive effect of a proposed merger, the result might be a differentiation of some or
all of the over seventy3"" separate banking services into separate lines of com-
merce. This would emphasize the merger's anticompetitive effect, rather than
minimize it. This result is possible because of the extensive powers possessed
by commerical banks. Since no other financial institution is authorized to pro-
vide the broad range of services that are provided by commercial banks, in order
to determine the total effect the merger will have on the concentration of all
the services which the commercial bank provides, the commercial banking
product market might be differentiated into respective submarkets in order to
correspond with the particular service rendered by each class of competing
financial institution. Thus the separate lines of commerce-would arise.' Therefore
it seems that Senator Robertson's interpretation could produce exactly the
opposite result from that intended.
If Senator Robertson's interpretation is not accepted, it would seem that,
by this omission, Congress has merely given the Supreme Court a carte blanche
532 Ibid.
533 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 363 '(1962), rev'd, 374
U.S. 321 (1963).
534 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
535 Id. at 356-57.
536 112 CoNo. RxE. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
537 Herman, The Philadelphia Bank Merger Decision and its Critics, in (The Administrator
of National Banks ed.), op. cit. supra note 504, at-43, 44 n.4.
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to determine, on a case by case basis, the relevant product market in future bank
merger litigation. However, noting the congressional intent that paragraph 5 (B)
is to be interpreted in the light of established antitrust principles, it seems likely
that the relevant product market established by the Supreme Court in Phila-
delphia will not be altered.
(ii) The Geographic Market
Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes mergers that have substantial anti-
competitive effects "in any line of commerce in any section of the country."
As noted above, however, paragraph 5(B) of the 1966 amendment deletes the
phrase "in any line of commerce," and directs attention only to the merger's
anticompetitive effects in "any section of the country."
In applying section 7 to the proposed merger in Philadelphia, the Court
defined the geographic market as the geographical limits "where, within the
area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be
direct and immediate." '38 Working with this definition in an effort to find "some
fair intermediate delineation"5 3 that would avoid the extremes of either a very
large or very small market, the Court decided that the relevant geographic
market was the four-county area where the banks' offices were located, 40 even
though they competed in a multistate regional market as well.
Whether the deletion of the words "in any line of commerce" from the
1966 amendment will liberalize the Philadelphia approach to determining the
relevant geographic market is as uncertain as its effect upon determining the
relevant product market. The legislative history gives no reason why the words
were deleted. Senator Robertson, the only legislator expressing an opinion on
the matter, thought the deletion was intended to liberalize the Philadelphia
approach by permitting assessment of the overall competitive effect of the
merger.54 This would involve balancing the anticompetitive effect in a local
market-where the bank does most of its retail business--with the precompetitive
effect in a regional market-where the bank services large industrial clients.
Whether the Supreme Court will follow Senator Robertson's interpretation, in
the absence of a more definite expression of congressional intent, is questionable.
(iii) The Mitigating Clause
Though a proposed merger would violate the antitrust standards of para-
graph 5(B), the agency and the courts are allowed to approve it if they find its
anticompetitive effects "are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served." This clause is a revision of the "archaic and inappro-
priate phraseology" that was used in the "banking factors" clause of the original
Bank Merger Act.542 The words "clearly outweighed" emphasize that the com-
petitive factor of the merger is to be given primary'consideration, unlike the
538 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
539 Id. at 361.
540 Id. at 359.
541 112 CONG. REc. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
542 H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
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approach of the 1960 act, which required a mere balancing of the banking
factors against the competitive factor. 43 According to Representative Patman,
"clearly outweighed" means outweighed by the preponderance of the evidence, 5 ".
with the proponents of the merger carrying the burden of proof.54 "The con-
venience and needs of the community to be served" is now the only factor that
may be weighed against the anticompetitive effects of the merger."' The major
question, then, is the meaning of this phrase. One interpretation leaves the
relevant community largely undefined, dependent only upon the regional or even
world-wide areas where the banks transact their business."s ' Another inter-
pretation, finding that borrowers of limited size are usually restricted to a specific
locale in securing banking services, is that the "maintenance of competition in a
local market is of overriding significance." 4 " No clear meaning of "the con-
venience and needs of the community to be served" can be found in the legislative
history. In fact, one of the Representatives said the phrase was "as vague and
undefined a standard as any group of men could possibly dream up." '
(3) Challenging Proposed Mergers
In an effort to tighten the control over banking concentration, paragraph
6 of the 1966 amendment requires the responsible agency to notify the Attorney
General immediately after approving a proposed merger. Except in certain
emergency situations,5 0 the merger cannot be consummated until thirty days
after the date of agency approval. Paragraph 7 (A) provides that any antitrust
action brought by the Attorney General against the approved merger must be
initiated prior to the earliest time that consummation of the merger would be
allowed under paragraph 6, i.e., before the thirty days have elapsed. Commence-
ment of an action results in an automatic injunction, prohibiting effectuation
of the merger pending subsequent judicial approval. It is important to note that
the statute of limitations in paragraph 7 (A) is not all-inclusive. It applies only
to the merger per se and does "not... immunize banks created by such mergers
from future attacks . . . for later conduct which might violate the antitrust
laws." ' The time restriction placed upon Justice Department action challenging
proposed mergers was engendered by a desire to protect consummated mergers
543 112 CONG. Rxc. 2337 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
544 Id. at 2334.
545 Id. at 2333-34.
546 H.R. RaP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
547 112 CONO. REe. 2549-50 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966) (remarks of Senator Robertson).
548 112 CONG. REc. 2352 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966) (remarks of Representative Multer).
549 H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1966) (remarks of Representative
Gonzalez). Representative Weltner stated: "It cannot be argued that this new language
will clarify the bank merger situation. The contrary is true; and if this bill becomes law,
we must await years of litigation to know what we are actually legislating." Id. at 29.
550 Paragraph 6 provides:
If the agency has found that it must act immediately to prevent the probable
failure of one of the banks involved and reports on the competitive factor have
been dispensed with, the transaction may be- consummated immediately upon
approval by the agency. If the agency has advised the Attorney General and the
other two banking agencies of the existence of an emergency requiring expeditious
action and has requested reports on the competitive factors within ten days, the
transaction may not be consummated before the fifth calendar day after the date
of approval by the agency. ...
551 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 494.
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from a "sword of Damocles" that could have theoretically struck them months or
even years after consummation, thereby necessitating demerger, "which is worse
than unscrambling an egg."552 The thirty-day period was believed to be a "brief
but reasonable" time during which the Attorney General could determine whether
or not to bring an action. It has been argued, however, that the provision could
cause a flood of litigation. The Attorney General, faced with this short period
in which to make his determination, might, as a defensive measure, bring action
against many more proposed mergers than would be brought if a proscriptive
period did not exist. The fear has been expressed that this could substantially
disrupt the entire banking industry, due to the act's automatic injunction pro-
vision. 53 Judging from past procedure this fear seems unwarranted. The De-
partment of Justice, even in the absence of a statute of limitations, has always
initiated suit within days after the banking agencies have approved proposed
mergers.
5 5 4
Should the proposed merger be challenged, paragraph 7(A) provides for
de novo judicial review of all the issues."' In the interest of uniformity, para-
graph 7 (B) directs the court to judge the proposed merger under the identical
standards that the agencies are required to apply under paragraph 5. In its
review, the court is directed to "independently make a judgment as to whether
the merger should be approved" ' on the basis of the evidence presented, with-
out giving special consideration to the banking agency's determination of the
issues.5 ' Under the standards of paragraph 5, it seems as though the court would
be required not only to decide questions of law-the antitrust issues-but also
economic questions-the relevant market; it would then have to finally weigh
these factors to reach its conclusion. In the words of the Supreme Court in
Philadelphia, "a value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits
of judicial competence .. . .""' This possible difficulty, although considered in
Congress, was summarily dismissed without discussion.5 " It was, however, to
create jurisdictional problems in subsequent litigation. 65
Paragraph 7 (D) gives the federal banking agency that has approved the
552 Senate Hearings on S. 1698, at 177.
553 House Hearings on S. 1698, at 1044-45.
554 Id. at 173.
555 The purpose of this provision was stated during the hearings:
In a field as complex as merger policy- and more generally antitrust policy -
there is room for differences of opinion. However, any one agency is likely-
if only for reasons of administrative convenience - to develop set views with respect
to such policy. Where a bank regulatory agency and the Department of Justice
differ on a given merger case, the appropriate final arbiter must be the courts-
which provide a forum for the presentation of opposing views. Id. at 520.
556 112 CONG. R-c. 2335 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
557 Ibid.
558 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 '(1963).
559 Representative Widnall stated:
Finally, I wish to comment briefly on the charge that courts will not be able
to effectively assess the banking standards in judicial review of a merger. This is
a subjective admission of deficiency either on the part of the courts or on the
banking agencies. Wherever directed, it is not worthy of acceptance. If the courts
can accept legal evidence about banking from the Justice Department they cer-
tainly can accept banking evidence about banking from the banking agencies.
Courts have the responsibility for reviewing all facets of our laws, not just the
antitrust components . . . . 112 CONG. RIc. 2336 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
560 See text accompanying notes 570-71 infra.
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proposed merger the right to intervene and appear as a party before the court
when suit is brought by the Attorney General. Proponents of this provision argued
that agency interest in a merger does not end with approval, but includes a
public duty to insure that the merger is effected. 6' They also felt that the Attor-
ney General has neither the knowledge nor the experience to speak on the "con-
venience and needs of the community to be served." '562 Those arguing against
the inclusion of paragraph 7(D) stated that the provision "derogates the At-
torney General's authority and responsibility to control Government litigation" on
behalf of the United States, and presents the anomalous situation of the Govern-
ment opposing itself in court."' 3
(4) Operational Effectiveness
Under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, as interpreted in Philadelphia, two
major problems prevented uniform control of bank mergers. The Department
of Justice and the banking agencies viewed mergers from mutually-exclusive
vantage points-the former under the Clayton Act, which requires a considera-
tion of only the competitive factor; the latter under the Bank Merger Act,
which required a consideration not only of the competitive factor, but of the
banking factors as well. A dispute also existed between the two groups as to
the manner of evaluating a merger's competitive effects. 6 The 1966 amend-
ment seeks to solve these problems by unifying the ultimate statutory authority
under which mergers are viewed into one legislative act. This act, while still
allowing the Attorney General to assess and challenge a proposed bank merger
solely on the basis of traditional antitrust laws as in Philadelphia, goes beyond
the Philadelphia decision by permitting the merger to be consummated, even
though it violates the Sherman or Clayton Acts, if its anticompetitive effects
are "clearly outweighed in the public interest . . . in meeting the convenience
and needs of the community to be served."
Unfortunately, one year of regulation under the 1966 amendment shows
that some problems still exist. Due to the less than clear standards in paragraph
5(B), the doctrinal conflict in evaluating the competitive effects of a merger
remains. The Comptroller has continued to emphasize the financial benefits of
proposed mergers, while the Department of Justice has stressed their effects on
competition 6 5 Rather than establishing the promised uniformity, the 1966
amendment has resulted in the banking agencies and the Department of Justice
continuing their "clawing at each other's throats."5 6
Though judicial interpretation of the Bank Merger Act of 1966 has been
limited, the cases that have been decided show, for the most part, a conscientious
effort to end the present conflict and to implement congressional intent. In
561 Bratter, Should the Justice Department Represent the Comptroller?, Banking, Sept.
1965, p. 47.
562 112 CONG. REc. 2347 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
563 H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1966).
564 Waxberg & Robinson, Chaos in Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers: A Need for
Legislative Revision, 82 BANKING; L.J. 377, 381-84 (1965).
565 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 1966, p. 8, col. 2.
566 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1967, p. 10, col. 1.
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United States v. Crocker-Angelo Nat'l Bank,67 the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California rejected the contention of the Justice
Department that the Bank Merger Act of 1966 made no substantial change in
banking antitrust law or in the standards that courts must use in assessing the
legality of bank mergers. The Justice Department argued that the clause "con-
venience and needs of the community to be served" in paragraph 5 (B) was only
a rephrasing of the "failing company" doctrine. This doctrine makes section 7
of the Clayton Act inapplicable to an otherwise illegal acquisition of a com-
petitor "which is in such straits that the termination of the enterprise and the
dispersal of its assets seem inevitable unless a rival proprietor shall acquire and
continue the business."56  The court believed this interpretation "absurd" ' and
ruled that even if the bank to be merged was not a "failing company" the trans-
action could still be upheld under the standard of paragraph 5(B). The court
also faced a jurisdictional problem. Paragraph 7 (A) requires de novo judicial
review of all the issues presented. The court found no problem in hearing evi-
dence on the antitrust question-the legal issue-but it balked when faced with
evidence to determine the convenience and needs of the community.
No difficulty would be presented here so far as reviewing de novo the
first of these determinations for this court has traditionally adjudged whether
mergers have anti-competitive effects. But the problem of reviewing the
second determination by the Comptroller, namely, whether the proposed
transaction is outweighed in the public interest, and whether it meets the
convenience and needs of the community, is plainly and unquestionably a
legislative or administrative determination of a type which this court, as a
constitutional court, is prohibited from deciding.
5 70
Rather than hold this provision of the act unconstitutional, the court interpreted
de novo review to mean not an independent judicial decision based upon facts
presented, but a review of the banking agency's decision to determine if it is
supported by the evidence. 7 1 Finally, the court outlined what specific facts are
required from the Comptroller or other banking agency in order to make judicial
review effective: (1) "what he finds to be the convenience and needs of the
community"; (2) "what he considers will be the effect of the merger thereon";
(3) "how and by what means he weighs these effects as against the anticompeti-
tive effects of the transaction"; (4) "assuming that the merger has the effect upon
potential competition which the Government claims,... whether... that effect
would be outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the trans-
action in meeting the interest and convenience of the community to be served.""
In United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 3 the Department of Justice
attempted to attack a bank merger solely under section 7 of the Clayton Act-
the successful technique of the Philadelphia case. The United States District
567 5 TRADE REG. REP. 71898 '(N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 1966).
568 Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961).
569 5 TRaDE REG. REP. 1 71898, at 83157.
570 Id. at 83154 (Footnote omitted.)
571 Id. at 83154-56.
572 Id. at 83159.
573 259 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1966), rev'd sub nom. United States v. First City Nat'l
Bank, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4303 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1967).
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, however, stating that the pur-
pose of the 1966 amendment was to overrule Philadelphia, ruled that "the only
suit open to Justice to enjoin a bank merger lies solely within the ambit of...
[the Bank Merger Act of 1966]."" '
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank,5 ' the Nashville case, substantiated the
holding in Crocker-Angelo by stating that paragraph 5(B) of the 1966 amend-
ment was not a mere rewording of the "failing company" doctrine, but established
new standards to be used in assessing the legality of bank mergers.5 76 The court
also ruled that the banking agency's findings regarding the convenience and needs
of the community "should not be disturbed unless they are unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence." '577
The decision in United States v. First City Nat'l Bank,57 the Houston case,
shows an obvious disregard for congressional intent. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held not only that the Attorney General
must prove the anticompetitive effects of the merger, but also that he must prove
that these effects are not outweighed by the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served.57
The culmination of these lower court opinions is the decision in United
States v. First City Natl Bank,8 ' in which the Supreme Court answered the
574 Id. at 377.
575 260 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
576 Id. at 875.
577 Id. at 874.
578 5 TADE REG. REP. 1 71970 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1966), rev'd, 35 U.S.L. WExa 4303
(U.S. Mar. 28, 1967).
579 Id. at 83434.
580 35 U.S.L. WEEx 4303 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1967). This case was a consolidated appeal of
United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 5 TRADE R G. REP. 11 71970 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1966)
and United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 259 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1966). During argl-
ment before the Court two main questions emerged: what is the meaning of the phrase "review
de novo" in paragraph 7(A) of the 1966 amendment, and who must assume the burden of
proof when a bank merger is challenged for its alleged anticompetitive effects.
"Familiar with the phrase 'trial de novo,' the Justices could not grasp the significance
of the Act's use of 'review de novo.'" 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3297 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1967). Counsel
for the parties to the litigation suggested three conflicting interpretations. The Department
of Justice interpreted the phrase to mean "that there is to be a complete new trial of all
the issues in the court action." Ibid. When Mr. Justice Brennan asked how much weight
was to be given, under the Department's interpretation, to the determinations of the banking
agencies, the assistant Attorney-General stated:
To the administrative determination as such, none. To expertise as to par-
ticular issues, I don't think there is a single answer .... We are not urging that
the expertise of the agencies . . . is to be disregarded. They have an opportunity
by statute to appear as parties in the court procteding. They can appear as wit-
nesses and give testimony treated as expert testimony. Id. at 3298.
Counsel for the banks involved interpreted "review de novo" to mean a relitigation of all
issues of fact de novo and an acceptance "in the absence of clear abuse of discretion, [of]
the judgment of the Comptroller of the Currency as to whether the proven anticompetitive
effects are in fact clearly outweighed by other public-interest factors." Id. at 3297.
[C]ounsel for the Comptroller found both these interpretations, while compatible
with the words "de novo," to conflict with the concept of a "review." The Comp-
troller would have the court accept all agency findings supported by substantial
evidence and would give effect to the words "de novo" by letting both parties
introduce new -facts in the district court. Ibid.
Regarding the question of burden of proof, the Department of Justice believed that
Congress intended the, Bank Merger Act's "convenience and needs" standard as
an affirmative defense to be proven by the banks once the government had shown
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vexing procedural questions raised by the Bank Merger Act of 1966: the prob-
lems of pleading and burden of proof, and the meaning of "review de novo."
In the Provident case the district court ruled that the Government's complaint,
alleging solely a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, was defective because
it failed to state that the action was brought under the Bank Merger Act. In
overruling the district court's opinion in Provident, the Supreme Court held
that the Bank Merger Act of 1966 did not affect the applicability of the Sherman
or Clayton Acts to bank mergers.
There is no indication that an action challenging a merger on the ground
of its anticompetitive effects is bottomed on the Bank Merger Act rather
than on the antitrust laws. . . . [T]he Government's failure to base the
actions on the Bank Merger Act of 1966 does not constitute a defect in its
pleadings. Nor is the Government's failure to mention the Bank Merger
Act fatal .... [A]n action challenging a bank merger .. .is [to be] brought
under the antitrust laws. Once an action is brought under the antitrust
laws, the Bank Merger Act provides a new defense or justification to the
merger's proponents - "that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
merger are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect
of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community
to be served.SsOA
The Court went on to overrule the district court decision in the Houston case
by holding that the burden of proving this new "defense or justification" rested
with the banks seeking to merge. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court,
observed that this "is the general rule where one claims the benefits of an
exception to the prohibition of a statute.
'
)SSB
In deciding the jurisdictional problem- the meaning of "review de novo"
as it applies to the "convenience and needs" standard in paragraph 5(B) of
the 1966 amendment - the Court disagreed with the holding in Crocker-Angelo
that "review de novo" means a review of the banking agency's decision to deter-
mine if it is supported by the evidence. The Court stated:
This language does not express the conventional standard, e.g., [sic] whether
the agency's action is supported by substantial evidence .... Traditionally
in antitrust actions involving regulated industries, the courts have never
given presumptive weight to a prior agency decision . . . . ["Review de
novo"] mean[s] to us that the court should make an independent determina-
tion of the issues....
The courts may find the Comptroller's reasons persuasive or well nigh
conclusive. But it is the court's judgment, not the Comptroller's, that finally
determines whether the merger is legal. That was the practice prior to the
1966 Act; and we cannot find a purpose on the part of Congress to change
a violation of the Section 7 Clayton Act standards incorporated into the Bank
Merger Act. Ibid.
Counsel for the banks, however, under the questioning of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Black, expressed the opinion that the entire burden of proof -the anticompetitive effect of
the merger as well as the fact that this effect is not outweighed by the convenience and needs
of the community to be served-must be borne by the Department of Justice. 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 3297-302 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1967).
580A 35 U.S.L. WEEKc 4303, 4304 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1967).
580B Id. at 4305.
[June 1967]
the rule. This conclusion does not raise serious constitutional questions by
making the courts perform nonjudicial tasks. The "rule of reason," long
prevalent in the antitrust field.., has been administered by the courts....
We see no problems in bringing... [the "convenience and needs" standard]
into the area of judicial competence. There are no constitutional problems
here not present in the "rule of reason" cases."'e 0
In deciding these procedural questions the Court made clear that it was
reserving its opinion on any substantive questions raised by the 1966 amend-
ment."' °D In doing so, it left undetermined the important question of whether
the omission of the Clayton Act phrase "in any line of commerce" from para-
graph 5(B) of the 1966 amendment in any way liberalizes the Philadelphia
approach for determining the relevant geographic or product markets in assessing
the anticompetitive effect of a proposed bank merger.
c. The Future of the Bank Merger Act of 1966
Over 175 years ago, Alexander Hamilton made the following observation:
[W]here there are a number of actors who may have . .. different degrees
and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there
has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose
account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.58'
This statement clearly applies to the present unsettled state of federal bank
merger regulation, which has culminated in two departments within the Execu-
tive branch of the Government battling each other in court. The federal banking
agencies and the Department of Justice, however, are not solely to blame for
this conflict. Its roots extend to the vague standards embodied in the Bank
Merger Act of 1960, the infamous decision of the Supreme Court in Philadelphia,
and the standards and procedures of questionable utility in the Bank Merger Act
of 1966. Even after passage of the 1966 amendment, the bank merger conflict
seems to be far from resolved. Experience has shown that, due to the equally
strong political influence of the banking industry and the Department of Justice,
the enactment of legislation establishing definite standards in this area is doubtful.
The burden, therefore, lies with the judiciary. The Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. First City Nat'l Bank 2 has answered some important ques-
tions, but others - particularly the interpretation of the 1966 amendment's
substantive standards - remain unsettled. The fact remains, however, that
the ultimate effectiveness of the act, notwithstanding the establishment of clear
judicially defined standards and procedures, depends upon a conscientious
effort by both the banking agencies and the Department of Justice to achieve
uniformity of opinion in assessing the competitive effects of bank mergers. If
this is not accomplished, the Bank Merger Act of 1966, like its predecessor,
is doomed to failure.
5800 Id. at 4305-06.
580D Id. at 4306 n.1.
581 Tn FEDERALIST No. 70, at 460 '(Modern Library ed. 1941).
582 35 U.S.L. WEEx 4303 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1967).
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C. Bank Holding Companies
In addition to the bank merger device, unified control of banking interests
may also be achieved by bringing banks under the control of a holding company.
The major difference between the two methods lies in the fact that mergers
are accomplished by asset acquisition, whereas holding companies gain control
over banks by acquiring their stock. For this reason it has been argued that
anticompetitive bank acquisitions by holding companies have always been subject
to section 7 of the Clayton Act. 3 The Clayton Act, however, was not successfully
used in this regard until 1953;..4 and aside from its recent limited use, the history
of federal regulation of bank holding companies parallels the ineffectiveness of
attempts to regulate bank mergers. s8
1. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
In an attempt to end ineffective control over bank holding companies,
Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956."'0 This legislation
was directed against two major problems: the "unrestricted ability" of bank
holding companies to concentrate commercial banking facilities in a specific area
under unified control and management; and the combination of both banking
and nonbanking interests within the control of a single enterprise, which violated
the principle that banking institutions should not engage in unrelated businesses,"'
lest the funds of depositors of the banking affiliate be used to assist affiliated
nonbanldng interests that are financially unsound.ssA The act defined a "bank
holding company" as any "company" that owns at least twenty-five percent of
the voting shares of two or more banks. -Included within the definition of "com-
pany" were corporations, business trusts, and similar organizations. The act
583 112 CONG. REc. 11793-94 (daily ed. June 6, 1966).
584 Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953).
585 Limited control over bank holding companies was achieved under the Banking Act
of 1933. 48 Stat. 162, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 221-503 (Supp. 1966). This act gave the Federal Reserve Board authority to regulate
bank holding companies only if one of the banking affiliates of the holding company was a
member of the Federal Reserve System and if the holding company voted the stock which
it owned in such a bank. In the limited situations where the Board did have authority, the
act was of little help in controlling banking concentration:
[Tihe regulation to which a holding company . . . [was] subject under the 1933
legislation . . . [was] aimed primarily at protecting the soundness of affiliated banks
rather than controlling the holding companies with respect to either expansion
or their ability to engage in nonbanking business. LAwsm, GROUP BANKING 176(1961).
In 1954 only 18 bank holding companies were subject to the act's provisions. This situation
led Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin, Jr. to state:
Existing provisions of law, originally enacted in the Banking Act of 1933, have
proved entirely inadequate to deal with the special problems presented by bank
holding companies. It has been, and still is, the Board's view -that additional
legislation is essential to deal effectively with these problems.
S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2483; Legislation, 31 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 146, 148-49 (1956).
586 70 Stat. 133 (1956), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. §§
1841-49 (Supp. 1966).
587 S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2483.
587A 111 CONG. REc. 24034 '(daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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required that all bank holding companies register with the Federal Reserve
Board and prohibited formation of a bank holding company without the
Board's approval. Board approval was also required when a bank holding com-
pany sought to acquire a bank's voting shares in an amount that would result in
the holding company controlling more than five percent of the bank's total
voting stock, when a bank holding company sought to acquire substantially all
the assets of a bank, or when two or more bank holding companies sought to
merge or consolidate. Bank holding companies were prohibited from engaging
in any business other than banking and were required to divest themselves of
all nonbanking interests, except for holdings of five percent or less of the stock
of nonbanking corporations.
Speaking for many members of Congress, Representative Patman stated that
although the Bank Holding Company Act was "an excellent piece of ground-
breaking legislation. . . [it] was not designed to stand the test of time."5"
He based his views on the fact that in order to assure passage of the act, provisions
had been included that exempted particular groups or organizations from the act's
coverage, even though they were de facto bank holding companies." 9 The act
exempted certain companies, and their affiliates, that were registered under
the Investment Company Act of 1940;.9 long-term nonbusiness trusts, and
charitable, religious, and educational organizations; and companies that con-
trolled only one bank.
The act's antitrust provision differed significantly from the vague antitrust
provisions in the Bank Merger Act of 1960. A savings clause was included that
made it clear that any anticompetitive conduct of a bank holding company,
although approved by the Federal Reserve Board and performed pursuant to
the act's provisions, could nonetheless be attacked under the Sherman or Clayton
Acts.
2. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1966
Disapproval of the 1956 act's exemptions was repeatedly voiced by the
Federal Reserve Board5 9' and echoed by the Department of Justice." 2 Congress
agreed with them that it was time, in the interest of "justice and fairness,"59
to remove the exemptions, which should never have been included. 94 The ex-
istence of exempt de facto bank holding companies violated the basic principle
that "banking and nonbanking activities should be kept apart."5 5 Consequently,
588 Id. at 24022-23. In signing the Bank Holding Company Act into law, President
Eisenhower remarked, "[The exemptions and other special provisions will require the further
attention of Congress." Hearings on S. 2253, S. 2418, and H.R. 7371 Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371].
589 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 29.
590 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 52 (1964).
591 111 CONG. Rac. 24024 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965); Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371,
at 43.
592 112 CoNG. REc. 11792 (daily ed. June 6, 1966).
593 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 28.
594 111 CONG. REc. 24035 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
595 Id. at 24036.
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in 1966 Congress enacted an amendment.. to "improve and perfect"5 9 the
original act by broadening its coverage."'
a. The Registered Investment Company Exemption
The 1956 act excluded from its coverage any company, including all its
affiliates, that prior to May 15, 1955, had registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940. This exemption applied as long as these companies or
affiliates did not directly own twenty-five percent or more of the stock of two
or more banks. Congress believed that the Investment Company Act, as ad-
ministered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, provided adequate reg-
ulation of such companies, so that the additional regulatory authority of the
Federal Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act would be un-
necessary. 99 Congress also believed it would be impossible for any bank holding
company to utilize this provision as a means of escaping regulation under the
Bank Holding Company Act, since the act applied only to companies that had
registered prior to its passage."' 0 Both assumptions of Congress proved to be
incorrect. The purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act differed from that
of the Investment Company Act. The former sought "to control the expansion
and operation of bank holding companies in furtherance of Federal bank reg-
ulatory policy," '' whereas the latter was primarily concerned with the pro-
tection of investors in securities of investment companies.0 2 Chairman Cohen
of the Securities and Exchange Commission admitted that the Commission had
no "special expertise or particular experience"6 ' in effectively carrying out the
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act. Besides these administrative
difficulties, the exemption contained a major loophole. Although prior to May
15, 1955, only 275 companies were registered under the Investment Company
Act,
0 4
other companies could... take advantage of this exemption to evade regu-
lation under the act, simply by acquiring 5 percent of the stock of any one of
... [the] investment companies registered before May 15, 1955 .... As an
"affiliate" of a registered investment company, they would be exempt as
long as they avoided "direct" ownership of 25 percent or more of the stock
of two or more banks'0
596 80 Stat. 236, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-49 (Supp. 1966).
597 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 28.
598 H.R. REP. No. 534, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 '(1965).
599 S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2487.
600 Ibid.
601 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 39.
602 Ibid.
603 Ibid. In reporting H.R. 7371, which after amendment became the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1966, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated:
This exemption was granted because it was felt that regulation under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 would provide adequate protection. However, ex-
perience has demonstrated that the SEC's authority under the Investment Com-
pany Act does not in any way substitute for the type of control provided under
the Bank Holding Company Act from the point of view of banking policies. S.
REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
604 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 38.
605 Ibid.
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The restriction on the percentage of "direct" ownership could easily be avoided
if the holding company formed a subsidiary corporation to control the banks
acquired."'8 In this manner the affiliate of a registered investment company could
gain control over every bank in the United States without being subject to any
type of federal regulation." 7 This was possible since the regulations of the In-
vestment Company Act applied only to dealings between the registered invest-
ment company and its affiliates, and not to dealings between affiliates and their
subsidiaries.08 Although at the time the 1966 amendment was enacted, only
one company had taken advantage of this loophole,0 9 Congress repealed the
exemption for registered investment companies and their affiliates because of
a fear that more companies might take advantage of it in the future.610
b. One-Bank Holding Companies
In determining whether to remove the exemption contained in the 1956
act for holding companies that controlled only one bank, Congress heard cogent
arguments from two factions. Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board
was in favor of removing the exemption in order to avoid possible abuses. He
believed abuses could occur where a bank's customer would be required to do
business with the holding company's nonbanking interests as a condition to
receiving banking services, or where profitable extensions of credit would be
denied by a bank to competitors of the bank's nonbanking fellow subsidiaries.6"
Other proponents of removing this exemption stated that it presently left un-
regulated 341 bank holding companies in 44 states612 with deposits of approxi-
mately 14 billion dollars.6 ' Those in favor of retaining the exemption argued
that its repeal would be unjustified since no showing of actual abuse had been
made.1 ' Rather, they believed the exemption was "consistent with the primary
purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act" of maintaining "independent com-
petitive banking." 1 ' Senator Robertson stated that
repeal of the exemption would make it more difficult for individuals to
continue to hold or to form small independent banks. The repeal of the
exemption would, therefore, be likely to cause the forced sale of large
606 Id. at 40.
607 Id. at 39.
608 Id. at 38.
609 112 CONG. REc. 11792 (daily ed. June 6, 1966). This company was Financial General
Corporation, which, through subsidiary corporations, owned from 14% to majority interests
in 26 banks located in 6 different states and the District of Columbia. Seventeen of these
banks were acquired subsequent to passage of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. In
addition, Financial General also owned controlling interests in several nonbanking businesses.
Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 38; S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1966).
610 112 CONG. REc. 11792 (daily ed. June 6, 1966).
611 Statement of William Mchesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, on S. 2353, S. 2418, and H.R. 7371, March 16, 1966,
52 F D. RESERVE BULL. 330 (1966).
612 111 CONG. REc. 24026 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
613 Id. at 24043; Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 59.
614 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 194.
615 Id. at 142.
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numbers of banks and . . . a diminution of competition rather than an
increase of competition. 16
The basis for the difficulty mentioned by the Senator lies in the management
structure of small country banks, many of which are owned and controlled by
a single person or family. 1 Many of these people own the bank by means of
a holding company in order to take advantage of an eighty-five percent dividend-
received tax credit on dividends received by the holding company."' However,
if this holding company is owned by five persons or less, it must engage in some
nonbanking business in order to avoid tax penalties that are imposed upon "per-
sonal holding companies." 1 9 Since removal of the exemption would force
divestiture of the nonbanking interests, the "personal holding company" tax
penalties would immediately be imposed. The result would be that the small
independent bankers could no longer carry on a profitable banking business, and
most of their banks would be absorbed by larger financial institutions. 2
Persuaded by these arguments, the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency reported adversely on the proposal to remove the one-bank holding com-
pany exemption,6"' and it was retained in the present law. However, in order
to minimize the possibility that the banking affiliate of a bank holding company
would make imprudent loans to, or investments in, the holding company's
nonbanking affiliates, Congress broadened the coverage of section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act"z to prohibit any insured bank from extending credit by
means of loans or investments totaling more than ten percent of its capital and
surplus to any one affiliate, or more than twenty percent to all affiliates. Prior
to this amendment, section 23A had applied only to banks that were members
of the Federal Reserve System.
c. Long Tem Trusts and Charitable Institutions
In deciding to exclude charitable, religious, and educational organizations
from the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency stated:
The exclusion of religious and other charitable organizations is similar to
that granted to such organizations under the Internal Revenue Code. The
committee's attention was invited to at least one case where a bona fide
religious organization controls two or more banks as well as nonbanking
interests as an incident to its main purpose. In the opinion of the com-
mittee, even though these incidental business activities are organized for
the primary purpose of profit, the very nature of the religious organization
itself precludes the possibility of violating the spirit of this bill.
6 23
616 112 CONG. RYec. 11792 '(daily ed. June 6, 1966). For additional arguments on this
point, see Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 277-82.
617 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 139.
618 Id. at 140-41.
619 Id. at 140.
620 Id. at 141.
621 S. Rnp. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
622 48 Stat. 183 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1964), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 371c (Supp. 1966).




Ten years later, however, the feelings of the Committee members had changed
radically:
The committee reached the conclusion that it was not consistent with
the basic policy of the Bank Holding Company Act to permit an exemption
from the broad public purposes of that act for long-term trusts and religious,
charitable and educational institutions. This conclusion does not, of course,
indicate any reflection whatever on the desirability or value of such institu-
tions or of their purposes and objectives. It simply means that the basis for
special treatment of such institutions, for example in the field of tax exemp-
tion, does not warrant exemption from statutes carrying out broad public
policy purposes, such as the Bank Holding Company Act, any more than it
would support an exemption from the antitrust laws or the Interstate Com-
merce Act.
6 24
The congressional hearings and debates on the value of retaining this exemp-
tion centered around one organization. This was the perpetual testamentary
trust created under the will of the late Alfred I. duPont.12 5 The duPont trust
controlled over thirty banks within the State of Florida as well as various in-
dustries, railroads, land, and stockholdings, with an aggregate value of over one
billion dollars.626 The will provided that substantially all the trust income be
distributed to Mr. duPont's widow for her life and then to the duPont Founda-
tion, a charitable organization, in perpetuity.62 Although the principal bene-
ficiary had irrevocably assigned twelve percent of her income from the trust to
the Foundation,62 and although after her death the entire income would be
used strictly for charitable purposes, Congress believed 'it best to eliminate the
exemption that allowed this de facto bank holding company and other similar
organizations to control both banking and nonbanking interests. According to
Senator Morse, "the point of the Bank Holding Company Act is not who gets
the money but who holds the power - and how that power should be wielded." 2 9
Speaking for repeal of the exemption, Vice-Chairman Balderson of the Federal
Reserve Board stated:
The trust device can be used to achieve control for an indefinite period,
and the potentiality for abuse through long-term trusts is just as great as
in the case of the more normal forms of business organizations now covered
by the act's definition of "company."
630
In repealing this exemption, however, it'was made clear that long term trusts
624 112 CoNG. Rc. 11791 (daily ed. June 6, 1966).
625 The bill which ultimately became the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966, H.R.
7371, before substantial amendment by the Senate, appears to have been introduced primarily,
if not solely, as a direct attack upon the holding company activities of the duPont trust. See
H.R. REP. No. 534, 89th C6ng., 1st Sess. 4 (1965). During debate in the House the bill
was criticized as special punitive legislation, 111 CoNo. REc. 22753-55 (daily ed. Sept. 13,
1965), and recommendations were made that it be expanded to cover all the then exempt
de facto bank holding companies. Id. at 22753.
626 Senate Hearings on H.R. 7371, at 30.
627 Id. at 446.
628 Ibid.
629 Id. at 31.
630 Hearings on H.R. 7371 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
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or charitable, religious or educational organizations would not be required to
divest themselves of charitable hospitals or tax-exempt educational institutions,
because these publicly beneficial activities would not constitute "nonbanking in-
terests" as defined by the 1966 amendment.63" '
d. The Antitrust Provision
Although the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966 has broadened the 1956
act's coverage to include previously exempt de facto bank holding companies,
it emasculated the 1956 act's savings clause, which made anticompetitive conduct
of a bank holding company subject the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In its
stead, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966 adopted the liberal antitrust
standards and procedures of the Bank Merger Act of 1966."' This significant
change was neither contemplated by any of the original bills introduced to amend
the Bank Holding Company Act,6"' nor was it discussed during the committee
hearings.63 Rather, it was added to the bill by the Senate Banking and Cur-
rency Committee after hearings had been concluded.633 Senator Bennett, sponsor
of the provision, speciously argued that it was necessary "in the interest of uni-
formity and equity," since a similar provision had been included in the Bank
Merger Act of 1966.66 Vigorous arguments were advanced against his position.
The Department of Justice believed that the presence of such a provision in the
recently amended Bank Merger Act was no reason for its inclusion in the Bank
Holding Company Act.
The position of bank holding companies that have made acquisitions is not
at all similar to the position of banks that have merged, for prior to 1963
merging banks may reasonably have believed that bank mergers were not
subject to the Clayton Act, but bank holding companies could not have
believed that they were free from antitrust scrutiny. Moreover, since stock
acquisitions are involved, an antitrust suit cannot produce difficult "un-
scrambling of assets" problems, as allegedly occurred when bank mergers
were attacked.63
7
Senator Hart, also opposing inclusion of this provision, noted that while many
members of Congress believed that bank mergers should be assessed by a more
liberal antitrust standard than is applied to other types of industrial mergers,
there always has been a clear congressional understanding that "all bank holding
company acquisitions are governed by the antitrust laws." '638 Senator Hart rightly
believed that the historic congressional intent of "unqualified application of the
antitrust laws" to bank holding companies should not be changed without a
showing of substantial desirability.6 9
631 112 CONG. REG. 11791 (daily ed. June 6, 1966).
632 Compare f 4-8 of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 8, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828c
(Supp. 1966), with §§ 7(c), 11 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 237,
240, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1842, 1849 (Supp. 1966).
633 112 CONG. Rae. 11841 (daily ed. June 6, 1966).
634 Id. at 11841-42.
635 Id. at 11842.
636 Id. at 11804.
637 Id. at 11794.
638 Id. at 11842
639 Ibid.
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The arguments presented by the opponents of this provision are persuasive.
Since, unlike the chaos in the bank merger field, no serious dispute has ever arisen
concerning the applicability or wisdom of strict antitrust regulation of bank
holding companies, the change promulgated by the 1966 amendment can only






640 Text accompanying notes 224-355 supra.
641 Text accompanying notes 1-191 supra.
642 Text accompanying notes 192-223, 356-421 supra.
643 Text accompanying notes 422-639 supra.
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